In March 2026, we published a GT Alert recapping some of the key takeaways from recent case law in England and Wales regarding the ability to set aside judgments obtained by fraud. We concluded that, whilst the underlying principles required to set aside a judgment on the basis of fraud are well-established, the number of cases reaching the Court of Appeal and UK Supreme Court in recent years indicates there is still scope for debate around this doctrine and how it may be applied in the specific circumstances of each case.
This was demonstrated by Estate of Euan McIntyre Lindsay & Anor v. Outlook Finance Ltd & Anor [2026] EWCA Civ 1005, in which the Court of Appeal recently confirmed that a judgment may, under limited circumstances, be set aside against a party that has not itself acted fraudulently, where that party adopted and benefited from the fraudulent case advanced by another.
Background
A family of Scottish dairy farmers (the Lindsays) experienced financial difficulties in or around 2008 and subsequently borrowed money from Outlook Finance Limited (OFL). This financing was secured by a charge over farmland in Scotland and Cumbria. In 2012, OFL appointed Roderick Graham Butcher as Law of Property Act receiver over the farm in Cumbria. Mr. Butcher took possession of the farm and certain assets before causing the farm to be sold to a third party.
Multiple lengthy proceedings followed, and they took place in England and Wales, as well as in Scotland.
The Lindsays first brought proceedings against OFL, Mr. Butcher, and the third-party purchaser, alleging that OFL had no right to appoint a receiver under the terms of the security. The claims against Mr. Butcher and the purchaser were parasitic on the claims against OFL; if OFL was entitled to enforce its security, the claims against Mr. Butcher and the purchaser necessarily failed. The Lindsays were unsuccessful, with a Manchester court preferring the evidence of OFL’s witness (its owner, Mr. Derek Fradgley).
Further proceedings occurred in Scotland, which culminated in a Scottish court holding that OFL’s owner had, in fact, defrauded the Lindsays, including through fabrication of documents and falsification of records. The court held that the loan and the charge over the Cumbrian farm were obtained through fraudulent misrepresentation and the Scottish equivalent of undue influence.
The Lindsays later brought another action in England and Wales against OFL and Mr. Butcher, alleging that the Manchester court’s judgment had been obtained by fraud on the part of OFL’s owner (who was by this point deceased). The Lindsays asserted that the judgment and consequential order should therefore be set aside as against both OFL and Mr. Butcher.
In 2025, the matter came before Kerr J. He took a broad approach, focusing on the integrity of the judgment itself rather than on whether the fraud could be attributed to each party individually. He held that the equitable jurisdiction could extend to setting aside the judgment against Mr. Butcher, even though Mr. Butcher was not implicated in or complicit in the fraud.
Court of Appeal
Mr. Butcher appealed Kerr J’s decision. One question for the Court of Appeal was whether the equitable jurisdiction to set aside a judgment procured by fraud of one person extends to setting aside the judgment as against a non-fraudulent party to the original proceedings. The Court of Appeal (Singh LJ, Arnold LJ and Zacaroli LJ) ultimately dismissed the appeal, but it reached its conclusion based on a narrower reasoning than the first instance judge.
In an unusual development, several authorities were brought to the Court of Appeal’s attention only after it circulated a draft judgment. The Court of Appeal distilled three principles from these authorities:
- In order to set aside a judgment on the basis of fraud, the fraudulent evidence must be that of the party against whom the judgment is to be set aside.
- Fraudulent evidence given by a party’s witness is not enough, unless that evidence is vital to the party’s case and the witness was an integral part of the litigation team.
- In some circumstances it is appropriate to treat the fraud of party A as that of party B — for example, because the two parties adopt a common cause in the proceedings and party B adopts the fraudulent evidence of party A for its own benefit (albeit without knowing it is fraudulent). In these circumstances, the judgment may also be set aside against party B.
The Court of Appeal held that the circumstances of this case fell within the third principle above. The fraud of OFL and its owner led the Manchester court to dismiss the claim against OFL in 2014, and therefore also to dismiss the claim against Mr. Butcher. Mr. Butcher’s position in the Manchester proceedings was parasitic on OFL’s position; he adopted and relied on OFL’s defence and the supporting evidence of OFL’s owner. Although Mr. Butcher was innocent of the fraud and did not have knowledge of it, he benefitted from it. Therefore, the Court of Appeal held that it was appropriate in the circumstances to treat the fraudulent evidence of OFL’s owner as that of Mr. Butcher.
The Court of Appeal also refused permission to appeal on the second ground, which challenged the first instance judge’s rejection of the defence of laches (which requires substantial and unexplained delay by the claimant, together with prejudice or detriment to the defendant).
Key Takeaways
The Court of Appeal decision confirms that a judgment obtained by fraud may, under limited circumstances, be set aside against a party that was not itself fraudulent. However, the focus is not simply whether the judgment was “tainted” by fraud, but whether the non-fraudulent party adopted and relied on the fraudulent case in such a way that the fraud could properly be attributed to it.
This will be fact sensitive. If a party’s defence is parasitic on another’s fraudulent case, and said party obtains the benefit of the fraud, it may be vulnerable to the judgment being set aside, even if it had no knowledge of the dishonesty. Conversely, the Court of Appeal decision does not create a general rule that fraud by one party automatically unravels judgments in favour of all co-parties.
Finally, by way of postscript to its judgment, the Court of Appeal noted that there may be other routes open to a party seeking to re-open issues determined in previous litigation. This militated against applying an overly expansive interpretation of the principles governing the setting aside of judgments obtained by fraud.