

WEBSITE AND MOBILE APP ACCESSIBILITY UNDER THE ADA

Excerpted from the forthcoming 2023 update to Chapter 48
(Assessing and Limiting Liability Through Policies, Procedures and Website Audits)
E-Commerce and Internet Law: Legal Treatise with Forms 2d Edition
A 5-volume legal treatise by Ian C. Ballon (Thomson/West Publishing, www.IanBallon.net)

(These excerpts are unrevised page proofs for the current update and may contain errors. Please email the author at ballon@gtlaw.com for a complimentary copy of the final published version.)

INTERNET AND MOBILE LAW AND LITIGATION TRENDS

SNAP INC.

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networks is set forth in chapter 51.

48.06[3] Challenges in Controlling Corporate Communications

Network access makes it easier for employees to steal or unintentionally divulge trade secrets or other company communications, which ultimately could be circulated to third-parties or posted online. Companies likewise run into problems when employees post confidential information on securities bulletin boards and chat rooms, potentially in violation of federal securities laws.¹ Efforts to curb these problems (as well as even mundane employment disputes), in turn, may lead to the creation of employee gripe sites (much in the same way that third parties may create consumer criticism sites).²

Employee education, policies and procedures should attempt to limit the risk of unauthorized corporate disclosures. Security measures such as internal use of encryption and (where necessary) email monitoring also may help address the problem. A number of suggested internal policies are considered in chapter 58 in connection with intranet policies and extranet agreements.³ Businesses also should adopt a more gentle approach to resolving both internal and external disputes, to avoid such conflicts spilling over into cyberspace.⁴

48.06[4] Website and Mobile App Accessibility Under the Americans with Disabilities Act and Related State Laws

Websites and mobile apps deemed to service (or in some circuits, to constitute) *places of public accommodation* under Title III of the Americans With Disabilities Act¹ (ADA) must be accessible to those with disabilities, including people with

[Section 48.06[3]]

¹See *supra* § 32.04[5].

²See *supra* §§ 6.14[5], 7.07[10], 7.12, 9.13, 12.03[3], 12.05[4]; *infra* chapter 57.

³See *infra* §§ 58.10 to 58.12.

⁴See *infra* chapter 57.

[Section 48.06[4]]

¹42 U.S.C.A. § 12182(a). The ADA “as a whole is intended ‘to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.’” *Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring*, 527 U.S. 581, 589 (1999), quoting 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(b)(1).

impaired hearing or vision, to avoid liability under the Act. The ADA covers three main types of discrimination, each of which is addressed in one of the statute's three main subchapters: Title I prohibits discrimination in private employment; Title II prohibits discrimination by public entities (state or local governments); and Title III prohibits discrimination by a *place of public accommodation*, which is

Title III “advances that goal by providing that ‘[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations of any place of public accommodations by any person who owns, leases (or leases to) or operates a place of public accommodation.’” *Robles v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC*, 913 F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir.) (quoting 42 U.S.C.A. § 12182(a)), *cert. denied*, 140 S. Ct. 122 (2019). Discrimination under the Act encompasses the denial of the opportunity, by the disabled, to participate in programs or services, or providing them separate but unequal goods or services. *See* 42 U.S.C.A. § 12182(a). It also provides that a place of public accommodation engages in unlawful discrimination if it fails to “take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated, or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services.” *Id.* § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii); *see also id.* § 12103(1) (defining *auxiliary aids and services*); 28 C.F.R. § 36.303(a) (“A public accommodation shall take those steps that may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the public accommodation can demonstrate that taking those steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden, *i.e.*, significant difficulty or expense.”). U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) regulations further require that a public accommodation “furnish appropriate auxiliary aids and services where necessary to ensure *effective communication* with individuals with disabilities.” 28 C.F.R. § 36.303(c)(1) (emphasis added); *see also Bragdon v. Abbott*, 524 U.S. 624, 646 (1998) (holding that DOJ’s administrative guidance on the ADA is entitled to deference); *Robles v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC*, 913 F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir.) (same), *cert. denied*, 140 S. Ct. 122 (2019).

The DOJ defines *auxiliary aids and services* to include “accessible electronic and information technology” or “other effective methods of making visually delivered materials available to individuals who are blind or have low vision.” 28 C.F.R. § 36.303(b)(2); *Robles*, 913 F.3d at 904-05 (holding that Domino’s website and app constituted auxiliary aids and services that Domino’s, as a place of public accommodation, was required to make accessible to those who are blind); *Reed v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc.*, Case No. CV 17–3877–MWF (SKx), 2017 WL 4457508, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2017) (holding that although “the regulations emphasize that . . . no specific auxiliary aid or service is required in any given situation, whatever auxiliary aid or service the public accommodation chooses to provide must be effective.”).

a private entity that constitutes one or more of the twelve statutorily enumerated commercial places available to the public.² Website and mobile app accessibility typically arises under Title III, although, as discussed later in this section, a small number of suits have been brought under Title II.

Title III does not mandate accessibility for all virtual locations, but it has been widely held applicable to websites and apps that service places of *public accommodation*, which is broadly defined under the statute to include locations that offer goods or services, facilities, stores, restaurants, hotels, and other places in the physical world. Where there is not a sufficient nexus between a website or app and a place in the physical world that qualifies as a place of public accommodation, an ADA Title III suit may not be maintained in a majority of circuits. A minority, however, have held that a website or app itself may constitute a place of public accommodation and therefore be subject to the ADA even if it does not service or have a nexus with a physical world location. Some state laws also potentially may require that websites and apps be accessible. Even where a business may not be legally required to do so, many have chosen to make their websites and mobile apps accessible to the deaf (through closed captioning) and blind (by making their sites compatible with screen reader software), in the interest of good customer relations.

Certain consumer privacy notices under the California Consumer Privacy Act (including Privacy Policies and notices by businesses to consumers of collection of their personal information and notices by businesses to consumers of their right to opt-out of collection of their personal information and notices of financial incentives) likewise must be “reasonably accessible to consumers with disabilities.”³

Federal government websites must be accessible to

²*A.L. by and through D.L. v. Walt Disney Parks & Resorts US, Inc.*, 900 F.3d 1270, 1289 (11th Cir. 2018).

³Cal. Code Regs. §§ 999.305(a)(2)(d), 999.306(a)(2)(d), 999.307(a)(2)(d), 999.308(a)(2)(d). The regulation provides that “[f]or notices provided online, the business shall follow generally recognized industry standards, such as the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines, version 2.1 of June 5, 2018, from the World Wide Web Consortium, incorporated herein by reference.” *Id.* Those guidelines may be accessed at <https://www.w3.org/TR/2018/REC-WCAG21-20180605/>

“In other contexts, the business shall provide information on how a consumer with a disability may access the notice in an alternative format.”

individuals with disabilities,⁴ but the ADA, which was enacted in 1990, neither expressly covers nor expressly excludes private websites.

To state a claim for an ADA violation, a plaintiff must allege (1) that the plaintiff is disabled within the meaning of the ADA, (2) that the defendant owns, leases, or operates a place of public accommodation, and (3) that the defendant discriminated against the plaintiff by denying the plaintiff a full and equal opportunity to enjoy the services the defendant provides.⁵ A majority of circuit courts that have analyzed the definition of a place of *public accommodation*,⁶ including the

Cal. Code Regs. §§ 999.305(a)(2)(d), 999.306(a)(2)(d), 999.307(a)(2)(d), 999.308(a)(2)(d); *see generally supra* § 26.13A (analyzing the CCPA and its applicability).

⁴29 U.S.C.A. § 794(d).

⁵*E.g., Camarillo v. Carrols Corp.*, 518 F.3d 153, 156 (2d Cir. 2008).

⁶The statute defines a place of public accommodation as the following (if they affect commerce):

- (A) an inn, hotel, motel, or other place of lodging, except for an establishment located within a building that contains not more than five rooms for rent or hire and that is actually occupied by the proprietor of such establishment as the residence of such proprietor;
- (B) a restaurant, bar, or other establishment serving food or drink;
- (C) a motion picture house, theater, concert hall, stadium, or other place of exhibition or entertainment;
- (D) an auditorium, convention center, lecture hall, or other place of public gathering;
- (E) a bakery, grocery store, clothing store, hardware store, shopping center, or other sales or rental establishment;
- (F) a laundromat, dry-cleaner, bank, barber shop, beauty shop, travel service, shoe repair service, funeral parlor, gas station, office of an accountant or lawyer, pharmacy, insurance office, professional office of a health care provider, hospital, or other service establishment;
- (G) a terminal, depot, or other station used for specified public transportation;
- (H) a museum, library, gallery, or other place of public display or collection;
- (I) a park, zoo, amusement park, or other place of recreation;
- (J) a nursery, elementary, secondary, undergraduate, or postgraduate private school, or other place of education;
- (K) a day care center, senior citizen center, homeless shelter, food bank, adoption agency, or other social service center establishment; and
- (L) a gymnasium, health spa, bowling alley, golf course, or other place of exercise or recreation.

Third, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, have held that it must be a physical location.⁷ By contrast, the First and Second Circuits construe the term more expansively to cover services offered only remotely (which is an interpretation cited favorably in *dicta* in two Seventh Circuit opinions) by reference to the nature of a travel agency and insurance office (which, unlike websites and apps, are expressly enumerated in the statutory definition of a place of public accommodation⁸).

42 U.S.C.A. § 12181(7).

⁷See *Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp.*, 145 F.3d 601, 612–14 (3d Cir. 1998) (rejecting the reasoning in *Carparts Distribution Center, Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler’s Association of New England, Inc.*, 37 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 1994), and holding that the term *public accommodation* and the list of examples in the statute were not ambiguous and did not refer to non-physical access); *Magee v. Coca-Cola Refreshments USA, Inc.*, 833 F.3d 530, 534 & n.23 (5th Cir. 2016) (concluding that vending machines are not places of public accommodation because the ADA definition of *public accommodation* only includes actual physical spaces open to the public; “In following the Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits, we acknowledge our departure from the precedents of the First, Second, and Seventh Circuits, which have interpreted the term “public accommodation” to extend beyond physical places.”), *cert. denied*, 138 S. Ct. 55 (2017); *Parker v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.*, 121 F.3d 1006, 1010-15 (6th Cir. 1997) (“The clear connotation of the words in § 12181(7) is that a public accommodation is a physical place.”); *Earll v. eBay, Inc.*, 599 F. App’x 695, 696 (9th Cir. 2015) (affirming dismissal of plaintiff’s ADA claim based on *Weyer*; “Because eBay’s services are not connected to any ‘actual, physical place[],’ eBay is not subject to the ADA.”); *Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.*, 198 F.3d 1104, 1114-15 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that “some connection between the good or service complained of and an actual physical place is required” because, based on the enumerated list set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 12181, a place of public accommodation must be an “actual, physical place . . . where goods or services are open to the public.”); *Gil v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc.*, 993 F.3d 1266, 1274-77 (11th Cir. 2021) (holding that “[t]he statutory language in Title III of the ADA defining ‘public accommodation’ is unambiguous and clear. It describes twelve types of locations that are public accommodations. All of these listed types of locations are tangible, physical places. No intangible places or spaces, such as websites, are listed. Thus, we conclude that, pursuant to the plain language of Title III of the ADA, public accommodations are limited to actual, physical places. Necessarily then, we hold that websites are not a place of public accommodation under Title III of the ADA. Therefore, Gil’s inability to access and communicate with the website itself is not a violation of Title III.”); see also Kathleen Finnerty, Paul McGrady & Christopher Marlow, *Web Access for the Disabled Under the ADA*, Greenberg Traurig Alert, Oct. 2006.

⁸See, e.g., *Carparts Distribution Center, Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler’s Ass’n*, 37 F.3d 12, 19-20 (1st Cir. 1994) (reversing the lower court’s order dismissing plaintiffs’ suit challenging the decision of a trade associa-

Consequently, many courts that have considered the issue to date (including the Ninth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit and district courts in the Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuit) have concluded that a Title III accessibility claim premised on an allegedly inaccessible website or mobile app may not be brought against Internet-only service providers⁹ and may

tion and administering trust for a health benefit plan that limited lifetime benefits for illnesses related to AIDS because “[t]o . . . limit the application of Title III to physical structures . . . would severely frustrate Congress’s intent that individuals with disabilities fully enjoy the goods, services, privileges and advantages, available indiscriminately to other members of the general public.”; “By including ‘travel service’ among the list of services considered ‘public accommodations,’ Congress clearly contemplated that ‘service establishments’ include providers of services which do not require a person to physically enter an actual physical structure.”); *Palozzi v. Allstate Life Insurance Co.*, 198 F.3d 28, 32–33 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing the First Circuit’s *Carparts* decision and holding, in the context of insurance, that “Title III’s mandate that the disabled be accorded ‘full and equal enjoyment of the goods, [and] services . . . of any place of public accommodation,’ . . . suggests to us that the statute was meant to guarantee them more than mere physical access. . . . We believe an entity covered by Title III is not only obligated by the statute to provide disabled persons with physical access, but is also prohibited from refusing to sell them its merchandise by reason of discrimination against their disability.”), *amended on denial of reh’g*, 204 F.3d 392 (2d Cir. 2000); *Morgan v. Joint Administration Board, Retirement Plan of Pillsbury Co. & American Federation of Grain Millers, AFL-CIO-CLC*, 268 F.3d 456, 459 (7th Cir. 2001) (stating in *dicta* that “[t]he defendant asks us to interpret ‘public accommodation’ literally, as denoting a physical site, such as a store or hotel but we have already rejected that interpretation. An insurance company can no more refuse to sell a policy to a disabled person over the Internet than a furniture store can refuse to sell furniture to a disabled person who enters the store.”); *Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co.*, 179 F.3d 557, 559 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing the First Circuit’s *Carparts Distribution Center* case and stating in *dicta* that section 12182(a) means that “the owner or operator of a store, hotel, restaurant, dentist’s office, travel agency, theater, website, or other facility (whether in physical space or in electronic space, . . .) that is open to the public cannot exclude disabled persons from entering the facility and, once in, from using the facility in the same way that the nondisabled do.”); *see also National Federation of the Blind v. Scribd Inc.*, 97 F. Supp. 3d 565, 568–70 (D. Vt. 2015) (observing the circuit split between, at that time, the First Circuit, on the one hand, and the Third, Sixth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits).

