A freezing order may be one of the most powerful tools available to a creditor in the courts of England and Wales. In simple terms, a freezing order stops a person from moving, hiding, or spending their assets, up to a set value, so that a judgment can later be enforced against them. A worldwide freezing order (WFO) extends that protection to assets anywhere in the world.
However, a freezing order is only as good as the court’s power over the person it targets. Where that person is outside England and Wales, the claimant usually needs the court’s permission to serve the application on them abroad. Permission may only be given if the claim fits within one of the “gateways” listed in paragraph 3.1 of Practice Direction 6B to the Civil Procedure Rules (PD 6B).
In Gilbert & Anor v Broadoak Private Finance Ltd [2026] EWCA Civ 1172, the Court of Appeal confirmed that none of the three gateways the claimants relied upon permitted service out for a free-standing freezing order application brought to assist the enforcement of a judgment of the courts of England and Wales. A strong case on the merits is not enough if the court has no jurisdiction over the respondent. The decision also highlights the difference between domestic and foreign judgments, as there is a gateway enabling an application for a freezing order intended to assist in the enforcement of a foreign judgment to be served abroad.
Background
The claimants lent money to Broadoak Private Finance Ltd (Broadoak), an English property finance company, but the loans were not repaid. The claimants obtained judgments against Broadoak totaling more than £5.5 million, as well as WFOs against Broadoak and its majority shareholder, Mr Jamie Bleakley. Disclosure orders against Broadoak’s bank and a payments provider showed that Mr Bleakley had taken around £5 million out of Broadoak. Of this, €2.55 million had reached a Spanish bank account in the name of his wife, Mrs Bleakley, and other money may have benefitted a Spanish company he owned.
The claimants then sought a WFO against Mrs Bleakley and the Spanish company. They did not claim that these parties owed them anything. Instead, they relied on the “Chabra” jurisdiction[1], which allows the court to freeze assets held by a third party where there is good reason to believe those assets are available to satisfy a judgment against the debtor, and there is sufficient risk of dissipation.
The WFO was granted without notice in July 2025. At the return date, the court found that there was a real risk that assets would be dissipated and that England and Wales would have been the proper forum if the application fell within a service out gateway. However, the court determined the WFO should be set aside because none of the gateways allowed the application to be served on the respondents in Spain.
The Legal Issue and the Court of Appeal Decision
The question was whether the application could be served abroad through any of the following three gateways, which are found in paragraph 3.1 of PD 6B.
The Enactment Gateway
The Enactment Gateway (PD 6B para. 3.1(20)(a)) applies to a claim “under an enactment which allows proceedings to be brought.” The claimants argued section 37 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 (SCA 1981), which deals with the High Court’s power to grant injunctions, fell within scope.
The Court of Appeal considered arguments on whether the Court’s power to award a freezing order had been given statutory footing, and, if so, if such an application was a claim “under an enactment which allows proceedings to be brought.” Ultimately, it was held that a claim “under” an enactment needs a strong legal link, with the main conditions for the claim to be set out in the statute itself. The gateway targets “claim conferring” statutes, which say who may apply and when. Section 37 SCA 1981, by contrast, is a general provision confirming the court’s power to grant injunctions where “just and convenient.” The requirements for obtaining a particular form of injunctive relief are not to be found in Section 37 SCA 1981, but in case law. Accepting the claimant’s argument would have caused “a major upheaval in the service out regime.”
The Injunction Gateway
The Injunction Gateway (PD 6B para. 3.1(2)) applies to a claim for an injunction ordering the defendant to do or not do something within England and Wales.
In relation to this gateway, the Court of Appeal followed earlier authority from the UK House of Lords.[2] In particular, the Injunction Gateway presupposes a substantive cause of action, applying only to an injunction sought as final, substantive relief for the invasion of a legal or equitable right. It does not permit service out of the jurisdiction for a free-standing interim freezing order.
