On June 2, 2025, for the first time, the European Commission sanctioned a “no-poach” agreement between rival companies as an infringement of Article 101 TFEU. The decision was subsequently published on July 25, 2025. The infringement essentially consisted of “bilateral contacts between Delivery Hero and Glovo, amounting to agreements and/or concerted practices in the EEA not to poach each other’s employees, exchanges of commercially sensitive information and the allocation of national markets”1. The total fines imposed on Delivery Hero and Glovo exceeded €329 million—signaling that the Commission is expanding its enforcement lens to include not only customer markets, but also labor markets and governance dynamics.
The importance of this case goes beyond food delivery, with implications for any business operating in the digital economy, particularly those with crossholdings, shared board seats, or strategic cooperation agreements. This decision suggests a turning point in EU enforcement policy and expands the frontiers of antitrust risk in several directions:
- Labor Markets Now Subject to Formal Antitrust Scrutiny: The recognition that no-poach agreements “had as their object the restriction or distortion of competition for talent”2 constituted a restriction “by object” under Article 101 TFEU, means that HR practices may carry the same level of legal exposure as price-fixing or market sharing. This aligns EU policy with trends in the United States.
- Minority Shareholdings Are Also Relevant: The case is also notable for its treatment of minority stakes in competitors. Even without a controlling interest, Delivery Hero’s shareholding in Glovo was found to be a conduit for collusion, which led two independent undertakings to exchange “commercially sensitive information, including through direct contacts at different levels of the undertakings”3. This potentially calls into question assumptions M&A and corporate strategy teams have long held: minority investments may now trigger full cartel liability under EU law, particularly when accompanied by information rights or governance powers.
- Corporate Governance Structures May Create Antitrust Risk: Board seats, veto rights, shareholder agreements, and informal understandings between affiliated competitors may be seen as facilitating collusion and potentially result in anticompetitive practices which, as per the Commission’s decision, shall not “be justified by the need to protect Delivery Hero’s investment in Glovo.”4 Companies should be cautious about internal firewalls, sharing sensitive information, and the presence of dual executives or observers across rival entities.
- Broader Enforcement Agenda Ahead: With this decision, the Commission is signaling a willingness to expand antitrust scrutiny to non-traditional forms of coordination. Businesses in the tech, digital, platform, and franchise ecosystems—often governed by complex ownership and cooperation frameworks—should reassess their compliance strategies accordingly.
- Companies acknowledge their participation in the infringement and waive certain procedural rights;
- In exchange, they receive a 10% reduction in fines; and
- The Commission issues a shorter-form decision, omitting extensive factual and legal reasoning.
- Full immunity from fines if they are the first to come forward; or
- Significant fine reductions if they are second or later to come forward but still provide valuable information.
The Settlement Procedure
This case was resolved through the EU cartel settlement procedure, a streamlined process that enables the Commission to close investigations more efficiently when companies cooperate. Under this mechanism:
This final point is not incidental: some companies choose to settle because the resulting decision is less detailed, making it more difficult for third parties to pursue damages in national courts (so-called private enforcement). The shorter format may discourage follow-on litigation from competitors, customers, or workers the cartel harmed who might otherwise rely on the Commission’s findings to seek compensation under the EU’s 2014 Private Enforcement Directive.
The Commission’s Leniency Policy
Alongside the settlement procedure, leniency also played a role in this investigation. Under the Commission’s Leniency Notice, companies that report the existence of a cartel and cooperate fully may receive:
While the Commission has not confirmed which party triggered the case, both Delivery Hero and Glovo are understood to have cooperated and may have received additional fine reductions under the leniency framework. However, it is worth noting that leniency applications have declined in recent years. One reason is the rise of private enforcement: under the 2014 Directive, claimants may seek damages before national courts using the Commission’s findings. This might create a dilemma for companies: while leniency may reduce or eliminate fines from Brussels, it does not protect against follow-on damage claims in civil litigation. This effect has prompted some to think twice before self-reporting.
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1 See Commission Decision, Case AT. 40795 – Food Delivery Services, para. 16.
2 See Decision para. 72.
3 See para. 79.
4 Ib., ut supra.