GT Newsletter | Competition Currents | February 2026

In This Issue1

United States | Mexico | Poland | The Netherlands | Italy | European Union

United States

A. Federal Trade Commission (FTC)

1. FTC issues annual report on ethanol market concentration 2025.

On Jan. 9, 2026, the FTC issued its 2025 Report on Ethanol Market Concentration. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 directs the FTC to conduct an annual review of market concentration in the ethanol production industry “to determine whether there is sufficient competition among industry participants to avoid price-setting and other anticompetitive behavior.” Similar to its findings in prior years, the FTC report concludes that “the level of concentration and number of market participants in the U.S. ethanol production industry continue to suggest that the exercise of market power to set prices, or coordinate on price or output levels, is unlikely on a nationwide basis.”

2. 2025 HSR thresholds take effect Feb. 17, 2026.

On Jan. 14, 2026, the FTC approved updated jurisdictional thresholds and filing fees for the Hart-Scott-Rodino (HSR) Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, as well as revised jurisdictional threshold updates for interlocking directorates. These revisions are made annually, with the size-of-transaction threshold for reporting proposed mergers and acquisitions under the Clayton Act increasing from $126.4 million to $133.9 million for 2026. These changes take effect on Feb. 17, 2026. The adjustments are based on changes in the gross national product and consumer price index as mandated by the HSR Act and the 2023 Consolidated Appropriations Act. Please see our GT Alert 2026 HSR Merger Notification Thresholds & Fees Announced for more information.

3. FTC seeks to prevent anticompetitive healthcare services merger.

The FTC announced on Jan. 30, 2026, that it had issued a proposed consent order relating to Sevita Health’s (Sevita) acquisition of BrightSpring Health Services, Inc.’s community living business ResCare Community Living (ResCare). The two organizations are the largest national providers of residential services to individuals with intellectual and developmental disabilities. Specifically, the FTC was concerned with the transaction’s effects in certain geographic markets of Indiana, Louisiana, and Texas, and that Sevita’s acquisition of ResCare would reduce the quality of care and options for services for individuals with intellectual and development disabilities in those areas. Under the proposed consent order, Sevita would divest assets, including 128 intermediate care facilities in Indiana, Louisiana, and Texas. The proposed consent order also requires Sevita to obtain prior notice from the FTC before consummating any similar transaction in the same areas in Indiana, Louisiana, and Texas as any divestiture facility. Notably, in October 2025, three directors resigned from Sevita’s board of directors in response to the FTC’s ongoing enforcement efforts against interlocking directorates, described further in GT’s October 2025 Competition Currents.

B. Department of Justice (DOJ) Civil Antitrust Division

1. Justice Department requires Columbus McKinnon to divest assets to proceed with acquisition of Kito Crosby.

The DOJ’s Antitrust Division announced on Jan. 29, 2026, that it had filed a complaint and proposed settlement relating to Columbus McKinnon Corporation (CMCO)’s acquisition of Kito Crosby Limited (Kito Crosby). The DOJ alleges that the companies are two of the leading manufacturers of electric chain hoists and overhead lifting chains in the country (with the complaint alleging a combined market share of over 70% in electric chain hoists and over 60% in overhead lifting chains). The DOJ was concerned that the parties to the transaction compete head-to-head, and that without the proposed divestiture, the transaction would likely result in higher prices and reduced quality innovation. Under the proposed settlement, CMCO would divest its power chain hoist and chains businesses.

2. Justice Department requires Reddy Ice to divest assets to proceed with proposed acquisition of Arctic Glacier.

The DOJ’s Antitrust Division announced on Jan. 30, 2026, that it will require divestitures to resolve its antitrust concerns relating to Reddy Ice’s proposed acquisition of Arctic Glacier (each packaged ice providers). Specifically, the DOJ was concerned with the transaction’s effects in certain markets of ice sold to retail chains in Oregon, Washington, and certain counties in California, and packaged ice sold to airlines and airline caterers in the greater Boston and New York City metro areas. In each of these areas, the DOJ alleged that the parties were the two largest suppliers of packaged ice and that the proposed transaction would lead to higher prices and lower quality. Each of Stone Canyon Industries Holdings LP (the owner of Reddy Ice) and Chill Parent Holdco LP (the owner of Arctic Glacier) would be required to divest assets in California, Massachusetts, New York, Oregon, and Washington to resolve the DOJ’s antitrust concerns.

