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  • The U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) has issued an interim final rule, “Addressing Remote Access to Advanced Semiconductors,” effective Nov. 19, 2026 (the IFR).
  • Pre-existing Export Administration Regulations (EAR) controls focus mainly on restricting the export, re-export, and transfer of advanced semiconductors themselves.
  • They generally have not restricted entities in Country Group D:5 countries (i.e., countries subject to a U.S. arms embargo, including China) from remotely accessing the computing power of those semiconductors when the chips are physically located elsewhere.
  • The IFR seeks to close this gap by imposing controls on certain data centers that provide such remote computing access.
  • The IFR:
    • imposes a new end-use license requirement on exports, re-exports, and in-country transfers of advanced chips to data centers that remotely supply significant volumes of compute to companies headquartered in a Country Group D:5 country or Macau;
    • adds license requirements for advanced semiconductors destined for Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Brazil (and any additional country later designated), with an exclusion for U.S.-headquartered companies that comply with new monthly reporting requirements;
    • narrows the ways front-end fabricators and chip packagers can overcome the presumption that advanced-node logic chips are controlled; and
    • formally rescinds the Biden-era AI Diffusion Rule.

BIS has issued an IFR – scheduled to be formally published (and effective) on Nov. 19, 2026 – amending the EAR to prevent computing power built on U.S. technology and provided through non-U.S. data centers from being used against U.S. national security interests. The 60-day comment period is open until Jan. 18, 2027. The IFR is notable in that it imposes not only (1) additional export and reexport controls on the physical advanced chips themselves but also (2) use and remote access restrictions on the chips once they are physically located outside of the United States.

The measures also impose new and different licensing requirements on chip suppliers, as well as data center operators and service providers.

Background: Pre-Existing EAR Controls and the Remote Access Gap for Advanced Chips

Under pre-existing controls (which will continue in effect, and be expanded by the new measures), a license is already required to export, re-export, or transfer (in-country) advanced SI[1] semiconductors and related hardware and technology (referred to as “advanced SI items”) that are subject to the EAR to entities headquartered in, or whose ultimate parent company is headquartered in, a Country Group D:5 country (i.e., a country subject to a U.S. arms embargo, including China) or Macau. See 15 C.F.R. § 742.6(a)(6). BIS describes this new IFR as a logical extension of those controls, noting that the purpose of the IFR is to keep those D:5 and Macau entities from reaching large volumes of advanced chips remotely, including through connected cloud computing, and using them to train advanced SI models.

BIS ties the rule to specific national security concerns, including the use of advanced compute to (i) speed up development of weapons of mass destruction, (ii) carry out sophisticated cyberattacks on critical infrastructure, and (iii) disrupt global military balances of power. The rule also replaces the AI Diffusion Rule’s worldwide country tier framework with destination-based controls and stronger end-use controls for items under Export Control Classification Numbers (ECCNs) 3A090 and 4A090 and the corresponding .z items. (Notably, the IFR does not change the technical parameters for chips and related items controlled under the relevant ECCNs.)

Key Provisions of the IFR: New End-Use Licensing, Country Requirements, and Rescission of the AI Diffusion Rule

1. New license requirements for exports to Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Brazil.

Under revised § 742.6(a)(6)(iii)(A)(1), a license is now required to export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) advanced semiconductors to or within Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Brazil. The requirement also covers any additional country designated by the Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the Secretary of State or the President’s National Security Advisor. BIS says these identified countries present a higher-than-normal risk of diversion. Applications will be reviewed case-by-case, taking into account the effectiveness of each destination’s export control regime and how well it coordinates with BIS on enforcement.

The BIS license requirement does not apply to ultimate consignees or end users headquartered in, or whose ultimate parent company is headquartered in, the United States. However, in this scenario, the exporter must comply with the reporting requirements in the new § 743.10. Those reports are due monthly to BIS, and each report must include:

  • Information on each party to the transaction and its role, including each parent company headquarters and the ultimate parent of the consignee and end user;
  • The ultimate destination and any end users that are not the ultimate consignee;
  • Each product’s ECCN at the paragraph level, product name and SKU, total processing performance (TPP), and quantity; and
  • The date of each export, reexport, or transfer (in-country).

BIS also stated that it will actively monitor for foreign governments that tolerate evasion of the IFR. Possible consequences include country-specific import restrictions, new license requirements on advanced semiconductor exports, a downgrade of the country’s export control status, and Entity List designations and temporary export prohibitions for foreign persons involved.

Separately, the IFR replaces the former worldwide license requirement with an export license requirement covering only destinations in Country Groups D:1, D:4, and D:5. Destinations listed in Country Groups A:5 or A:6 are excluded from the license requirement, and the United Arab Emirates is subject to its own treatment pursuant to the previously issued final rule providing the UAE with favorable treatment related to certain advanced computing exports.