⁹*See, e.g., Earll v. eBay, Inc.*, 599 F. App’x 695, 696 (9th Cir. 2015) (affirming dismissal of plaintiff’s ADA claim, holding that the term *place of public accommodation* requires some connection between the good or service alleged to be discriminatory and a physical place; “Because eBay’s services are not connected to any ‘actual, physical place[],’ eBay is not subject to the ADA.”), *aff’g*, No. 5:11–cv–00262–JF (HRL), 2011 WL 3955485, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2011) (noting that places of public ac-

commodation are limited to physical places); *Zaid v. Smart Financial Credit Union*, Civil Action No. H-18-1130, 2019 WL 314732, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 24, 2019) (dismissing plaintiff’s Title III website accessibility case because a website does not qualify as an “other service establishment” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C.A. § 12181(7)(F), which “refers only to other physical locations While websites may be affiliated with brick-and-mortar businesses that are places of public accommodation, that does not render the businesses’ websites themselves places of public accommodation.”); *Namisnak v. Uber Technologies, Inc.*, Case No. 17-cv-06124-RS, 2018 WL 7200717, at *3-4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2018) (dismissing plaintiff’s ADA claim under 42 U.S.C.A. § 12182 because the Uber app was not a place of public accommodation; “While ‘travel service’ is listed as a place of public accommodation under section 12181(7)(F), . . . [t]he fact that Uber sends cars to pick up customers at their desired location and drop them off at different locations is insufficient to qualify Uber’s rideshare service as a place of public accommodation. . . . Neither the street corner where a customer hails a car-for-hire nor the cars themselves fit in the same category as the locations contemplated by *Weyer*.”); *Gomez v. Bang & Olufsen America, Inc.*, Case No.: 1:16-cv-23801—LENARD, 2017 WL 1957182, at *2-4 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 2, 2017) (dismissing the claim of a visually impaired plaintiff who had sued a retail store alleging that he could not access the store’s website because it was not compatible with his screen reading software, where the plaintiff only alleged that he planned to order goods online; “a website that is wholly unconnected to a physical location is generally not a place of public accommodation under the ADA. However, if a plaintiff alleges that a website’s inaccessibility impedes the plaintiff’s ‘access to a specific, physical, concrete space[,]’ and establishes some nexus between the website and the physical place of public accommodation, the plaintiff’s ADA claim can survive a motion to dismiss.”); *Kidwell v. Florida Commission on Human Relations*, No. 16-403, 2017 WL 176897, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 17, 2017) (holding that the SeaWorld and Busch Gardens’ websites were not places of public accommodations under Title III of the ADA; “Plaintiff is unable to demonstrate that either Busch Gardens’ or SeaWorld’s online website prevents his access to ‘a specific, physical, concrete space such as particular airline ticket counter or travel agency.’”); *Jancik v. Redbox Automated Retail, LLC*, No. SACV 13–1387–DOC (RNBx), 2014 WL 1920751, at *8–9 (C.D. Cal. May 14, 2014) (holding that a website was not a place of public accommodation because it was not a physical place and there was not a sufficient nexus between the website and physical kiosks); *Cullen v. Netflix, Inc.*, 880 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1023–24 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (holding that websites were not places of public accommodation because they are not physical places), *aff’d*, 600 F. App’x 508 (9th Cir. 2015) (affirming dismissal of plaintiff’s ADA-predicated California Disabled Persons Act and Unruh Civil Rights Act claims, because Netflix’s services were not connected to any “actual, physical place[]” and therefore Netflix was not subject to the ADA in the operation of its website); *Ouellette v. Viacom*, No. CV 10–133–M–DWM–JCL, 2011 WL 1882780, at *4–5 (D. Mont. Mar. 31, 2011) (holding that a website, by itself, was not a physical place and that the plaintiff did not allege a sufficient connection between the website and a physical structure); *Young v. Facebook, Inc.*, 790 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1114–16 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (dismissing

only be asserted against where there is a nexus between the website or app and a physical location¹⁰ (or, in the Eleventh

plaintiff's ADA claim against Facebook where the plaintiff could not allege a nexus between the Facebook website and a physical place of public accommodation, in a suit where the plaintiff had been terminated for abuse for repeatedly sending friend requests to strangers, but alleged discrimination because she was bi-polar); *Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines, Co.*, 227 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1319–21 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (rejecting the application of Title III to a website because it was not a physical location nor a means of accessing a concrete space), *appeal dismissed*, 385 F.3d 1324, 1328-29 (11th Cir. 2004) (rejecting the appeal where the appellant sought to advance a new theory not addressed below).

¹⁰*See, e.g., Robles v. Domino's Pizza, LLC*, 913 F.3d 898, 904-05 (9th Cir.) (holding that the ADA's mandate under DOJ regulations that "places of public accommodation, such as Domino's, provide auxiliary aids and services to make visual materials available to individuals who are blind" applied to Domino's website and app, even though customers predominantly accessed them while away from the physical restaurant, because "[t]he statute applies to the services of a place of public accommodation, not services in a place of public accommodation."), *cert. denied*, 140 S. Ct. 122 (2019), quoting *National Federation for the Blind v. Target Corp.*, 452 F. Supp. 2d 946, 953 (N.D. Cal. 2006); *Haynes v. Dunkin Donuts LLC*, 741 F. App'x 752 (11th Cir. 2018) (reversing the lower court's order granting defendant's motion to dismiss because defendant's website was plausibly alleged to provide a service that facilitated use of physical world shops, which were places of public accommodation); *Langer v. Carvana, LLC*, Case No. 8:21-cv-00303-JLS-JDE, 2021 WL 4439096 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2021) (dismissing plaintiff's ADA and Unruh Act claims where he failed to plead a nexus between Carvana's alleged failure to provide closed captioning on videos on its website and his ability to access a physical location or take advantage of Carvana's products or services); *Jones v. Piedmont Plus Federal Credit Union*, 335 F. Supp. 3d 1278, 1281-82 (N.D. Ga. 2018) (denying defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's Title III website accessibility case because the plaintiff alleged a nexus between the plaintiff's website and physical location); *Gomez v. General Nutrition Corp.*, 323 F. Supp. 3d 1368, 1374-76 (S.D. Fla. 2018) (granting summary judgment for the plaintiff on liability, holding that GNC's website was subject to the ADA because of a nexus with its physical premises; "The Website facilitates the use of the physical stores by providing a store locator. Moreover, the ability to purchase products remotely is, in and of itself, a service of the physical stores. By providing information about promotions and deals in addition to information about store information, the Website operates as a gateway to the physical stores."); *Tawam v. APCI Federal Credit Union*, No. 5:18-cv-00122, 2018 WL 3723367 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 6, 2018) (denying defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's ADA Title III website accessibility case where the plaintiff alleged that the accessibility barriers on the defendant's website prevented him from finding and visiting the APCI's physical location or learning about services offered at APCI locations); *Price v. Everglades College, Inc.*, No. 6:18-CV-492-ORL-31GJK, 2018 WL 3428156, at *3-4 (M.D. Fla. July 16, 2018) (dismissing plaintiff's claim

without prejudice, explaining that there must be a nexus between a website and a brick-and-mortar place for an actionable Title III claim in the Eleventh Circuit); *Fuller v. Smoking Anytime Two, LLC*, Case No. 18-cv-60996, 2018 WL 3387692, at *2-3 (S.D. Fla. July 11, 2018) (denying defendant's motion to dismiss where the plaintiff adequately pleaded a nexus between the defendant's website and its physical stores); *Castillo v. Jo-Ann Stores, LLC*, 286 F. Supp. 3d 870, 877-83 (N.D. Ohio 2018) (denying defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's ADA and Unruh Act claims where the plaintiff "sufficiently alleged a nexus between Jo-Ann's website and its brick-and-mortar stores."); *Robles v. Yum! Brands, Inc.*, Case No. 2:16-cv-08211-ODW(SS), 2018 WL 566781, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2018) (denying defendant's motion for summary judgment; "Acknowledging the fact that Pizza Hut's restaurants are physical, brick-and-mortar places, and that Pizza Hut's website and mobile application are services provided by Pizza Hut, the Court finds that Pizza Hut's website and mobile app are both subject to accessibility regulations under the ADA."); *Gil v. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc.*, 242 F. Supp. 3d 1315, 1317-21 (S.D. Fla. 2017) (denying defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings where the plaintiff alleged that defendant's website was "directly connected" and had a "true nexus" to Winn-Dixie's grocery and pharmacy stores and that the website augmented Winn-Dixie's physical store locations by assisting customers in finding physical store locations, educating the public about Winn-Dixie brand grocery items, and providing the public with the ability to fill and re-fill prescriptions from its pharmacy for in-store pick-up and delivery); *Rios v. N.Y. & Co.*, Case No. 2:17-cv-04676-ODW(AGRx), 2017 WL 5564530, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2017) (denying defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings where the plaintiff alleged a nexus; "a plaintiff may challenge the online services provided by a brick-and-mortar store, so long as the plaintiff establishes a nexus between the online services and the physical place. . . . Here, Plaintiff alleges that he was unable to visit Defendant's physical locations because of his inability to utilize Defendant's website."); *Reed v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc.*, Case No. CV 17-3877-MWF (SKx), 2017 WL 4457508, at *3-4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2017) (denying plaintiff's motion to dismiss, where the plaintiff alleged a nexus between CVS's website and mobile app and its brick and mortar locations; "according to the Complaint, CVS has not made this service available equally to people with vision impairments. People with vision impairments are not offered, for example, any alternative store locator service, or any alternative service for determining whether a particular item is in stock in a particular store."); *Gomez v. J. Lindeberg USA, LLC*, No. 16-22966, 2016 WL 9244732, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 17, 2016) (holding, in granting in part plaintiff's request for a default judgment, that plaintiff stated a claim under the ADA by alleging that the inaccessibility of the defendant's website prevented him from purchasing the defendant's clothing online and searching for physical store locations); *National Federation of the Blind v. Target Corp.*, 452 F. Supp. 2d 946, 954 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (holding that plaintiffs had alleged sufficient facts to state a claim because the website was heavily integrated with brick-and-mortar stores and operated as a gateway to those stores); see also, e.g., *Brooks v. See's Candies, Inc.*, No. 2:20-cv-01236-MCE-DB, 2021 WL 3602153 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2021) (dismissing plaintiff's Unruh Act and ADA claims where she failed to al-

Circuit, where a website or app acts as an intangible barrier resulting in a plaintiff being discriminatorily excluded, denied service, segregated, or otherwise treated differently than other individuals in the physical stores because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services),¹¹ although a number

lege a sufficient nexus between See’s website and one of its physical locations); *Estavillo v. Blizzard Entertainment, Inc.*, No. 5:19-cv-05540-EJD, 2019 WL 6612061, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2019) (dismissing plaintiff’s ADA claim premised on a video game developer’s “digital storefront” where there were no allegations that the website in question was “heavily integrated with physical store locations” and operated as a “gateway” to those locations); *Martinez v. San Diego County Credit Union*, 50 Cal. App. 5th 1048, 1065-71, 264 Cal. Rptr. 600, 612-17 (4th Dist. 2020) (reversing the lower court’s order of dismissal, holding that the plaintiff sufficiently alleged that the union’s website, which had a nexus to its physical location, was inaccessible to him); *Thurston v. Midvale Corp.*, 39 Cal. App. 5th 634, 638, 642-46, 252 Cal. Rptr. 3d 292 (2d Dist. 2019) (affirming summary judgment for the plaintiff in a suit brought by a blind woman against a restaurant for disability discrimination under California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act (premiered on an ADA violation) for maintaining a website that was incompatible with her screen reading software, holding that the requisite nexus between the restaurant’s website and the restaurant itself was satisfied by facts showing that website provided consumers with the opportunity to review the menu and make a reservation, which the court found expedited the customer’s ability to obtain the benefits of the restaurant’s physical facility).