C. U.S. Litigation

1. Strive Specialties, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Company, No. 5:26-cv-00155 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 14, 2026)

On Jan. 14, 2026, Strive Compounding Pharmacy filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas alleging that Eli Lilly & Co. and Novo Nordisk waged a coordinated effort to suppress competition and limit patients’ access to compounded glucagon-like-peptide-1 agonists (GLP-1), a popular weight loss medication. The compounding pharmacy alleges Eli Lilly and Novo Nordisk have done so by “entering into exclusive agreements with major telehealth providers that bar medical practitioners associated with those telehealth providers from writing prescriptions for compounded medicines.” The suit asserts claims for monopolization of the U.S. GLP-1 market and restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Act.

2. Dupuis v. Zillow Group Inc., Case No. 3:26-cv-05049 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 16, 2026)

In a suit filed in Washington federal court, a proposed class of real estate agents accused Zillow Group Inc. of running a monopoly that forces real estate agents to use a Zillow client-referral program that pushes agents to refer clients to Zillow’s loan services. The complaint alleges that Zillow uses proprietary software to keep track of how often program participants refer clients to its loan service. According to the complaint: “An agent’s rating in [the software] is tied to the number of loan pre-approvals they secure through [Zillow Home Loans] . . . . The higher the agent’s rating, the more connections Zillow sends their way; conversely, the lowest rating agents risk getting cut from the program.” In November 2025, another proposed class lodged similar antitrust claims against Zillow in Washington federal court, and that proposed class action was consolidated with another one in December.

3. Federal District Court blocks FTC new self-reporting requirements for merging companies.

On Feb. 12, 2026, Judge Jeremy D. Kemodle from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas ruled that the FTC’s recent overhaul of the premerger reporting requirements exceeded the FTC’s authority. In granting summary judgment in favor of U.S. Chamber of Commerce and other industry groups, Judge Kemodle held that the FTC had failed to show that the alleged cost-savings and efficiency for the FTC did not “reasonably outweigh” the burden to companies of the substantial increase in information required by the FTC rule. Furthermore, the court held that the FTC failed to show that less burdensome alternatives were insufficient to provide FTC with the information needed. The court stayed enforcement of that order for seven days to give the FTC time to appeal the decision.

Mexico

The National Antitrust Commission Sets Fees for Its Services

On Dec. 19, 2025, Agreement CNA-068-2025 (the Agreement) was published in the Official Gazette of the Federation (DOF), and the National Antitrust Commission (CNA), establishing new fees, effective immediately on Dec. 19, 2025.

Context

• The CNA is a decentralized agency under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Economy, which replaced the Comisión Federal de Competencia Económica (COFECE) and the Instituto Federal de Telecomunicaciones (IFT) following the constitutional and legal reform of 2024–2025.
• CNA established new fees because it was mandated to finance its own operations and reduce its dependence on public funds.
• Companies and economic agents should be cognizant of these changes, as they may directly impact financial planning and the management of operations subject to review by the competition authority.

Nature of the Fees

• The fees are not taxes or duties under the Federal Duties Law; they are payments for technical and complex services, in line with criteria the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation established.
• The CNA will manage the revenue from the fees in order to strengthen its financial autonomy.

Methodology for Setting Fees

• CNA referred to international practices (including from the United States, United Kingdom, Spain, Colombia, and Portugal) where fees are adjusted according to the transaction’s value.
• The base cost of the service was set at 767,094.22 pesos, to which a 15% sustainability charge is added, resulting in an initial fee of 882,158.00 pesos.
• There are five fee ranges, depending on the Maximum Estimated Value (MEV) of the transaction.

Fees for Notifying Concentrations (Mergers, Acquisitions, or Restructurings)

The fees apply to the receipt, analysis, and processing of concentrations according to Article 86 of the Federal Economic Competition Law (LFCE), as well as to transactions carried out without prior authorization from the CNA.

*Value Added Tax (VAT) must be added to these fees.

The MEV must be determined according to the criteria set forth in Article 86 of the Ley Federal de Competencia Económica (LFCE), its regulations, the applicable CNA regulations, and the Guide for Notification of Concentrations. The highest value among the available options (amount actually paid, asset value, share capital, or sales value) must be considered.

Payment of the fee is an essential requirement for the CNA to review the transaction, and proof of payment must be attached when submitting the notification.

Evidence of Calculation

The notification letter must clearly explain how the MEV was determined and, consequently, the applicable fee.

• If the CNA detects inconsistencies and a fee lower than required was paid, it may request clarifications and impose sanctions if false information is found.
• Upon the transaction’s closing, evidence of its final value must be submitted. If this value is higher than the estimated amount and the fee paid was lower, the difference must be paid, along with updates and surcharges in accordance with the Federal Tax Code.