2. New license requirements for non-U.S. data centers serving D:5- and Macau-headquartered companies (§ 744.24).

The IFR adds a new end-use restriction (to pre-existing end-use restrictions); under the new EAR § 744.24, a license is required to export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) “advanced SI items” if the exporter has “knowledge” that the advanced SI items will be used in a data center, wherever located, that will provide access to more than 12,000,000 “aggregate Total Processing Performance (TPP)”[2] to or for companies headquartered, or with an ultimate parent headquartered, in Macau or a Country Group D:5 destination. That restricted access can be direct or indirect, and the threshold can be reached at a single data center or across “linked data centers.” Key features include:

  • Aggregating the TPP threshold across linked data centers. The threshold counts aggregate capacity across data centers whose networking infrastructure links them to share resources, balance workloads, and replicate data as a unified whole. Digital links count, not just physical ones.
  • Restrictions tied to the end customer location, not data center location. The control reaches a data center that provides remote access to a non-D:5 customer if that customer is training SI models for a D:5 company, helping train them, or supplying SI models to such an entity.
  • Restrictions on subsequent changes in end-use. If a data center begins supplying a significant volume of compute to covered companies after the chips were exported, the owner, operator, or other transferor must obtain a license. A change from a permitted end-use to a prohibited one is treated as a “transfer (in-country).” The prohibition also applies to a party in possession of the advanced SI items even if it was not a party to the original shipment.
  • 90-day grandfathering period for pre-existing services. A data center that was already supplying a significant volume of compute to covered companies before publication and wants to continue must obtain a BIS license within 90 days of the effective date or face future export restrictions.
  • Enhanced due diligence requirements. Non-U.S. data centers must perform comprehensive due diligence to identify the parties, technologies, end uses, and access arrangements involved, in order to identify direct or indirect ownership, control, or other involvement by D:5 or Macau persons, so that corporate restructurings or spinoffs cannot be used to evade the controls.
  • Potential notification of restrictions under the “is informed” process. BIS may notify parties, individually or through an EAR amendment, that a license is required for certain parties or transactions because of an unacceptable risk of diversion to a prohibited end-use.
  • Exclusion for commercial recommender systems. The prohibitions do not apply when compute is provided exclusively for a “commercial recommender system,” such as those used by online retailers and social media companies, if the related reporting requirements are met. The definition is narrow and covers only SI tools designed and used exclusively to rank, filter, or suggest commercial products, services, or content. The term does not cover any system that generates novel text, images, audio, video, software, or other content, even if that system also makes recommendations.

  • 3. Amended presumptions for front-end fabricators and chip packagers.

    The IFR amends Note 1 to ECCN 3A090.a, which sets out the presumptions that front-end fabricators and outsourced semiconductor assembly and test (OSAT) companies face when producing advanced-node logic chips. Integrated circuit designers can no longer overcome the presumption if they are located in, or have an ultimate parent headquartered in, a Country Group D:1, D:4, or D:5 destination or Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, or Brazil. Designers in those locations that are not Approved or Authorized IC designers face a presumption that their chips are 3A090.a for all “applicable advanced logic integrated circuits.” Under new § 744.23(a)(3)(i)(C), front-end fabricators and OSATs need a license to ship applicable advanced-node ICs designed by non-approved, non-authorized IC designers to or within any destination. Fabricators and OSATs may still overcome the presumption in other cases by following the due diligence steps in Note 1.

    4. Formal rescission of the AI Diffusion Rule.

    The IFR formally rescinds the regulations that implemented the “Framework for Artificial Intelligence Diffusion” (90 Fed. Reg. 4544 (Jan. 15, 2025)). BIS notes that the rule was never enforced and that BIS announced its rescission in May 2025. Specifically, the IFR:

    • Removes the worldwide Regional Stability license requirement and the AI Diffusion Rule’s country tiers;
    • Revokes the controls on model weights, removing ECCN 4E091, the AI model weights foreign direct product (FDP) rule, Red Flag 28, and the “model weights” definition;
    • Eliminates License Exception Artificial Intelligence Authorization (AIA) and License Exception Low Processing Performance (LPP); and
    • Removes the Data Center Validated End-User (VEU) Authorization (but retains the EAR’s general VEU Authorization framework). (Companies that previously received, applied for, or structured compliance programs around Data Center VEU treatment should not assume that those approvals or compliance measures automatically satisfy the new framework. Further BIS guidance will likely be needed regarding the treatment of prior approvals, pending requests, and compliance measures under the rescinded Data Center VEU program.)