¹¹See *Gil v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc.*, 993 F.3d 1266, 1274-84 (11th Cir. 2021) (vacating the lower court’s order, holding that, although a website itself may not be a place of public accommodation, Title III also prohibits “intangible barriers” that prevent an individual with a disability from fully and equally enjoying the goods, services, privileges, or advantages of a place of public accommodation, but ruling that “Winn-Dixie’s limited use website, although inaccessible by individuals who are visually disabled, does not function as an intangible barrier to an individual with a visual disability accessing the goods, services, privileges, or advantages of Winn-Dixie’s physical stores (the operative place of public accommodation). Specifically, Winn-Dixie’s website has only limited functionality. Most importantly, it is not a point of sale; all purchases must occur at the store. Further, all interactions with Winn-Dixie which can be (although need not be) initiated on the website must be completed in-store: prescription pickups and redemption of coupons. And nothing prevents Gil from shopping at the physical store.”); *Rendon v. Valleycrest Productions, Ltd.*, 294 F.3d 1279, 1283-86 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that a contestant hotline for the quiz show *Who Wants to Be a Millionaire?* was an intangible barrier that prevented plaintiffs from “accessing a privilege” of a physical place of public accommodation (the game show) because the definition of discrimination in Title III covered “both tangible barriers. . . and intangible barriers, such as eligibility requirements and screening rules or discriminatory policies and procedures that restrict a disabled person’s ability to enjoy the defendant entity’s goods, services and privileges.”).

of district courts in the First and Second Circuits (and elsewhere) have concluded that the ADA applies more broadly than merely to physical spaces and that a website or mobile app itself may constitute a place of public accommodation.¹²

In *Winn-Dixie*, the district court had entered injunctive relief against the company following a bench trial on the ADA claim of a visually impaired man who had sued over access to Winn-Dixie’s website, because the site operated as a “gateway” to the physical stores and its online offerings (which included, among other things, digital coupons). See *Gil v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc.*, 257 F. Supp. 3d 1340, 1348-49 (S.D. Fla. 2017), vacated, 993 F.3d 1266 (11th Cir. 2021). On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit rejected this analysis as well as the nexus test underlying it, holding that a website, *per se*, is not a place of public accommodation but that it could be actionable if it imposes an intangible barrier to a physical place of accommodation (which it found was not the case with Winn-Dixie’s limited use website). The Eleventh Circuit majority distinguished *Rendon*, as a case where there was only method of contestant selection. The panel also distinguished the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in *Robles* as involving facts that were “distinctly and materially different” because Domino’s made pizza sales through its website and app, whereas Winn-Dixie made no product sales on its website. Nevertheless, the majority in *Winn-Dixie* made clear that it also disagreed with the Ninth Circuit’s analysis in *Robles* and was declining to adopt the nexus standard. See 993 F.3d at 1283-84. The majority explained that

under such an expansive interpretation, virtually anything—from the tangible to the intangible—might be deemed a “service,” “privilege,” or “advantage” for purposes of Title III. In turn, the place of public accommodation would then be required to provide “full and equal enjoyment” to not only tangible services—in this case the filling of prescriptions and redemption of coupons—but intangible “privileges” or “advantages” such as increased privacy and time saving benefits. When the text of Title III is read in context and with a view to the overall statutory scheme, it is clear that Title III will not bear such a sweeping interpretation.

Id. at 1281-82 (footnote omitted).

¹²See, e.g., *Mejico v. Alba Web Designs, LLC*, 515 F. Supp. 3d 424, 433-35 (W.D. Va. 2021) (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s Title III ADA claim against a website business that sold personalized return address labels and had no physical world location, holding that “places of ‘public accommodation’ are not limited to physical, brick-and-mortar establishments and instead include commercial websites that offer good and services. Thus, the fact that Alba has no physical location open to the public is not dispositive and its motion for judgment on the pleadings must be denied.”); *National Association of the Deaf v. Harvard University*, 377 F. Supp. 3d 49, 57-61 (D. Mass. 2019) (denying in relevant part Harvard’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, holding that its online services constituted a place of public accommodation and that a nexus to a physical place was not required, but also holding in the alternative that there was a nexus between its online services and the university, which has a physical presence in Cambridge); *Access Living of Metropoli-*

tan Chicago v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 3d 1141, 1154-56 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (acknowledging the circuit split and that the court was not bound to apply *dicta* from Seventh Circuit case, but nonetheless applying that *dicta* in holding that Uber constituted a place of public accommodation and denying in relevant part its motion to dismiss); *Del-Orden v. Bonobos, Inc.*, No. 17-cv-2744, 2017 WL 6547902, at *4-11 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2017) (denying defendant's motion to dismiss, holding that commercial websites qualify as places of public accommodations within the meaning of the ADA, based on the court's estimation of how the Second Circuit would resolve the issue, but ruling in the alternative that the plaintiff had stated a claim based on "the online services of real-world public accommodations" because "the ADA separately is violated where failure to afford equal access to a website impairs the user's access to a traditional public accommodation, such as a merchant's brick-and-mortar stores."); *Access Now, Inc. v. Blue Apron, LLC*, Civil No. 17-cv-116-JL, 2017 WL 5186354, at *4 (D.N.H. Nov. 8, 2017) (denying defendant's motion to dismiss, holding that the plaintiff adequately pleaded that defendant's blueapron.com website met the statutory definition of a *public accommodation* as a "grocery store" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C.A. § 12181(7)(E)); *Andrews v. Blick Art Materials, LLC*, 268 F. Supp. 3d 381, 391-98 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (following *Scribd* in denying defendant's motion to dismiss, holding that no nexus to a physical world store was required to state a claim, in a suit alleging that the website *dickblick.com* was a place of public accommodation, because the Second Circuit, in *Pallozi v. Allstate Life Insurance Co.*, 198 F.3d 28 (2d Cir. 1999), *amended on denial of reh'g*, 204 F.3d 392 (2d Cir. 2000), emphasized "that it is the sale of goods and services to the public, rather than how and where that a sale is executed, that is crucial when determining if the protections of the ADA are available . . . ;" emphasis in *Blick Art*); *Markett v. Five Guys Enterprises LLC*, No. 17-CV-788 (KBF), 2017 WL 5054568, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2017) (holding that a fast food restaurant's website, *Fiveguys.com*, was "covered under the ADA, either as its own place of public accommodation or as a result of its close relationship as a service of defendant's restaurants, which indisputably are public accommodations under the statute."); *Gniewkowski v. Lettuce Entertain You Enterprises, Inc.*, 251 F. Supp. 3d 908, 914-19 (W.D. Pa. 2017) (denying defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' ADA Title III website accessibility claim, in a suit brought by visually impaired individuals alleging that defendant's website was inaccessible to them, because defendant AmeriServ Financial was a bank and the court found that its website was property that AmeriServ owned, operated and controlled, where discrimination was alleged to have taken place); *National Federation of the Blind v. Scribd Inc.*, 97 F. Supp. 3d 565, 568-72 (D. Vt. 2015) (denying the motion to dismiss of *Scribd*, a digital library, in a suit alleging that its website and mobile applications were places of public accommodation under Title III of the ADA because, although the examples provided in 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) are all physical world locations, "[t]he fact that the ADA does not include web-based services as a specific example of a public accommodation is irrelevant because such services did not exist when the ADA was passed and because Congress intended the ADA to adapt to changes in technology. . . . Notably, Congress did not intend to limit the ADA to the specific examples listed and the catchall categories

Courts have held that Facebook¹³ and America Online chatrooms and related services,¹⁴ which existed only online, were not places of public accommodation in the analogous context of Title II Civil Rights suits (where—as under Title III of the ADA—a plaintiff must establish that a claim involves a place of public accommodation).

To understand the current split of authority on whether a website or app on its own may constitute a place of public accommodation, it is helpful to review how case law has developed in this area.

In 2004, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the argument that Southwest Airlines' travel service, to which its website was connected, constituted a place of public accommodation, but on procedural grounds (because the issue was raised for the first time on appeal).¹⁵

In 2006, in *National Federation of the Blind v. Target*

must be construed liberally to effectuate congressional intent. . . . [A plaintiff need] only to show that the website fell within one of the general categories enumerated in the statute”), citing *National Association of the Deaf v. Netflix, Inc.*, 869 F. Supp. 2d 196, 200-02 (D. Mass. 2012) (holding that Netflix's on-demand service website was a place of public accommodation even though its services were accessed exclusively in the home, explaining that the ADA covers not only transactions that take place by phone or mail but “applies with equal force to services purchased over the Internet.”); *Straw v. American Bar Association*, No. 14 C 5194, 2015 WL 602836, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 11, 2015) (holding that even though the American Bar Association does not offer its services at a physical site, such as a store, it nevertheless could be a place of public accommodation for purposes of the ADA).

¹³See *Ebeid v. Facebook, Inc.*, Case No. 18-cv-07030-PJH, 2019 WL 2059662, at *6 (N.D. Cal. May 9, 2019) (dismissing plaintiff's claim under Title II of the Civil Rights Act on multiple grounds). In *Ebeid*, the court noted that “[a]lthough plaintiff points to the physical location of Facebook's servers, plaintiff's use of and the service provided by Facebook's online platform ‘is unconnected to entry into a public place or facility’ and therefore ‘the plain language of Title II makes the statute inapplicable.’” *Id.* (emphasis in original), quoting *Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network*, 18 F.3d 752, 756 (9th Cir. 1994).

¹⁴See *Noah v. AOL Time Warner, Inc.*, 261 F. Supp. 2d 532, 540-45 (E.D. Va. 2003), *aff'd mem.*, No. 03-1770, 2004 WL 602711 (4th Cir. Mar. 24, 2004) (dismissing plaintiff's claim because “as the relevant case law and an examination the statute's exhaustive definition make clear, ‘places of public accommodation’ are limited to actual, physical places and structures, and thus cannot include chat rooms, which are not actual physical facilities but instead are virtual forums for communication provided by AOL to its members.”).

¹⁵See *Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines Co.*, 385 F.3d 1324 (11th

Corp.,¹⁶ Chief Judge Marilyn Patel of the Northern District of California ruled that the plaintiff stated an ADA claim against Target (as well as claims under California’s Unruh Act¹⁷ and Disabled Persons Act¹⁸) by alleging that Target Corp.’s website was incompatible with screen reader software that would allow a blind person to perceive the contents of the site by vocalizing and describing the text and contents of a website based on “alternative text” commonly embedded in website code to make sites accessible to the blind.¹⁹ The court’s rationale was that the website serviced the physical store, not that the site itself was a place of accommodation.

In *Target Corp.*, plaintiffs alleged that unequal access to the website effectively denied them equal access to Target stores, which are physical places of public accommodation. The court reasoned that off-site discrimination could be actionable because the statute applies to services *of* a place of public accommodation, not services *in* such a place. Judge Patel also noted in a footnote that it appeared that Target treated *Target.com* “as an extension of its stores, as part of its overall integrated merchandising efforts.”²⁰ The court rejected as premature Target’s alternative argument that under the ADA’s auxiliary aid provision, plaintiff could not prevail if the same information available on its website could be obtained in another reasonable format, such as over the phone, which the court noted was an affirmative defense.

Judge Patel subsequently granted plaintiff’s motion to

Cir. 2004). The district court had rejected the claim that the inaccessibility of *Southwest.com* prevented access to Southwest’s “virtual” ticket counters because virtual ticket counters are not actual physical places. See *Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines, Co.*, 227 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1321 (S.D. Fla. 2002), *appeal dismissed*, 385 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2004). On appeal, plaintiff sought unsuccessfully to broaden its claim for the first time, alleging that Southwest’s overall travel service constituted a public accommodation, which the appellate court rejected because it had not been raised below. See 385 F.3d at 1328-29.

¹⁶*National Federation of the Blind v. Target Corp.*, 452 F. Supp. 2d 946 (N.D. Cal. 2006).

¹⁷Cal. Civ. Code § 51.

¹⁸Cal. Civ. Code § 54.1.

¹⁹*National Federation of the Blind v. Target Corp.*, 452 F. Supp. 2d 946, 949-50 (N.D. Cal. 2006).

²⁰*National Federation of the Blind v. Target Corp.*, 452 F. Supp. 2d 946, 956 n.4 (N.D. Cal. 2006).

certify a nationwide class action²¹ under Rule 23(b)(2).²² The case ultimately settled, with Target proposing to pay up to \$6 million in damages (for state claims since the ADA only provides for injunctive relief), or up to \$3,500 per member of the California class, plus attorneys' fees, and pay the National Federation tens of thousands of dollars each year, for three years, to monitor its website, and \$15,000 per session for training sessions that the National Federation would run for Target employees.²³ The proposed class action settlement was approved at a fairness hearing held in early 2009. Judge Patel ultimately awarded plaintiffs' counsel \$3,738,864.96 in attorneys' fees and costs²⁴ (or roughly 62% of the maximum value of the actual settlement).

The *Target Corp.* ruling has been widely followed, including by the Ninth Circuit. In *Robles v. Domino's Pizza*,²⁵ the Ninth Circuit held that the ADA's mandate under U.S. Department of Justice regulations²⁶ that "places of public accommodation, such as Domino's, provide auxiliary aids and services to make visual materials available to individuals who are blind" applied to Domino's website and app, even though customers predominantly accessed them while away from the physical restaurant, because "[t]he statute applies to the services of a place of public accommodation, not services in a place of public accommodation."²⁷ In *Robles*, the panel explained that the alleged inaccessibility of Domino's website and app, if true, would impede access to goods and services of its physical pizza franchises, which are places of public accommodation.²⁸ Critical to the court's analysis was the nexus between Domino's website and app and the physi-

²¹*National Federation of the Blind v. Target Corp.*, 582 F. Supp. 2d 1185 (N.D. Cal. 2007).