Other Services

*These fees are subject to Value Added Tax (VAT) 

Poland

President of the Polish Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (UOKiK)

1. UOKiK alleges Bolt and Tchibo made greenwashing claims.

On Jan. 19, 2026, the UOKiK announced that it had brought charges against Bolt and Tchibo in connection with suspected greenwashing practices. The proceedings concern marketing communications that may have misled consumers by presenting products or services as more environmentally friendly than they actually are. If the allegations are confirmed, the companies may face fines of up to 10% of their annual turnover for each contested practice.

In the case of Bolt, UOKiK questioned claims relating to “zero-emission” or “emission-free” transport and the use of “100% renewable energy.” According to the authority, such statements might lead consumers to believe that Bolt’s services are predominantly provided using electric vehicles or that emissions are eliminated entirely, whereas in practice most rides are carried out using combustion-engine vehicles and environmental claims may relate only to selected stages of service provision.

The proceedings against Tchibo focus on the use of labels such as “eco,” “sustainable,” or green symbols for products sold online, without sufficiently clear information on the criteria behind these designations. UOKiK indicated that some of the labelled products contain significant amounts of synthetic materials or only minimal recycled content. In addition, the authority raised concerns about communications relating to the recyclability of Cafissimo coffee capsules, which may not accurately reflect recycling conditions in Poland.

2. Nearly PLN 80 million fine imposed on PKO BP for unclear rules on interest rate changes.

On Jan. 23, 2026, UOKiK issued a decision imposing a fine of approximately PLN 79.3 million (approx. USD 22.2 million / EUR 18.8 million) on PKO BP – the biggest bank in Poland – for using unfair contractual clauses relating to changes in interest rates on consumer credit products. The decision concerns annexes to agreements for revolving credit facilities in payment accounts that the bank had applied since December 2018.

According to UOKiK, the challenged clauses allowed the bank to unilaterally change interest rates based on vague and insufficiently specified premises. While mechanisms enabling interest rate adjustments are not prohibited as such, UOKiK emphasized that they must be formulated in a clear, precise, and verifiable manner. In this case, the authority found that the contractual provisions did not adequately explain which factors could trigger a change, how those factors would be weighed, or how consumers could independently verify the justification and scope of the adjustment. As a result, consumers were unable to foresee the economic consequences of their credit obligations.

In addition to imposing the fine, UOKiK prohibited PKO BP from further using the contested clauses and ordered the bank to inform affected consumers individually once the decision becomes final. The bank will also be required to publish relevant statements on its website and social media channels. UOKiK underlined that unfair contractual terms are ineffective by operation of law and do not bind consumers. The decision is not yet final, and PKO BP may appeal to the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection.

3. UOKiK conducts dawn raids in the consumer electronics market.

On Jan. 28, 2026, UOKiK announced that it had initiated explanatory proceedings concerning a suspected anticompetitive agreement in the market for IT, consumer electronics (RTV) and household appliances (AGD). The authority had received signals indicating the possible existence of arrangements restricting competition, including potential price coordination, involving a wide range of popular consumer products.

As part of the proceedings, and with the consent of a court, UOKiK inspectors – assisted by the police –carried out dawn raids at the premises of three major wholesale distributors operating in Poland (AB, Action, and GT Group Tomaszek), as well as at the premises of one manufacturer, Beko. According to UOKiK, the suspected practices may have involved entities at different levels of the supply chain, including manufacturers, importers, wholesalers, and retailers, such as large electronics chains and online stores.

At this stage, no formal allegations have yet been brought against specific companies. If UOKiK initiates formal antitrust proceedings and present charges, the companies involved may face fines of up to 10% of their annual turnover, while managers responsible for the infringement may be subject to personal fines of up to PLN 2 million.

The Netherlands

 A. Dutch Competition Authority (ACM)

1. Further Dutch enforcement action regarding Nexperia.

In Oct. 2025, the Dutch government invoked the rarely used Dutch Goods Availability Act (Wbg) – a Cold War-era law from 1952 – to take control of a Nijmegen-based chipmaker, Nexperia, owned by Chinese company Wingtech. The government cited serious administrative shortcomings and fears that Wingtech intended to dismantle Dutch operations and transfer sensitive technology to China. The Minister of Economic Affairs suspended the company’s CEO and installed an independent administrator to oversee the company’s voting rights. This intervention has led to ongoing litigation, including international arbitration with claims reportedly reaching US $8 billion. Notably, the Dutch authorities had previously cleared Wingtech’s acquisition of the Delft-based startup Nowi in late 2023 pursuant to the Act, illustrating a more cautious and selective approach in recent months.