The Property Gateway
The Property Gateway (PD 6B para. 3.1(11)) applies to a claim whose subject matter relates wholly or principally to property within England and Wales.
In this case, the “property” in the jurisdiction was said to be the English judgment debt, which the claimants argued was wholly or principally the subject of the claim for the WFO. The Court of Appeal considered that it was not arguable that the subject matter of a freezing order application for Chabra relief related wholly or principally to property in England and Wales merely because the order was sought to assist enforcement of a judgment from this jurisdiction. To decide otherwise would have striking consequences more broadly, effectively meaning that the Property Gateway would provide a means of serving all applications for ancillary relief in respect of an English judgment debt out of the jurisdiction.
The Court of Appeal also declined to permit a late argument relying on a combination of gateways (which was in part also raised too late at first instance). The argument put forward engaged gateway PD 6B para 3.1(2), which provides a domestic gateway for a claim for an injunction to prevent an act within the jurisdiction. In turn, the gateway under PD 6B para. 3.1 (4A) would be engaged, allowing service out of the jurisdiction on the basis that the WFO was a claim “which arises out of the same or closely connected facts” as the claim for a domestic freezing injunction. The Court of Appeal determined that it was raised too late and would, in any event, need “the most careful consideration.”
The appeal was dismissed.
A Route to Reform
Foxton LJ gave the lead judgment, and this is the second judgment[3] in which he has stated his view that it is for the Civil Procedure Rule Committee to consider whether there should be a gateway allowing service of proceedings outside the jurisdiction to assist in enforcing an English court judgment. Whilst a gateway exists (PD 6B, paragraph 3.1(5A)) for serving applications for freezing orders supporting foreign judgments, there is no equivalent for judgments from within the jurisdiction of England and Wales. Foxton LJ described this as a “curiosity” and accepted that the result in this case might not seem “entirely attractive, given that the Judge found that all of the conditions for granting freezing order relief in respect of the dissipation of assets which would impair the enforcement of an English judgment are satisfied.”
However, in his judgment, Foxton LJ observed that the claimants had since brought claims under section 423 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (relating to transactions defrauding creditors) and for constructive trust relief, which appeared to provide a route to pursuing their complaints out of the jurisdiction, which may in turn provide a basis for seeking freezing order relief, such that the respondents’ success in this appeal “may yet prove to be pyrrhic.”
Key Takeaways
- The court can only grant a freezing order against someone abroad if it has jurisdiction over them, which generally means the application must be capable of being served out of the jurisdiction. A judge may find every condition for a freezing order satisfied and still set it aside because the application cannot be served abroad.
- None of the gateways considered in this case allow for service out of the jurisdiction for a free-standing freezing order application supporting an English judgment. That includes Chabra applications against third parties based abroad. However, the decision does not necessarily exclude every possible jurisdictional route in a different factual or procedural context, and in fact provides commentary on potential arguments that might be run.
- Where assets have been transferred to third parties abroad, claimants may wish to consider building a freezing order application around a substantive claim. For example, a claim against the foreign third party under section 423 of the Insolvency Act 1986 or for constructive trust relief may assist, although this may not prove to be relevant on the facts of every case.
- For respondents, a jurisdiction challenge may provide an effective defence. However, the protection may be short-lived if a claimant brings a substantive claim that can be served abroad.
- Given the Court of Appeal’s recognition of the tension between the existence of a gateway allowing service of WFOs in support of foreign judgments but not domestic judgments, reform may be on the horizon.
[1] Established in the case of TSB Private Bank International SA v Chabra [1992] 1 WLR 231.
[2] Siskina (Owners of the Cargo) v Distos Cia Naviera SA (“The Siskina”) [1979] AC 210.
[3] See the earlier decision in Commercial Bank of Dubai v Al Sari [2024] EWHC 3304 (Comm) at [274]: “if there is to be a general power to serve proceedings out of the jurisdiction to assist the enforcement of an English judgment debt, that is a matter for the Rules Committee.”