²²See *supra* §§ 25.07[2], 4.22 (analyzing Rule 23).

²³See Evan Hill, "Settlement Over Target's Web Site Marks a Win for ADA Plaintiffs," *Law.com*, Aug. 28, 2008.

²⁴*National Federation of the Blind v. Target Corp.*, No. C 06-01802 MHP, 2009 WL 2390261 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2009).

²⁵*Robles v. Domino's Pizza, LLC*, 913 F.3d 898 (9th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 140 S. Ct. 122 (2019).

²⁶See 28 C.F.R. § 36.303(b)(2).

²⁷*Robles v. Domino's Pizza, LLC*, 913 F.3d 898, 905 (9th Cir.) (quoting *National Federation for the Blind v. Target Corp.*, 452 F. Supp. 2d 946, 953 (N.D. Cal. 2006)), *cert. denied*, 140 S. Ct. 122 (2019).

²⁸*Robles v. Domino's Pizza, LLC*, 913 F.3d 898, 905 (9th Cir.) (citing 42 U.S.C.A. § 12181(7)(B) (listing a restaurant as a covered "public accom-

cal restaurants, which customers used “to locate a nearby Domino’s Restaurant and order pizzas for at-home delivery or in-store pickup.”²⁹ Because the website and app were deemed to facilitate access to a place of public accommodation (Domino’s physical restaurants), they were held to be subject to the ADA.³⁰

modation”), *cert. denied*, 140 S. Ct. 122 (2019).

²⁹*Robles v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC*, 913 F.3d 898, 905 (9th Cir.) (stating that “[t]his nexus between Domino’s website and app and the physical restaurants . . . is critical to our analysis.”), *cert. denied*, 140 S. Ct. 122 (2019).

³⁰*Robles v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC*, 913 F.3d 898, 905 (9th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 140 S. Ct. 122 (2019). The panel distinguished *Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.*, 198 F.3d 1104, 1114-15 (9th Cir. 2000), explaining:

Because the ADA only covers “actual, physical places where goods or services are open to the public, and places where the public gets those goods or services,” there had to be “some connection between the good or service complained of and an actual physical place.” *Id.* at 1114. While the insurance company had a physical office, the insurance policy at issue did not concern accessibility, or “such matters as ramps and elevators so that disabled people can get to the office.” *Id.* And although it was administered by the insurance company, the employer-provided policy was not a good offered by the insurance company’s physical office. *Id.* at 1115. Unlike the insurance policy in *Weyer*, Domino’s website and app facilitate access to the goods and services of a place of public accommodation—Domino’s physical restaurants. They are two of the primary (and heavily advertised) means of ordering Domino’s products to be picked up at or delivered from Domino’s restaurants.

Robles, 913 F.3d at 905. In so ruling, the panel expressly approved of the analysis in *Robles v. Yum! Brands, Inc.*, Case No 2:16-cv-08211-ODW(SS), 2018 WL 566781, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2018); *Rios v. N.Y. & Co.*, Case No. 2:17-cv-04676-ODW(AGRx), 2017 WL 5564530, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2017); *Reed v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc.*, Case No. CV 17-3877-MWF (SKx), 2017 WL 4457508, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2017); *Gorecki v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.*, CV 17-1131-JFW(SKx), 2017 WL 2957736, at *3-4 (C.D. Cal. June 15, 2017); *National Federation of the Blind v. Target Corp.*, 452 F. Supp. 2d 946, 953 (N.D. Cal. 2006); *Gomez v. General Nutrition Corp.*, 323 F. Supp. 3d 1368, 1375-76 (S.D. Fla. 2018); *Castillo v. Jo-Ann Stores, LLC*, 286 F.Supp.3d 870, 881 (N.D. Ohio 2018); and *Gil v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc.*, 257 F. Supp. 3d 1340, 1348-49 (S.D. Fla. 2017), *vacated*, 993 F.3d 1266, 1274-84 (11th Cir. 2021). . See *Robles*, 913 F.3d at 905 n.7.

On remand, the district court rejected the argument that there was no nexus because the defendant was a franchisor, and did not own or operate any brick-and-mortar stores, emphasizing that the case involved web-based alleged barriers that only the franchisor could control, and that its website and app were alleged to impede access to goods and services of its physical world pizza franchises, which are places of public accommodation. See *Robles v. Domino’s Pizza LLC*, Case No. CV 16-6599 JGB (Ex), 2021 WL 2945562, at *7-8 (C.D. Cal. June 23, 2021). The district court also rejected the defendant’s argument that a phone line was an acceptable accessibility substitute for its website and app, writing that “[n]o

By contrast, other courts have found a website itself may constitute a place of public accommodation. In explaining the basis for the circuit split, one court observed:

This split in the circuits is premised to some extent on the invocation of competing canons of statutory construction. There are twelve “public accommodation” categories in the statute. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Category F includes an illustrative list of service establishments, those being “a laundromat, dry-cleaner, bank, barber shop, beauty shop, travel service, shoe repair service, funeral parlor, gas station, office of an accountant or lawyer, pharmacy, insurance office, professional office of a health care provider, hospital, or other service establishment.” § 12181(7)(F). The First, Second, and Seventh Circuits, viewing the list of service establishments in conjunction with agency regulations, legislative history, and the broad policy goals of the ADA, concluded that the inclusion of “travel service” in the list of service establishments meant that Congress “contemplated that ‘service establishments’ include[d] providers of services which do not require a person to physically enter an actual physical structure.” *Carparts*, 37 F.3d at 19. *Accord Pallozzi*, 198 F.3d at 32–33; *Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co.*, 179 F.3d at 558–59. The Third, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits, relying on the principle of *noscitur a sociis* (“known by its associates”), concluded that because “[e]very term listed in § 12181(7) and subsection (F) is a physical place open to public access,” a place of public accommodation must be, or have a connection to, a physical place. *Parker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co.*, 121 F.3d 1006, 1014 (6th Cir. 1997). *Accord Magee*, 833 F.3d at 534–35; *Weyer*, 198 F.3d at 1114; *Ford*, 145 F.3d at 613–14.³¹

As explained by a district court in adopting the First Circuit’s more expansive view of what constitutes a place of public accommodation (which is based on public policy more than the plain terms of the statute):

The First Circuit’s reasoning [that “[b]y including ‘travel service’ among the list of services considered ‘public accommodations,’ Congress clearly contemplated that ‘service establishments’ include providers of services which do not require a person to physically enter an actual physical structure.”³²] applies with equal—if not greater—force in the modern world of e-commerce. As other courts have recently noted, “we shop in

person who has ever waited on hold with customer service—or ever been hungry for a pizza—would find this to be an acceptable substitute for ordering from a website.” *Id.* at *8.

³¹*National Association of the Deaf v. Harvard University*, 377 F. Supp. 3d 49, 59-60 (D. Mass. 2019).

³²*Carparts Distribution Center, Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler’s Ass’n of New England, Inc.*, 37 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 1994).

virtual marketplaces for everything from luxuries to necessities,” and “we now rely even more on online shopping in the recent pandemic.” *Lebamoff Enters. Inc. v. Whitmer*, 956 F.3d 863, 875, 878 (6th Cir. 2020) (McKeague, J., concurring); see also *McMillan v. Amazon.com*, 983 F.3d 194, 196 (5th Cir. 2020) (observing that the “migration of consumer spending online, further compounded by the COVID-19 pandemic, has enabled [Amazon] to make many traditional retailers disappear”). Thus, excluding online retailers and their commercial websites from the reach of Title III “would ‘run afoul of the purposes of the ADA and would severely frustrate Congress’s intent that individuals with disabilities fully enjoy the goods, services, privileges and advantages, available indiscriminately to other members of the general public.’” *Natl Ass’n of the Deaf v. Netflix, Inc.*, 869 F. Supp. 2d 196, 200 (D. Mass. 2012) (quoting *Carparts*, 37 F.3d at 20); see also *Natl Ass’n of the Blind v. Scribd Inc.*, 97 F. Supp. 3d 565, 575 (D. Vt. 2015) (same). It would also produce similarly “absurd results.” *Andrews v. Blick Art Materials, LLC*, 268 F. Supp. 3d 381, 396 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also *Scribd*, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 571 (noting that requiring a connection between the alleged discrimination and a physical place would arguably mean that “a company could freely refuse to sell its goods or services to a disabled person as long as it did so online rather than within the confines of a physical office or store”).³³

When a website accessibility claim is brought against an educational institution that receives federal funds, an additional claim potentially may be asserted under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.³⁴ Section 504 and the ADA

³³*Mejico v. Alba Web Designs, LLC*, 515 F. Supp. 3d 424, 434 (W.D. Va. 2021).

³⁴29 U.S.C.A. § 794; *National Association of the Deaf v. Harvard University*, 377 F. Supp. 3d 49, 61-63 (D. Mass. 2019) (denying in relevant part Harvard’s motion for judgment on the pleadings on plaintiffs’ section 504 claim based on Harvard’s alleged failure to provide accurate and timely captioning of online audiovisual content hosted by the university’s website); see also *National Association of the Deaf v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology*, Case No. 3:15-cv-30024-KAR, 2019 WL 1409301 (D. Mass. Mar. 28, 2019) (entering the same order, on the same grounds, as in *Harvard*, in plaintiffs’ parallel lawsuit against MIT); *National Association of the Deaf v. Harvard University*, Case No. 3:15-cv-30023-MGM, 2016 WL 3561622, at *5-10 (D. Mass. Feb. 9, 2016) (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ section 504 claim based on allegations “that much of Harvard’s online video content is inaccessible to millions of deaf and hard of hearing individuals, and their identification of captioning as a reasonable accommodation that would afford them the meaningful access millions of non-hearing impaired individuals already enjoy . . .”), report

are “frequently read in sync.”³⁵ Section 504 “provides as its general rule that ‘[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance’”³⁶ A *program or activity* includes “all of the operations of— . . . a college, university, or other postsecondary institution.”³⁷ Pursuant to implementing regulations,³⁸ at least one court has

and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 6540446 (D. Mass. Nov. 3, 2016).

³⁵*National Association of the Deaf v. Harvard University*, 377 F. Supp. 3d 49, 54-55 (D. Mass. 2019) (citing earlier cases). As explained in an earlier opinion in that case,

to state a claim for violation[s] of Section 504 and Title III, a plaintiff must allege (1) that he or she is disabled and otherwise qualified, (2) that the defendant receives federal funding (for Section 504 purposes) and is a place of public accommodation (for ADA purposes); and (3) that the defendant discriminated against the plaintiff based on disability. *Argenyi v. Creighton Univ.*, 703 F.3d 441, 447 (8th Cir. 2013) (citing *Mershon v. St. Louis Univ.*, 442 F.3d 1069, 1076-77 (8th Cir. 2006)); *el Kouni v. Trs. of Boston Univ.*, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2-3 (D. Mass. 2001) (citing *Katz v. City Metal Co.*, 87 F.3d 26, 30 (1st Cir. 1996)). There are three discrete theories available to a disability discrimination plaintiff. “First, a plaintiff can assert disparate treatment on account of disability, i.e., that the disability actually motivated the defendant’s challenged adverse conduct.” *Nunes v. Massachusetts Dep’t of Corr.*, 766 F.3d 136, 144 (1st Cir. 2014) (citing *Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez*, 540 U.S. 44, 52-53 (2003)). Second, a plaintiff can assert disparate impact, i.e. that a defendant’s challenged conduct, even if not motivated by a discriminatory animus, disparately affects the disabled. *Id.* at 145. “Finally, a plaintiff can pursue a third path, claiming that [the defendant] has refused to affirmatively accommodate his or her disability where such accommodation was needed to provide ‘meaningful access’” *Id.* (citing *Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg*, 331 F.3d 261, 273-76 (2d Cir. 2003)).

National Association of the Deaf v. Harvard University, Case No. 3:15-cv-30023-MGM, 2016 WL 3561622, at *4 (D. Mass. Feb. 9, 2016) (footnote omitted), *report and recommendation adopted*, 2016 WL 6540446 (D. Mass. Nov. 3, 2016).

³⁶*National Association of the Deaf v. Harvard University*, 377 F. Supp. 3d 49, 55 (D. Mass. 2019), *quoting* 29 U.S.C.A. § 794(a).

³⁷29 U.S.C.A. § 794(b)(2)(A).

³⁸The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) is responsible for coordinating the implementation of section 504 among the various federal agencies that extend financial assistance. *National Association of the Deaf v. Harvard University*, 377 F. Supp. 3d 49, 55 & n.4 (D. Mass. 2019), *citing* Exec. Order No. 12,250, 45 Fed. Reg. 72,995 (Nov. 2, 1980). DOJ coordination regulations are found at 28 C.F.R. §§ 41.1—41.58. The U.S. Department of Energy has issued regulations implementing section 504 for the programs and activities to which it provides assistance. *See* 34 C.F.R. §§ 104.1—104.61. DOE’s regulations must be consistent with the DOJ’s coordination regulations. 28 C.F.R. § 41.4(a); *National Association of the*

held that plaintiffs could state a claim for website accessibility under section 504 based on the Department of Education implementing regulation that prohibits federal fund recipients from denying qualified handicapped persons “the opportunity to participate in or benefit from provided aids, benefits, or services . . . and [from] providing qualified handicapped persons with aids, benefits, or services that are not as effective as those that are provided to others”³⁹ Whether failing to provide accurate and timely captioning of online audiovisual content on a university website amounts to the denial of “aids, benefits, or services” or meaningful access has yet to be ruled upon by any appellate court.