    BIS is keeping the worldwide scope of the advanced computing FDP rule in § 734.9(h). BIS also confirmed that it retains jurisdiction over a 3A090 IC after the IC is incorporated into a foreign-produced board or server. BIS is also keeping License Exception Advanced Compute Manufacturing (ACM) in § 740.28 to support supply chains for end users outside Macau and Country Group D:5.

    Key Takeaways & Considerations

    In general, the IFR should be viewed as part of a broader shift toward increased government scrutiny of advanced-computing transactions and the use of U.S.-origin technology outside of the United States. Key takeaways and issues to watch for include:

    1. New license requirements for chip exporters and re-exporters. Companies across the GPU (and related components) supply chain should be aware of the new license requirements. The rule will impact pending transactions and data center projects in Southeast Asia and Brazil. It remains to be seen whether BIS will grant licenses under the new requirements and what conditions those licenses will be subject to. While U.S.-headquartered companies operating in these countries are exempt, the U.S. headquarters exclusion depends on timely monthly reports to BIS. Exporters relying on the exclusion will need systems to capture party, parent company, product, TPP, and shipment date data for each transaction.
    2. Licensing Requirements for Cloud and Data Center Operators: Cloud and data center operators are now directly in scope. The remote access control applies to all non-U.S. data centers engaged in covered activities for customers in restricted countries, and continues to apply after the original shipment and installation of the advanced SI items in the non-U.S. data center. Operators outside the United States that use advanced SI items should therefore immediately assess their customer base for D:5 or Macau countries, and against the 12,000,000 aggregate TPP threshold, including capacity across linked facilities. Data centers already serving covered companies must obtain a license within 90 days of the effective date to continue doing so. Any evaluation of the new licensing requirements should include an evaluation of whether any past transactions warrant voluntary self-disclosure.
    3. Implications Beyond Chip Suppliers and Data Center Operators: Given the broad scope of the EAR’s “General Prohibition 10,”[3] the IFR may also affect parties that finance, insure, construct, equip, lease, acquire, or otherwise support advanced-computing infrastructure. In particular, lenders and investors financing data center development or expansion should consider whether transaction documents, diligence procedures, and ongoing covenants adequately address the location and classification of relevant equipment, the identity and ownership of customers and remote users, applicable licensing and reporting requirements, and potential changes in end use. Equipment manufacturers, distributors/resellers, hosting or colocation providers, lessors, insurers, cloud intermediaries, and transaction counterparties may face similar risks when they know or encounter red flags indicating that controlled advanced SI items may be used in a prohibited end use. For foundries and OSATs already familiar with previous controls on ICs and their manufacturing process, it is important to revisit IC designer onboarding and Note 1 due diligence procedures in light of the narrowed pathways.
    4. Know Your Customer Requirements: Customer diligence should look through corporate structures. The control reaches access provided both to and for a D:5 or Macau company, including through intermediaries that train or supply models for such a company. Ownership and control screening of direct customers alone may not be enough. Vigilance and awareness of potential red flags will be an important part of the diligence process for all parties involved in the supply chain or data center projects.
    5. Additional Congressional and Executive Action: Congress may well increase its oversight of export control enforcement, diversion risks, and access to advanced computing capacity, with related legislation being considered in Congress. Following this IFR and potential passage and enactment of export control legislation in Congress, additional agency guidance may follow. Further developments could address, among other issues, the VEU program, implementation and enforcement of remote-access controls, license application guidelines and requirements, and the use of Treasury Department authorities, including sanctions tools, to address conduct that may fall outside or complement controls administered under the EAR.

    Affected parties should consider whether to submit comments to BIS during the 60-day comment period (by Jan. 18, 2027). The IFR leaves open several questions, including the status of the general VEU process and value of compliance programs centered around the Data Center VEU criteria; the level of diligence and inquiries into ultimate ownership expected of parties in the supply chain; and the interplay between this IFR and pending legislation.

     


     

    [1] In line with Executive Order 14434, the IFR uses the term “Super Intelligence” (SI) in lieu of the term “Artificial Intelligence” (AI).

    [2] The IFR defines “aggregate TPP” of a group of integrated circuits (ICs) or commodities (e.g., in a license application or other authorization) as “the sum of the total processing performance (TPP), as defined in the Technical Notes to ECCN 3A090, of all of the ICs or commodities specified in ECCNs 3A001.z; 3A090 (except for 3A090.c); 4A003.z; 4A004.z; 4A005.z; 4A090; 5A002.z; 5A004.z; 5A992.z in the group.”

    [3] General Prohibition Ten prohibits proceeding with a transaction where a party knows that a violation of the EAR has occurred or is about to occur with respect to the items in question.