2. ACM report: competition contributes to innovation and resilience.

In its annual State of the Market report, the ACM found that competition in the Netherlands has weakened over the past decade. Indicators for the period 2011-2023 show rising market concentration, declining entry and exit rates, and increased ability for firms to raise margins, particularly in already concentrated sectors. The ACM warned that declining competition is not only associated with higher prices and reduced quality, but also undermines broader public interests such as innovation, economic resilience, and societal welfare; especially in times of geopolitical, digital, energy, and climate transitions.

In response, the ACM will place greater emphasis on its enforcement agenda on innovation and resilience, alongside existing priorities such as the digital economy and energy transition, as outlined in its agenda for 2026. The ACM signaled support for expanded powers to better address risks to innovation, including greater scrutiny of dominant firms’ small acquisitions and measures to lower entry barriers for new market players. The report also flags private equity, cloud services, and the attention economy as areas where market power, dependency on non-European providers, and harmful business practices may call for targeted regulatory and competition interventions.

Italy

A. Italian Competition Authority (ICA)

1. ICA fines eDreams €9 million for unfair commercial practices.

On Feb. 4, 2026, the ICA imposed a total fine of EUR 9 million on Vacaciones eDreams S.L., eDreams International Network S.L., and eDreams S.r.l. for engaging in unfair commercial practices in connection with the promotion and management of the “Prime” subscription service.  According to ICA, eDreams used misleading interface design strategies and manipulative techniques (so-called dark patterns) on its website and app to induce consumers to subscribe to Prime, in some cases unknowingly, and to remain subscribed. According to the authority, the companies presented ambiguous and misleading information regarding the characteristics and benefits of the subscription, while exploiting time pressure and artificial scarcity mechanisms to rush consumers’ purchasing decisions.

In particular, ICA noted the deceptive presentation of the actual level of discounts associated with Prime and the lack of transparency regarding price differentiation depending on the customer journey (direct access or via metasearch platforms) and the user’s Prime status. Consumer choice was further compromised by the preselection of the most expensive subscription option (Prime Plus) and by the immediate charging of the annual subscription fee to users ineligible for the free trial, without adequate prior notice.

These practices were found to be misleading and aggressive within the meaning of Articles 20, 21, 22, 23(1)(g), 24, 25, and 26(f) of the Italian Consumer Code and resulted in a €6 million fine. ICA also sanctioned eDreams with an additional €3 million fine for obstructing consumers’ right of withdrawal, both during the free trial period and throughout the subscription term, through retention strategies implemented also via customer service channels.

2. ICA opens investigation into alleged labour market cartel.

On Jan. 26, 2026, the ICA opened proceedings against Akkodis Italy, Coesia, G.D, I.E.M.A., I.M.A., S.I.A., and SPAIQ for a suspected anticompetitive agreement in the labour market for validators of automatic packaging machines.

According to ICA, which for the first time has launched an investigation into a restrictive agreement in the labour market following a whistleblowing report, the companies allegedly coordinated to limit the mobility of specialised validators by agreeing not to hire personnel who had previously worked for one of the other parties. The conduct concerns validators involved in the testing and validation of machines used in the packaging of pharmaceutical, cosmetic, food, tea, coffee, and tobacco products.

The alleged conduct, if confirmed, may constitute a restriction of competition in breach of Article 101 TFEU, with potentially significant implications for competition enforcement in labour markets.

European Union

European Courts

AG Spielmann: national courts must be able to annul unlawful sporting sanctions.

In his opinion on Dec. 18, 2025, in Joined Cases C-424/24 and C-425/24, Advocate General (AG) Spielmann concludes that the principle of effective judicial protection under EU law requires national courts to have the power to annul unlawful disciplinary sanctions imposed by sports federations and, where appropriate, to grant interim relief. The opinion arises from sanctions the Italian Football Federation (FIGC) imposed on former Juventus FC executives, which were upheld within the sporting system but, under Italian law, could not be annulled or suspended by administrative courts; only compensated financially if found unlawful. According to the AG, such a limitation may be incompatible with EU law if national courts constitute the only bodies qualifying as a “court or tribunal” capable of providing judicial review within the meaning of EU law.

While reiterating established case law that disciplinary sanctions in sport may be compatible with EU free movement and competition rules if justified, proportionate, and based on transparent and non-discriminatory criteria, AG Spielmann places particular emphasis on judicial oversight. He stresses that the decisive issue is whether sports tribunals themselves meet the EU-law standards of independence and impartiality required of a “court or tribunal.” If sports bodies do not meet these standards, EU law requires that national courts must be able to fully review, and annul, unlawful sanctions, reinforcing the limits of sporting autonomy in light of effective judicial protection.

1 Due to the terms of GT’s retention by certain of its clients, these summaries may not include developments relating to matters involving those clients.