Where a claim is directed at a public entity such as a state or local government, rather than a private company, suit potentially may be brought under Title II of the ADA, rather than Title III.⁴⁰ Title II provides that no person with a quali-

Deaf v. Harvard University, 377 F. Supp. 3d 49, 55 n.5 (D. Mass. 2019).

³⁹*National Association of the Deaf v. Harvard University*, 377 F. Supp. 3d 49, 62 (D. Mass. 2019) (construing 28 C.F.R. § 41.51(b)(1)(i)-(iii); and 34 C.F.R. § 104.4(b)(i)-(iii) in denying Harvard’s motion for judgment on the pleadings); *National Association of the Deaf v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology*, Case No. 3:15-cv-30024-KAR, 2019 WL 1409301 (D. Mass. Mar. 28, 2019) (entering the same order, on the same grounds, as in *Harvard*, in plaintiffs’ parallel lawsuit against MIT); *National Association of the Deaf v. Harvard University*, Case No. 3:15-cv-30023-MGM, 2016 WL 3561622, at *7 (D. Mass. Feb. 9, 2016) (construing 28 C.F.R. § 41.51(b)(1)(i)-(iii); 34 C.F.R. § 104.4(b)(i)-(iii) in denying Harvard’s motion to dismiss).

As explained by the court in *Harvard*:

Section 104.4 prohibits federal fund recipients from denying qualified handicapped persons the opportunity to participate in or benefit from provided aids, benefits, and services; affording qualified handicapped persons an unequal opportunity to participate in or benefit from provided aids, benefits, or services; and providing qualified handicapped persons with aids, benefits, or services that are not as effective as those provided to others. 34 C.F.R. § 104.4(b)(1)(i)-(iii). For aids, benefits, and services to be “equally effective,” they “must afford handicapped persons equal opportunity to obtain the same result, to gain the same benefit, or to reach the same level of achievement.” *Id.* at § 104.4(b)(2). In other words, these regulations are consistent with the requirement of “meaningful access,” and, as set forth above, Plaintiffs have adequately pleaded a lack of meaningful access. *Cf. K.M. v. Tustin Unified Sch. Dist.*, 725 F.3d 1088, 1102 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he ‘meaningful access’ standard incorporates rather than supersedes applicable interpretative regulations, and so does not preclude [plaintiffs] from litigating their claims under those regulations.’”).

National Association of the Deaf v. Harvard University, Case No. 3:15-cv-30023-MGM, 2016 WL 3561622, at *7 (D. Mass. Feb. 9, 2016), *report and recommendation adopted*, 2016 WL 6540446 (D. Mass Nov. 3, 2016).

⁴⁰*See, e.g., Price v. City of Ocala*, 375 F. Supp. 3d 1264, 1270-71,

fied disability shall “be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”⁴¹ To state a claim under Title II, a plaintiff must

1273-77 (M.D. Fla. 2019) (holding that Title II “undoubtedly applies to websites . . .,” but lamenting the lack of guidance from the U.S. Department of Justice “about what a government entity must do to make its website ADA compliant” and dismissing the suit of a blind Florida resident, alleging that a city’s website was incompatible with his screen reader software, for lack of Article III standing, in a suit brought under Title II of the ADA and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act); *see also National Ass’n of the Deaf v. Florida*, 980 F.3d 763, 770-76 (11th Cir. 2020) (holding that Congress abrogated state sovereign immunity for claims under Title II, in a suit alleging that the state of Florida violated Title II of the ADA by failing to provide closed captioning for live and archived videos streamed or otherwise made accessible via its website); *Price v. Town of Longboat Key*, Case No. 8:19-cv-00591-T-02AAS, 2019 WL 2173834, at *3-6 (M.D. Fla. May 20, 2019) (dismissing plaintiff’s ADA Title II and Rehabilitation Act website accessibility claims for lack of Article III standing and failure to state a claim where the plaintiff was not a town resident and did not allege concrete plans to move there or even visit, and where the town, in response to plaintiff’s request, adjusted its website to accommodate screen reader software and additionally provided the requested documents via a thumb drive and, thereafter, plaintiff did not allege that he sought further accommodation); *Open Access for All, Inc. v. Town of Juno Beach, Florida*, Case No. 9:19-CV-805-18 ROSENBERG/REINHART, 2019 WL 3425090 (S.D. Fla. July 30, 2019) (applying *Price v. City of Ocala’s* analysis of Article III standing in an ADA Title II (and Rehabilitation Act) website accessibility case and holding that the plaintiffs had standing where the individually named plaintiff had concrete plans to move from Miami, was seriously considering Juno Beach as a possible new home, and needed access to information about living in Juno Beach, which was on the city’s website but allegedly not accessible to him).

⁴¹42 U.S.C.A. § 12132. Pursuant to implementing regulations, public entities are prohibited from “providing any aid, benefit, or service” that “afford[s] a qualified individual with a disability an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the aid, benefit, or service that is not equal to that afforded others.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1)(ii). They must also “make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity.” *Id.* § 35.130(b)(7). Public entities are further required to “take appropriate steps to ensure that communications with applicants, participants, members of the public, and companions with disabilities are as effective as communications with others.” *Id.* § 35.160(a)(1). To accomplish this result, they are obligated to “furnish appropriate auxiliary aids and services where necessary to afford individuals with disabilities . . . an equal opportunity to participate in, and enjoy the benefits of, a service, program, or activity of a public entity.” *Id.* § 35.160(b)(1).

establish: (1) that the plaintiff is a “qualified individual with a disability;” (2) that the plaintiff was “excluded from participation in or . . . denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity” or otherwise “discriminated [against] by such entity;” (3) “by reason of such disability.”⁴²

Federal claims over website and app accessibility may be joined with state law causes of action. Thus, for example, suits have been brought under California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act⁴³ and California’s Disabled Persons Act (DPA).⁴⁴

A plaintiff potentially may recover a minimum of \$4,000 per violation and up to treble actual damages, injunctive relief and attorneys’ fees under the Unruh Act if (1) a violation of the ADA has occurred under Cal. Civ. Code § 51(f), or (2) the plaintiff has been denied access to a business establishment due to intentional discrimination in violation of Cal. Civ. Code § 52.⁴⁵

The Unruh Act provides that “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their . . . disability . . . are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.”⁴⁶

Courts construing Unruh Act claims premised on ADA violations have generally required there be a nexus with a physical location in website and mobile app accessibility cases, consistent with Ninth Circuit ADA case law, in both

⁴²*Price v. Town of Longboat Key*, Case No. 8:19-cv-00591-T-02AAS, 2019 WL 2173834, at *2 (M.D. Fla. May 20, 2019), citing *Shotz v. Cates*, 256 F.3d 1077, 1079 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting 42 U.S.C.A. § 12132).

⁴³Cal. Civ. Code §§ 51–52.

⁴⁴Cal. Civ. Code §§ 54, 54.1(a).

⁴⁵*Brooks v. See’s Candies, Inc.*, No. 2:20-cv-01236-MCE-DB, 2021 WL 3602153, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2021) (dismissing plaintiff’s Unruh Act and ADA claims where she failed to allege a sufficient nexus between See’s website and its physical locations and failed to allege any intentional misconduct by the defendant).

An intermediate appellate court has held that ADA violations are only actionable under the Unruh Act when the violation is by a *business establishment* within the meaning of Cal. Civ. Code § 51(b), not by any person or entity. See *Brennon B. v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County*, 57 Cal. App. 5th 367, 397-408, 271 Cal. Rptr. 3d 320, 345-52 (1st Dist. 2020).

⁴⁶Cal. Civ. Code § 51(b).

state⁴⁷ and federal⁴⁸ opinions.

To establish a violation of the Unruh Act independent of a claim under the ADA, a plaintiff “must ‘plead and prove intentional discrimination in public accommodations in violation of the terms of the Act.’”⁴⁹ The Unruh Act “contemplates ‘willful, affirmative misconduct on the part of those who violate the Act’ and that a plaintiff must therefore allege, and show, more than the disparate impact of a facially neutral policy.”⁵⁰

⁴⁷*See, e.g., Martinez v. San Diego County Credit Union*, 50 Cal. App. 5th 1048, 1065-71, 264 Cal. Rptr. 600, 612-17 (4th Dist. 2020) (reversing the lower court’s order of dismissal, holding that the plaintiff sufficiently alleged that the union’s website, which had a nexus to its physical location, was inaccessible to him; “Because the nexus test presupposes that Congress did not intend ADA to apply directly to a website, courts applying the nexus test consider whether the alleged website deficiencies impinge on the plaintiff’s ability to have equal access to, and enjoyment of, the products and services offered at the physical location. This standard requires a court to focus on the connection between the website and the goods and services offered by the defendant.”); *Thurston v. Midvale Corp.*, 39 Cal. App. 5th 634, 638, 642-46, 252 Cal. Rptr. 3d 292 (2d Dist. 2019) (affirming summary judgment for the plaintiff in a suit brought by a blind woman against a restaurant for disability discrimination under California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act (premised on an ADA violation) for maintaining a website that was incompatible with her screen reading software, holding that the requisite nexus between the restaurant’s website and the restaurant itself was satisfied by facts showing that website provided consumers with the opportunity to review the menu and make a reservation, which the court found expedited the customer’s ability to obtain the benefits of the restaurant’s physical facility).

⁴⁸*See, e.g., Brooks v. See’s Candies, Inc.*, No. 2:20-cv-01236-MCE-DB, 2021 WL 3602153 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2021) (dismissing plaintiff’s Unruh Act and ADA claims where she failed to allege a sufficient nexus between See’s website and one of its physical locations); *Estavillo v. Blizzard Entertainment, Inc.*, No. 5:19-cv-05540-EJD, 2019 WL 6612061, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2019) (dismissing plaintiff’s ADA claim premised on a video game developer’s “digital storefront” where there were no allegations that the website in question was “heavily integrated with physical store locations” and operated as a “gateway” to those locations).

⁴⁹*Greater Los Angeles Agency on Deafness, Inc. v. Cable News Network, Inc.*, 742 F.3d 414, 425-26 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding no violation where CNN failed to include closed captioning on videos made available only on its website because the Unruh Act requires showing of intentional discrimination based on disability), quoting *Munson v. Del Taco, Inc.*, 46 Cal. 4th 661, 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d 685 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

⁵⁰*Greater Los Angeles Agency on Deafness, Inc. v. Cable News Network, Inc.*, 742 F.3d 414, 425-26 (9th Cir. 2014), quoting among others

To be actionable, an Unruh Act claim must be based on a violation that took place within California.⁵¹

Actually doing business is not required to state an Unruh Act violation, however. It is sufficient that a party “visited a business’s website with intent to use its services and alleges that the business’s terms and conditions exclude him or her from full and equal access to its services”⁵² That intent, however, must be bona fide.⁵³

Koebke v. Bernardo Heights Country Club, 36 Cal. 4th 824, 31 Cal. Rptr. 3d 565 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted); *Earll v. eBay, Inc.*, 599 F. App’x 695, 696 (9th Cir. 2015) (affirming dismissal where the plaintiff had not alleged intentional discrimination).

⁵¹See, e.g., *Warner v. Tinder Inc.*, 105 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1099 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (dismissing plaintiff’s claim because it did not allege conduct that occurred in California and section 51(b) does not apply to injuries suffered outside of California).

⁵²*White v. Square, Inc.*, 7 Cal. 5th 1019, 1023, 250 Cal. Rptr. 3d 770, 771 (2019). The California Supreme Court, which was answering a certified question from the Ninth Circuit on statutory standing, explained in its brief opinion that:

In general, a person suffers discrimination under the Act when the person presents himself or herself to a business with an intent to use its services but encounters an exclusionary policy or practice that prevents him or her from using those services. We conclude that this rule applies to online businesses and that visiting a website with intent to use its services is, for purposes of standing, equivalent to presenting oneself for services at a brick-and-mortar store. Although mere awareness of a business’s discriminatory policy or practice is not enough for standing under the Act, entering into an agreement with the business is not required.

Id.

⁵³See, e.g., *White v. Square, Inc.*, 7 Cal. 5th 1019, 1032-33, 250 Cal. Rptr. 3d 770 (2019) (holding that, to have statutory standing under the Unruh Act, a plaintiff must have a “concrete and actual interest that is not merely hypothetical or conjectural” and that “a person who visits a business’s website with intent to use its services and encounters terms or conditions that exclude the person from full and equal access to its services has [statutory] standing . . . with no further requirement that the person enter into an agreement or transaction with the business” but noting that the opinion did not preclude Square from disputing White’s factual allegations at a later stage; “Square may argue in a motion for summary judgment or at trial that White did not actually possess a bona fide intent to sign up for or use its services. Our standing analysis is limited to the pleadings, in which White unequivocally alleges his intention to use Square’s services.”); *Thurston v. Omni Hotels Management Corp.*, 69 Cal. App. 5th 299, 284 Cal. Rptr. 3d 341 (4th Dist. 2021) (affirming a jury verdict for the defendant, holding that to prevail under the Unruh Act plaintiff would have had to prove that she had a bona fide intent to book a room at the defendant’s hotel when she allegedly encountered problems attempting to use its website with screen reader

The California Disabled Persons Act (DPA) provides that: Individuals with disabilities shall be entitled to full and equal access, as other members of the general public, to accommodations, advantages, facilities, . . . places of public accommodation, amusement, or resort, and other places to which the general public is invited.⁵⁴

“‘Full and equal access’ is defined by section 54.1 to mean access that complies with the regulations developed under the federal ADA or under state statutes, if the latter imposes a higher standard.”⁵⁵ A DPA claim may also be based on

software).

ADA and Unruh Act suits have been brought challenging, among other things, hotel reservation websites. While the “Reservation Rule”—codified at 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(e)(1)—requires that certain information be provided, a number of courts have held that it neither requires disclosure of accessible features made mandatory by the Standards for Accessible Design (since hotels are presumed to comply with those requirements) nor requires disclosure of whether optional amenities not required by ADA regulations are provided. *See, e.g., Love v. Handlery Hotels, Inc.*, Case No. 21-cv-00850-TSH, 2021 WL 2531090, at *4-7 (N.D. Cal. June 21, 2021); *Love v. CCMH Fisherman’s Wharf LLC*, Case No. 20-cv-07131-JCS, 2021 WL 1734924, at *3-9 (N.D. Cal. May 3, 2021); *Whitaker v. KK LLC*, Case No. 20-cv-06877-MMC, 2021 WL 1700228, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2021); *Love v. Ashford San Francisco II LP*, No. 20-cv-08458-EMC, 2021 WL 1428372, at *4-5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2021); *Love v. Wildcats Owner LLC*, 532 F. Supp. 3d 872, 876-84 (N.D. Cal. 2021); *Love v. Marriott Ownership Resorts, Inc.*, Case No. 20-cv-07523-CRB, 2021 WL 1176674, at *5-6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2021); *Love v. Marriott Hotel Services, Inc.*, Case No. 20-cv-07137-TSH, 2021 WL 810252, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2021); *Arroyo v. JWMFE Anaheim, LLC*, Case No.: SACV 21-00014-CJC (KESx), 2021 WL 936018, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2021), *appeal dismissed*, No. 21-55237, 2021 WL 2425300 (9th Cir. June 14, 2021). These opinions also underscore that suits challenging a particular industry’s practices sometimes are brought by the same plaintiff against multiple different defendants. These plaintiffs may self-identify as “testers” but are sometimes criticized by defendants for troll-like litigation tactics.

⁵⁴Cal. Civ. Code § 54.1(a)(1).

⁵⁵*Urhausen v. Longs Drug Stores, Inc.*, 155 Cal. App. 4th 254, 261, 65 Cal. Rptr. 3d 838, 843 (1st Dist. 2007), *quoting* Cal. Civ. Code § 54.1(a)(3); *see also Earll v. eBay, Inc.*, 599 F. App’x 695, 696 (9th Cir. 2015) (affirming dismissal of plaintiff’s Disabled Persons Act claim after holding that the ADA did not apply to the eBay services at issue in the case, where the plaintiff “failed to allege violation of any separate, applicable accessibility standard”); *Robles v. Yum! Brands, Inc.*, Case No 2:16-cv-08211-ODW(SS), 2018 WL 566781, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2018) (denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment; “Because Plaintiff’s UCRA claim is premised on a violation of rights under the ADA, Plaintiff does not need to plead or prove intentional discrimination. . . . Because there is a triable issue as to whether Pizza Hut has violated the ADA, the Court

merely an allegedly discriminatory policy.⁵⁶

Thus, for example, in *Earll v. eBay, Inc.*⁵⁷ and *Young v. Facebook, Inc.*,⁵⁸ where the courts had found that eBay's and Facebook's respective online-only locations were not places of public accommodation under the ADA and the plaintiffs had not alleged any facts beyond those supporting their ADA claims, the courts, as in *Target*, dismissed or affirmed dismissal of plaintiff's claims under the Unruh Act and DPA (as well as, in *Young*, for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and negligence).⁵⁹

Similarly, in *Cullen v. Netflix, Inc.*,⁶⁰ an earlier case, the court dismissed (with leave to amend) plaintiff's California state law Unruh Act and DPA claims, even as it dismissed with prejudice his ADA claim based on the court's finding

cannot grant summary judgment on the UCRA claim.”); *Rios v. N.Y. & Co.*, Case No. 2:17-cv-04676-ODW(AGRx), 2017 WL 5564530, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2017) (denying defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings where the plaintiff stated a claim under the ADA based on alleged online inaccessibility and therefore stated a claim under the Unruh Act because, among other things, the plaintiff was not required to plead intentional discrimination); *Reed v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc.*, Case No. CV 17-3877-MWF (SKx), 2017 WL 4457508, at *3-4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2017) (denying plaintiff's motion to dismiss ADA Title III and California Unruh Act claims in a website and mobile app accessibility case where the court found a nexus between the website and mobile app and the defendant's brick and mortar locations).

⁵⁶*Earll v. eBay, Inc.*, 599 F. App'x 695, 696 n.1 (9th Cir. 2015), citing *Hankins v. El Torito Restaurants, Inc.*, 63 Cal. App. 4th 510, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 684, 691-93 (1st Dist. 1998).

⁵⁷*Earll v. eBay, Inc.*, 599 F. App'x 695, 696 (9th Cir. 2015).

⁵⁸*Young v. Facebook, Inc.*, 790 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 2011).

⁵⁹*Young* involved the alleged termination of a user for sending an excessive number of friend requests, where the user alleged she was bipolar. Although he held that plaintiff Young had not stated a cognizable claim and dismissed plaintiff's complaint in its entirety with prejudice, Judge Fogel wrote that:

The Court is not without sympathy for Young's plight. Young was understandably frustrated that she could not discuss the termination of her account with a live person, and both this frustration and the loss of her access to Facebook's social network had a particularly acute impact on Young because of her bipolar condition. As customer service functions increasingly are handed over to automated systems, it is important that service providers . . . understand the implications that such practices can have for the less sophisticated and more vulnerable.

Young v. Facebook, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1118-19 (N.D. Cal. 2011).

⁶⁰*Cullen v. Netflix, Inc.*, 880 F. Supp. 2d 1017 (N.D. Cal. 2012), *aff'd*, 600 F. App'x 508 (9th Cir. 2015).

that Netflix’s streaming video library—“a website where consumers can access videos with an internet connection” was not “an actual physical place” and therefore, under Ninth Circuit law, not a place of public accommodation. In *Cullen*, the plaintiff, a deaf man, sued to require closed captioning (or subtitles) on all videos streamed by Netflix. Citing Judge Patel’s opinion in *Target*, Judge DaVila explained that Cullen potentially could pursue his discrimination claims under California law if they were asserted “as independent claims separate from an ADA violation because both the Unruh Act and the DPA apply to websites ‘as a kind of business establishment and an accommodation, advantage, facility, and privilege of a place of public accommodation, respectively. No nexus to [a] physical [place] need be shown.’”⁶¹ To establish an Unruh Act violation absent an ADA violation, however, Judge DaVila emphasized that “Cullen’s claim cannot be based solely on the disparate impact of Netflix’s policies on hearing-impaired individuals but must be grounded in allegations of intentional discrimination.” Judge DaVila similarly cautioned that to state a DPA claim in the absence of an ADA violation, Cullen would be required to show a violation of an accessibility regulation promulgated under California law that exceeded the level of protection set by the ADA. Ultimately, the appellate court affirmed dismissal of plaintiff’s Unruh Act and DPA claims because they were entirely dependent on his ADA claim.⁶²

Whether California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act and Disabled Persons Act apply to website and mobile app accessibility where the online location is unrelated to a brick and mortar place of public accommodation was a question certified to the California Supreme Court,⁶³ but the question ultimately was withdrawn when the underlying case settled.⁶⁴ Intermediate appellate courts in California have applied the nexus test—

⁶¹*Cullen v. Netflix, Inc.*, 880 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1024 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (citing *National Federation of the Blind v. Target Corp.*, 582 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1196 (N.D. Cal. 2007), *aff’d*, 600 F. App’x 508 (9th Cir. 2015)).

⁶²See *Cullen v. Netflix, Inc.*, 600 F. App’x 508, 509 (9th Cir. 2015).

⁶³See *Greater Los Angeles Agency on Deafness, Inc. v. Cable News Network, Inc.*, 742 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2014) (certifying the question “Does the DPA’s reference to “places of public accommodation” include web sites, which are non-physical places?”).

⁶⁴See *Greater Los Angeles Agency on Deafness, Inc. v. Cable News Network, Inc.*, 769 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2014) (dismissing the Ninth Circuit appeal and withdrawing the certification of questions to the California

requiring a nexus to a physical place of public accommodation—to maintain suit under the Unruh Act premised on an ADA violation.⁶⁵

Under D.C. law, online platforms and other online services that do not have physical locations are not places of public accommodation under the D.C. Human Rights Act, D.C. Code § 2-1402.31(a).⁶⁶

Supreme Court).

⁶⁵See, e.g., *Martinez v. San Diego County Credit Union*, 50 Cal. App. 5th 1048, 1065-71, 264 Cal. Rptr. 600, 612-17 (4th Dist. 2020) (reversing the lower court's order of dismissal, holding that the plaintiff sufficiently alleged that the union's website, which had a nexus to its physical location, was inaccessible to him, while declining to address whether a website itself could be considered a place of public accommodation); *Thurston v. Midvale Corp.*, 39 Cal. App. 5th 634, 638, 642-46, 252 Cal. Rptr. 3d 292 (2d Dist. 2019) (affirming summary judgment for the plaintiff in a suit brought by a blind woman against a restaurant for disability discrimination under California's Unruh Civil Rights Act (premised on an ADA violation) for maintaining a website that was incompatible with her screen reading software, holding that the requisite nexus between the restaurant's website and the restaurant itself was satisfied by facts showing that website provided consumers with the opportunity to review the menu and make a reservation, which the court found expedited the customer's ability to obtain the benefits of the restaurant's physical facility).

⁶⁶See *Freedom Watch v. Google, Inc.*, 368 F. Supp. 3d 30, 39-40 (D.D.C. 2019) (dismissing plaintiffs' claim and holding, in a case alleging discrimination based on political affiliation, that Google, Facebook, Apple, and Twitter, were not places of public accommodation within the meaning of D.C. Code Ann. § 2-1402.31(a), which requires that an "alleged place of public accommodation must be a physical location."). Section 1402.31(a), which also prohibits discrimination based on disability, states in relevant part that:

It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice to do any of the following acts, wholly or partially for a discriminatory reason based on the actual or perceived: race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age, marital status, personal appearance, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, familial status, family responsibilities, genetic information, disability, matriculation, political affiliation, source of income, or place of residence or business of any individual:

- (1) To deny, directly or indirectly, any person the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodations;
- (2) To print, circulate, post, or mail, or otherwise cause, directly or indirectly, to be published a statement, advertisement, or sign which indicates that the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of a place of public accommodation will be unlawfully refused, withheld from or denied an individual; or that an individual's patronage of, or presence at, a place of public accommodation is objectionable, unwelcome, unacceptable, or undesirable.
- (3) A health benefit plan or health insurer shall not establish rules for the

Some states such as New York have enacted state laws that parallel the ADA and “rise or fall in tandem with disability discrimination claims brought pursuant to the federal ADA.”⁶⁷

Other web accessibility suits brought under state law have

eligibility, new or continued, of any individual or adjust premium or contribution amounts for an individual on the basis of genetic information concerning the individual or family member of the individual, including information about a request for or receipt of genetic services by an individual or the individual’s family member.

- (4) A health benefit plan or health insurer shall not request or require an individual or the individual’s family member to undergo a genetic test. Nothing in this paragraph shall:
- (A) Limit the authority of a health care professional who is providing health care services to an individual to request that the individual or the individual’s family member undergo a genetic test;
 - (B) Limit the authority of a health care professional who is employed by or affiliated with a health benefit plan or a health insurer and who is providing health care services to an individual to notify such individual of the availability of a genetic test or to provide information to such individual regarding such genetic test; or
 - (C) Authorize or permit a health care professional to require that an individual undergo a genetic test.

D.C. Code Ann. § 2-1402.31(a).

⁶⁷*Andrews v. Blick Art Materials, LLC*, 268 F. Supp. 3d 381, 398 (E.D.N.Y. 2017), citing *Graves v. Finch Pruyn & Co.*, 457 F.3d 181, 186 n. 3 (2d Cir. 2006). In *Blick*, the court held that a legally blind plaintiff had stated a claim under the New York State Human Rights Law because a website, on its own and not ancillary to a physical location, could be a “place of public accommodation, resort or amusement” within the meaning of New York law for the same reason it qualified as a public accommodation under the ADA. See 268 F. Supp. 3d at 398-400. The relevant statutory provision states:

It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation, resort or amusement, because of the . . . disability . . . of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof

N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a). A *place of public accommodation, resort or amusement* is defined to include “wholesale and retail stores and establishments dealing with goods or services of any kind.” *Id.* § 292(9).

The court in *Blick* also had held that the plaintiff stated a claim under the New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y. C. Admin Code § 8-107, which is intended to provide broader protection than the ADA or New York Human Rights Law. See 268 F. Supp. 3d at 400-01.

The *Blick* case ultimately settled with the court agreeing to allow Blick to withdraw his class allegations and settle on an individual basis. See *Andrews v. Blick Art Materials, LLC*, 286 F. Supp. 3d 365 (E.D.N.Y. 2017).

been dismissed as preempted.⁶⁸

Some ADA claims involving access to websites also have been dismissed for lack of Article III standing, which is required to maintain suit in federal court (where, for example, a plaintiff could not lawfully join a defendant's credit union or had no concrete plans to move to a defendant's town or patronize a defendant's business).⁶⁹ By contrast,

⁶⁸See, e.g., *Foley v. JetBlue Airways, Corp.*, No. C 10-3882 JCS, 2011 WL 3359730 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2011) (dismissing plaintiff's complaint for violations of California's Unruh Civil Rights Act, Disabled Persons Act and Business and Professions Code based on JetBlue allegedly operating its website and airport kiosks in such a way that they were not accessible to the visually impaired, based on the finding that the federal Air Carrier Access Act, 49 U.S.C.A. § 41705, preempts the entire field of disability non-discrimination in air travel, but rejecting the defendant's argument that the claims also were preempted by the Americans with Disabilities Act); see also *National Federation of the Blind v. United Airlines, Inc.*, 813 F.3d 718 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that plaintiffs' claims that defendant's airport kiosks were inaccessible to the blind because they used exclusively visual computer screen prompts and touch-screen navigation, without offering a medium accessible to the blind (such as audio output), which had been brought under the Unruh Civil Rights Act and Disabled Persons Act, were impliedly field preempted by the Air Carrier Access Act (ACAA) and its implementing regulation setting forth accessibility requirements for automated airport kiosks, while rejecting the argument that the claims were expressly preempted by the ADA); see generally *Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in Air Travel: Accessibility of Web Sites and Automated Kiosks at U.S. Airports*, 78 Fed. Reg. 67,882 (Nov. 12, 2013).

Other courts have found particular claims to have not been preempted. See, e.g., *Greater Los Angeles Agency on Deafness, Inc. v. Cable News Network, Inc.*, 742 F.3d 414, 428-30 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding no preemption of plaintiff's DPA claim arising out of CNN's alleged failure to include closed captioning on videos made available only on its website).

⁶⁹See, e.g., *Griffin v. Department of Labor Federal Credit Union*, 912 F.3d 649, 653-56 (4th Cir. 2019) (affirming dismissal of plaintiff's ADA claim against a credit union, based on alleged lack of access to its website for those who are blind, because plaintiff was ineligible under federal law to become a member of the credit union, and thus his alleged injury was neither concrete nor particularized); *Carroll v. Northwest Federal Credit Union*, 770 F. App'x 102 (4th Cir. 2019) (affirming dismissal of plaintiff's ADA claim alleging that the defendant's credit union failed to make its services accessible by making its website compatible with the screen reader that the plaintiff used to access the Internet, for lack of standing, because Carroll merely alleged that he intended to volunteer for an organization that would have allowed him to join the credit union, but was ineligible to join at the time he filed his amended complaint); *Laufer v. Mann Hospitality, LLC*, 996 F.3d 269, 272-73 (5th Cir. 2021) (affirming dismissal of Laufer's claim that she could not tell from the Sunset Inn's online reservation system whether it had rooms available that could ac-

commodate her disability, for lack of Article III standing, where plaintiff did not claim she tried to book a room or even intended to do so. “According to her declaration, she visited the sites ‘for the purpose of reviewing and assessing the accessible features at the hotel and ascertain[ing] whether the websites contain the information required by [ADA regulations].’” . . . In other words, she visited the ORS to see if the motel complied with the law, and nothing more. Such allegations do not show enough of a concrete interest in Mann’s accommodations to confer standing.”); *Carello v. Aurora Policemen Credit Union*, 930 F.3d 830 (7th Cir. 2019) (affirming the lower court’s holding that the plaintiff, a blind person who alleged that as an ADA compliance tester and potential customer he was deprived access to the defendant-credit union’s website because it was incompatible with screen reader software, did not have Article III standing to sue on his ADA claim because, by statute, membership in the credit union was restricted to specific groups of individuals; “a person who is *legally barred* from using a credit union’s services cannot demonstrate an injury that is either concrete or particularized.”); *Diaz v. The Kroger Co.*, 18 Civ. 7953 (KPF), 2019 WL 2357531 (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2019) (dismissing plaintiff’s case as moot where defendant fully addressed plaintiff’s concerns, “brought the Website into compliance with Plaintiff’s preferred WCAG 2.0 standard, and commit[ted] to monitoring technological developments in the future to ensure that visually-impaired individuals [would] have equal access to the Website.”); *Price v. Town of Longboat Key*, Case No. 8:19-cv-00591-T-02AAS, 2019 WL 2173834, at *3-5 (M.D. Fla. May 20, 2019) (dismissing plaintiff’s ADA Title II and Rehabilitation Act website accessibility claims for lack of Article III standing where the plaintiff was not a town resident and did not allege concrete plans to move there or even visit); *Price v. Escalante-Black Diamond Golf Club*, Case No. 5:19-cv-22-Oc-30PRL, 2019 WL 1905865 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 29, 2019) (dismissing plaintiff’s ADA Title III website accessibility suit against a golf club for the lack of Article III standing and for failure to state a claim (because he did not plead facts showing that the Black Diamond website impeded his ability to access and enjoy the golf club)); *Price v. City of Ocala*, 375 F. Supp. 3d 1264 (M.D. Fla. 2019) (dismissing the suit of a blind Florida resident, alleging that a city’s website was incompatible with his screen reader software, for lack of Article III standing, in a suit brought under Title II of the ADA, which addresses discrimination by state or local governments, and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act); *Mendez v. Apple Inc.*, 18 Civ. 7550 (LAP), 2019 WL 2611168 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2019) (dismissing plaintiff’s ADA Title III website accessibility claim, and related New York state and city claims, for lack of Article III standing, because the plaintiff failed to allege an injury in fact); *Mitchell v. BMI Federal Credit Union*, 374 F. Supp. 3d 664, 668-69 (S.D. Ohio 2019) (dismissing plaintiff’s Title III website accessibility case, in a suit seeking only prospective injunctive relief, because he was not and could not become a member of BMI); *Mitchell v. Buckeye State Credit Union*, Case No. 5:18-CV-875, 2019 WL 1040962 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 5, 2019) (dismissing plaintiff’s Title III website accessibility claim for lack of Article III standing where the plaintiff was ineligible to join defendant’s credit union); *Gastelum v. Phoenix Central Hotel Venture, LLC*, No. CV-17-04544-PHX-DLR, 2019 WL 498750, at *3-4 & n.2 (D. Ariz. Feb. 7, 2019) (granting summary judg-

where a plaintiff is a customer or potential customer, courts have found Article III standing.⁷⁰ Article III standing is ad-

ment for the defendant, finding that the plaintiff, who had sued over 100 hotels in and around the Phoenix area in the preceding two years, lacked Article III standing because he could not allege any concrete plans to stay at the defendant's hotel; he had merely visited the property with his son and lawyer to verify whether it was ADA compliant, and the court noted that it was not even clear whether plaintiff got out of his vehicle during his visit to the property); *Price v. Orlando Health, Inc.*, No. 6:17-CV-1999-ORL-40DCI, 2018 WL 6434519, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 7, 2018) (finding plaintiff had not alleged a future injury related to a hospital website because of the distance between his house and the "place of public accommodation," his failure to travel to the area frequently, and his lack of definite plans to return); *Mitchell v. Dover-Phila Federal Credit Union*, Case No. 5:18CV102, 2018 WL 3109591, at *4 (N.D. Ohio June 25, 2018) (dismissing plaintiff's ADA claim against a credit union located 200 miles from his home, based on alleged lack of access to its website, because plaintiff was ineligible to join and expressed no intention to use its services in the future). *But see Jones v. Lanier Federal Credit Union*, 335 F. Supp. 3d 1273, 1276 (N.D. Ga. 2018) (finding standing because the injury alleged was plaintiff's inability to access defendant's website, rather than an inability to access its services, while rejecting without detailed analysis, in a brief opinion, the argument that the plaintiff was ineligible to join defendant's credit union); *Jones v. Piedmont Plus Federal Credit Union*, 335 F. Supp. 3d 1278, 1280-81 (N.D. Ga. 2018) (holding that the plaintiff had Article III standing in a website accessibility case even though he was not eligible to become a member of the credit union, in an opinion involving the same plaintiff, issued by the same judge, as *Jones v. Lanier*); *Jones v. Family First Credit Union*, 340 F. Supp. 3d 1356, 1362-63 (N.D. Ga. 2018) (holding that the plaintiff had standing to pursue damages based on the barriers he encountered when he tried to access defendant's website, but did not have standing to seek injunctive relief to prevent future harm because his complaint was devoid of allegations about his plans or intent to use defendant's services in the future).

⁷⁰*See, e.g., Gil v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc.*, 993 F.3d 1266, 1273-74 (11th Cir. 2021) (holding that a visually impaired man had an injury-in-fact sufficient to support Article III standing; "While Gil does not dispute that he was able to access the physical store without impediment, he argues that he suffered an injury both when 'he was unable to avail himself of the goods and services' on the website and when the website interfered with his 'ability to equally enjoy the goods and services of Winn-Dixie's stores.' The difficulties caused by his inability to access much of the Winn-Dixie website constitute a 'concrete and particularized' injury that is not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical,' and will continue if the website remains inaccessible."); *Kennedy v. Siesta Inn & Suites, Inc.*, 828 F. App'x 658 (11th Cir. 2020) (holding that the claim of a self-described "tester" where plaintiff's alleged remediation of its website was allegedly inadequate and both its website and third-party booking sites allegedly failed to comply with the Reservation Rule, 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(e)); *Mejico v. Alba Web Designs, LLC*, 515 F. Supp. 3d 424, 433-35 (W.D. Va. 2021) (denying

defendant's motion to dismiss, holding that the plaintiff, who was permanently blind and relied on a screen reader to access the Internet, had Article III standing where she alleged that she had visited defendant's website on several occasions and encountered a number of specific access barriers that prevented her from purchasing items from the site and otherwise denied her equal access to the goods and services available on the site); *Honeywell v. Harihar Inc.*, No. 2:18-CV-618-FTM-29MRM, 2018 WL 6304839, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 3, 2018) (denying defendant's motion to dismiss an ADA website accessibility claim for lack of Article III standing where plaintiff tried unsuccessfully to access the website for defendant's motel and alleged she was therefore deterred from visiting it, where she pleaded a future injury related to a hotel's website by alleging she intended to travel from Fort Lauderdale to Fort Myers within six months); *Wu v. Jensen-Lewis Co.*, 345 F. Supp. 3d 438, 441-42 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (holding that the fact that the defendant had launched a new website, which it contended was ADA compliant, did not moot the lawsuit or deny the plaintiff Article III standing); *Gomez v. General Nutrition Corp.*, 323 F. Supp. 3d 1368, 1374 (S.D. Fla. 2018) (holding, in a brief opinion, that an online shopper who was legally blind and a "tester" of website ADA compliance had Article III standing to sue a nutrition retailer, alleging that its website did not comply with Title III of the ADA); *Castillo v. Jo-Ann Stores, LLC*, 286 F. Supp. 3d 870, 873-74 (N.D. Ohio 2018) (holding that the plaintiff, who was visually impaired, had standing to bring ADA and California Unruh Act claims alleging that the defendant's website was inaccessible to her); *Gathers v 1-800-Flowers.com, Inc.*, Civil Action No. 17-cv-10273-IT, 2018 WL 839381, at *4 (D. Mass. Feb. 12, 2018) (holding that plaintiffs had standing to sue on behalf of visually impaired users of defendant's website where they alleged that buttons were missing labels necessary for screen reader software to operate properly, error messages generated when plaintiffs sought to place orders were difficult for the screen reader software to locate and read, multiple audio streams began playing automatically at the same time on defendant's customer support page, images of items for sale did not include written descriptions, the screen reader was unable to "go back," and the screen reader was unable to locate the correct field in which to insert payment information); *Suvino v. Time Warner Cable, Inc.*, No. 16 CV 7046-LTS-BCM, 2017 WL 3834777, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2017) (holding that plaintiff had Article III standing and stated a claim for an ADA violation based on access to the defendant's website, where the "Website functionalities (including service selection, online bill payment and access to streaming services) are among the service features sold through the physical locations and thus are an aspect of the goods and services offered by the stores as public accommodations."); *Gniewkowski v. Lettuce Entertain You Enterprises, Inc.*, 251 F. Supp. 3d 908, 913-14 (W.D. Pa. 2017) (holding that plaintiffs suffered an injury in fact under the ADA where "Defendant's website barred Plaintiffs' screen reader software from reading the content of its website," such that "Plaintiffs were unable to conduct on-line research to compare financial services and products"); see also *Access Living of Metropolitan Chicago v. Uber Technologies, Inc.*, 958 F.3d 604 (7th Cir. 2020) (holding that a nonprofit organization had Article III standing to raise a Title III discrimination claim, but failed to state a claim, and that the in-

dressed more extensively in section 27.07[2] (in connection with security breach cases), among other places in this treatise.

Claims brought against an interactive computer service provider alleging the inaccessibility of third party content (as opposed to content created by the site or service itself) will not be actionable because of the immunity provided by the Communications Decency Act (CDA), 47 U.S.C.A. § 230. This is true of both claims under the ADA⁷¹ and claims under state statutes such as California's Unruh Act.⁷² CDA immunity is analyzed extensively in section 37.05 in chapter

dividual plaintiff failed to adequately allege a substantial risk of future injury sufficient to support standing, without addressing the question of whether the ADA's Title III public accommodation provisions even apply to companies that provide ridesharing technology); *Equal Rights Center v. Uber Technologies, Inc.*, 525 F. Supp. 3d 62, 73-88 (D.D.C. 2021) (holding that plaintiffs had Article III standing to assert claims under Title III of the ADA and the District of Columbia Human Rights Act and holding that plaintiff plausibly alleged—at least for purposes of a motion to dismiss at the outset of the case—that the defendant was a provider of public transportation services and a place of public accommodation under the ADA).

⁷¹See *National Association of the Deaf v. Harvard University*, 377 F. Supp. 3d 49, 64-70 (D. Mass. 2019) (holding the CDA applicable to plaintiffs' claims under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.A. § 794, and Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 12181-12189, to the extent based on third party content embedded within online content produced or created by Harvard, on Harvard's platforms); see also *National Association of the Deaf v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology*, Case No. 3:15-cv-30024-KAR, 2019 WL 1409301 (D. Mass. Mar. 28, 2019) (entering the same order, on the same grounds, in plaintiffs' parallel lawsuit against MIT).

⁷²See, e.g., *Federal Agency of News LLC v. Facebook, Inc.*, Case No. 18-CV-07041-LHK, 2019 WL 3254208, at *5-7 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2019) (dismissing without prejudice, as precluded by the CDA, the claims brought under Title II of the U.S. Civil Rights Act of 1964 and California Unruh Civil Rights Act, among others, by a Russian news site whose Facebook account was terminated in early 2018 after it was determined by Facebook that the account was controlled by the Russian government's Internet Research Agency, which according to a U.S. intelligence community report had created 470 inauthentic accounts on Facebook that were used to influence the outcome of the 2016 Presidential election); *Ebeid v. Facebook, Inc.*, Case No. 18-cv-07030-PJH, 2019 WL 2059662, at *3-5 (N.D. Cal. May 9, 2019) (dismissing plaintiff's claims under the Civil Rights Act Title II, the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and California's Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 51 *et seq.*, with prejudice, and dismissing with prejudice plaintiff's related claim under California's Unlawful Business Practices Act, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 *et seq.*, to the extent it relied on allegations that Facebook removed

37.

The Eleventh Circuit has held that the Twenty-First Century Communications and Video Accessibility Act (CVAA), which gives the Federal Communications Commission exclusive jurisdiction over certain regulatory matters relating to closed captioning, does not bar ADA litigation by website users objecting to the lack of closed-captioning on online videos.⁷³

The volume of ADA litigation over website and mobile app accessibility has increased in the years since the *Target* decision. Many website and mobile app accessibility cases are filed in California, Florida and New York—often with particular industries targeted and in a number of instances with the same lawyers and/or plaintiffs seeking to bring putative class action suits against various defendants. As one federal court in Florida noted in 2019:

Recently there have been an explosion of cases—under both Title II and III—alleging that websites violate the ADA. Usually, they arise in the context of websites either failing to be compatible with screen reader software or failing to have closed captioning for videos. Courts have struggled to apply traditional principles of standing to these website cases and have disagreed about what features a website must have to comply with the ADA. The latter is largely due to a complete lack of rules and regulations being promulgated by the Department of Justice despite being aware of this issue for years.⁷⁴

Noting the practice of some lawyers and plaintiffs in bringing numerous ADA website accessibility claims, Senior District Court Judge Loretta Preska commented—in dismissing plaintiff’s ADA Title III website accessibility claim and related New York state and city claims, for lack of Article III standing (because the plaintiff failed to allege an injury in fact)—that while there was “nothing inherently wrong with filing duplicative lawsuits against multiple defendants if the

plaintiff’s posts or restricted his ability to use the Facebook platform).

⁷³See *Sierra v. City of Hallandale Beach*, 904 F.3d 1343 (11th Cir. 2018).

Regulations implementing the CVAA, which took effect on January 1, 2019, may be found at 47 C.F.R. §§ 14.1 to 14.61.

⁷⁴*Price v. City of Ocala*, 375 F. Supp. 3d 1264, 1270 (M.D. Fla. 2019) (dismissing the suit of a blind Florida resident, alleging that a city’s website was incompatible with his screen reader software, for lack of Article III standing, in a suit brought under Title II of the ADA (not Title III), which addresses discrimination by state or local governments, and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act).

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harms to be remedied do exist and are indeed identical . . . , those who live by the photocopier shall die by the photocopier.”⁷⁵

To mitigate the risk of class action litigation, businesses may choose to require customers to enter into a binding arbitration agreement. To be enforceable, however, a business must make sure that patrons with special needs in fact receive adequate notice and provide clear assent. Otherwise, the agreement will be unenforceable.⁷⁶

Contract formation and consumer arbitration provisions are analyzed in chapters 21 and 22.

For guidance on how to make a site accessible, readers should refer to the Web Accessibility Initiative of the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C)⁷⁷ and its Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG).⁷⁸ To be accessible to the blind, for example, WCAG provides that a website should use

⁷⁵*Mendez v. Apple Inc.*, 18 Civ. 7550 (LAP), 2019 WL 2611168, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2019).

⁷⁶*See, e.g., National Federation of the Blind v. The Container Store*, 904 F.3d 70, 84 (1st Cir. 2018) (affirming the lower court’s order denying defendant’s motion to compel arbitration where the plaintiffs were blind and could not access the keypad on which the terms and conditions of a loyalty program (including an arbitration provision) were displayed because they could not read them and the defendant allegedly did not have tactile keypads on its point-of-sale devices, where the plaintiffs alleged they were not told that the loyalty program was subject to an agreement to arbitrate disputes and where the defendant did not present evidence that the terms in fact were communicated to them; “Based upon the lack of any evidence that the in-store plaintiffs had any knowledge, actual or constructive, that arbitration terms applied to their enrollment in the loyalty program, we conclude that the Container Store failed to meet its burden of establishing that an agreement to arbitrate was ever consummated between it and the in-store plaintiffs.”).

⁷⁷*See* <http://www.w3.org/WAI/>

⁷⁸*See* <https://www.w3.org/TR/WCAG21/> WCAG 2.0 guidelines are private industry standards for website accessibility developed by technology and accessibility experts. *Robles v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC*, 913 F.3d 898, 902 n.1 (9th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 140 S. Ct. 122 (2019). As explained by the Ninth Circuit,

WCAG 2.0 guidelines have been widely adopted, including by federal agencies, which conform their public-facing, electronic content to WCAG 2.0 level A and level AA Success Criteria. 36 C.F.R. pt. 1194, app. A (2017). In addition, the Department of Transportation requires airline websites to adopt these accessibility standards. *See* 14 C.F.R. § 382.43 (2013). Notably, the Department of Justice has required ADA-covered entities to comply with WCAG 2.0 level AA (which incorporates level A) in many consent decrees and settlement agreements in which the United States has been a party.

alternative text that allows blind users to translate website content into speech or Braille using screen reader software and special keyboards. The U.S. Department of Justice—which is charged with issuing rules to implement the ADA⁷⁹—has neither adopted nor rejected the WCAG 2.0 standard.⁸⁰ The Eleventh Circuit, however, characterized the WCAG 2.0 web access standard in 2018 as “the recognized

Robles, 913 F.3d at 902 n.1.

The June 2018 WCAG guidelines are incorporated by reference into the California Consumer Privacy Act, which requires that “[f]or notices provided online, the business shall follow generally recognized industry standards, such as the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines, version 2.1 of June 5, 2018, from the World Wide Web Consortium, incorporated herein by reference.” Cal. Code Regs. § 999.305(a)(2)(d). “In other contexts, the business shall provide information on how a consumer with a disability may access the notice in an alternative format.” *Id.*; see generally *supra* § 26.13A (analyzing the CCPA and its applicability).

⁷⁹42 U.S.C.A. § 12186(b); *Bragdon v. Abbott*, 524 U.S. 624, 646 (1998); *Robles v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC*, 913 F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 140 S. Ct. 122 (2019).

⁸⁰The DOJ announced its intention to engage in rulemaking on website accessibility in 2010, but never did so and formally withdrew its notice of proposed rulemaking in 2017. See *Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability*, 75 Fed. Reg. 43460-01 (July 26, 2010) (issuing Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) to “explor[e] what regulatory guidance [DOJ] can propose to make clear to entities covered by the ADA their obligations to make their Web sites accessible”); *Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability*, 82 Fed. Reg. 60932-01 (Dec. 26, 2017) (withdrawing the ANPRM).

The Ninth Circuit has held that the DOJ’s failure to issue rules for many years after the 2010 notice of proposed rulemaking on website accessibility did not amount to a denial of due process for a company sued for failing to provide website accessibility. See *Robles v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC*, 913 F.3d 898, 906-09 (9th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 140 S. Ct. 122 (2019); see also *Jones v. Fort McPherson Credit Union*, 347 F. Supp. 3d 1351, 1355 (N.D. Ga. 2018) (rejecting defendant’s Due Process argument where DOJ regulations provided that discrimination could be found because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, noting screen reader software as an example of an auxiliary aid, where plaintiff, in any case, was not seeking relief for defendant’s failure to comply with WCAG 2.0 but with the ADA itself). The Ninth Circuit in *Robles* speculated that DOJ may have purposefully declined to provide specific instructions to afford public accommodations maximum flexibility in meeting the statute’s requirements. *Id.* at 908-09, *citing Reed v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc.*, Case No. CV 17-3877-MWF (SKx), 2017 WL 4457508, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2017); *Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability*, 82 Fed. Reg. 60932-01 (Dec. 26, 2017) (noting that DOJ “continue[s] to assess whether specific technical standards are necessary and appropriate to assist covered entities with complying with the ADA.”) (emphasis added by the Ninth Circuit panel in *Robles*).

industry standard for website accessibility.”⁸¹

Additional guidance on Web accessibility may be obtained from the State of California Web Accessibility Standards website.⁸²

48.07 ISP Obligations

In addition to facing potential third-party liability (which is addressed in chapters 49, 50 and 51), interactive computer services are required “at the time of entering an agreement with a customer for the provision of interactive computer service” to notify the customer “in a manner deemed appropriate by the provider” that “parental controls (such as computer hardware, software, or filtering services) are commercially available” to assist the customer in limiting access to material harmful to minors.¹ The notice must identify, or provide the customer with access to information identifying, current providers of such protections.²

ISP contract issues are addressed in chapter 23. Website terms and conditions are analyzed in chapter 22. Internet safety and the protection of children on social networks is addressed in chapter 51.

Service providers also typically must respond to subpoenas, warrants and court orders seeking disclosure of contact information for, and content posted by, pseudonymous users.³

48.08 Additional Considerations for Blogs, Social Networks and Other Web 2.0 Applications

Social networks, blogs, wiki and other Web 2.0 applications, like the introduction of the World Wide Web itself back in the early 1990s, have revolutionized the way we interact, do business and play. The central feature of a social network is the network—or the community within which users may interact. Social networks such as Google+, LinkedIn, Facebook, MySpace or Friendster allow users to create their own profiles, which are like personal websites interconnected

⁸¹*Haynes v. Hooters of America, LLC*, 893 F.3d 781, 783 (11th Cir. 2018).

⁸²See <https://webstandards.ca.gov/accessibility/overview/>

[Section 48.07]

¹See 47 U.S.C.A. § 230(d).

²See 47 U.S.C.A. § 230(d).

³See *supra* § 37.02; *infra* § 50.06[4].

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Ian Ballon is Co-Chair of Greenberg Traurig LLP's Global Intellectual Property and Technology Practice Group and is a litigator in the firm's Silicon Valley Los Angeles and Washington, DC offices. He defends data privacy, cybersecurity breach, AdTech, TCPA, and other Internet and mobile class action suits and litigates copyright, trademark, patent, trade secret, right of publicity, database, AI and other intellectual property cases, including disputes involving safe harbors and exemptions, platform liability and fair use.



Mr. Ballon was the recipient of the 2010 Vanguard Award from the State Bar of California's Intellectual Property Law Section. He also has been recognized by *The Los Angeles and San Francisco Daily Journal* as one of the Top Intellectual Property litigators in every year the list has been published (2009-2021), Top Cybersecurity and Artificial Intelligence (AI) lawyers, and Top 100 lawyers in California.

Mr. Ballon was named a "Groundbreaker" by *The Recorder* at its 2017 Bay Area Litigation Departments of the Year awards ceremony and was selected as an "Intellectual Property Trailblazer" by the *National Law Journal*.

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Mr. Ballon received his B.A. *magna cum laude* from Tufts University, his J.D. *with honors* from George Washington University Law School and an LLM in international and comparative law from Georgetown University Law Center. He also holds the C.I.P.P./U.S. certification from the International Association of Privacy Professionals (IAPP).

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