On June 30, 2026, the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) released a Second Report and Order and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (Second Order) related to its submarine cable landing license rules and the associated procedures to assess evolving national security, law enforcement, foreign policy, and trade policy risks.
The Second Order seeks to facilitate faster, more efficient deployment of submarine cables while strengthening national security. It builds upon the FCC’s 2025 Submarine Cable First Report and Order (First Order) by:
- adopting a licensing requirement for Submarine Line Terminal Equipment (SLTE) owners and/or operators, inclusive of routine conditions and reporting requirements;
- implementing additional national security-related routine conditions and certification requirements for submarine cable landing applicants and license holders; and
- expediting submarine cable deployment by presumptively exempting applications that meet 10 national security standards from Commission referral to the executive branch agencies making up the Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation in the United States Telecommunications Services Sector (Team Telecom).
SLTE Licensing Framework
In the Second Order, the FCC finds that the Cable Landing License Act and Executive Order 10530 authorize it to regulate entities that own and/or operate SLTE on a submarine cable connected to the United States. Consistent with that conclusion, the FCC has adopted a blanket licensing regime for current and future SLTE owners and operators that are not otherwise required to be licensed under the Commission’s submarine cable rules.
The blanket license excludes entities that would not be qualified to hold a cable landing license under the Commission’s presumptive disqualifying conditions. These include entities that:
- are owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary, including China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Russia, and the Maduro Regime (foreign adversary-controlled entities);
- entities that are identified on the Covered List (Covered List entities); and/or
- entities whose authorization, license, or other FCC approval was denied, revoked, or terminated on national security and law enforcement grounds (Blocked Licensees).
Moreover, entities with character violations are also disqualified from holding a blanket SLTE license, including those that have:
- materially violated the Cable Landing License Act;
- committed national security-related violations of the Communications Act or the Commission’s rules;
- made materially false statements or engaged in fraudulent conduct concerning national security related to the Cable Landing License Act or before another U.S. government agency; or
- materially failed to comply with the terms of a cable landing license.
SLTE owner and operator blanket licensees must adhere to a subset of the routine conditions that are also applicable to cable landing licensees, including an obligation to comply with FCC rules and regulations; a requirement to file annual circuit capacity reports; and a need to create, implement, and update cybersecurity and physical security risk management plans, among other conditions.
In addition, in situations where submarine cables contain SLTEs: (1) that are owned and/or operated by foreign adversary-controlled entities, Covered List entities, and/or Blocked Licensees; (2) whose owner/operator utilizes equipment or services listed on the Covered List; (3) where the submarine cable system on which the SLTE is deployed lands in a foreign adversary country; or (4) the SLTE is owned in or operated from a foreign adversary country, the applicable SLTE owners and operators must file an SLTE Foreign Adversary Annual Report.
The risk of violating the Commission’s disqualifying conditions or incurring an annual reporting requirement puts a premium on understanding the national security concerns underpinning the Second Order and how those concerns could evolve over time.
New Certifications and Routine Conditions
The FCC adopted certifications and routine conditions for submarine cable landing applicants and licensees that will prohibit the following:
- the use of principal equipment that is produced (including any major stage of the process through which the device is made, including manufacturing, assembly, design, and development) by foreign adversary-controlled entities in a submarine cable system;
- the use of third-party service providers that are foreign adversary-controlled entities, Covered List entities, or entities that can access the submarine cable from a foreign adversary country; and
- licensees, their customers, and further downstream customers from entering into indefeasible rights of use (IRUs) and capacity lease arrangements with Covered List entities, where such arrangement would give such Covered List entity the ability to install, own, or manage SLTE on a submarine cable landing in the United States.
The FCC also adopted certifications and routine conditions that will require licensees to notify the Commission when there are ownership changes involving foreign adversary-controlled entities or changes to the Commission’s Covered List. Licensees must also notify the FCC of changes to the previously disclosed address or geographic coordinates of the submarine cable, if the licensee does not intend to renew the license, and when the cable will be retired.
Presumptive Exemption from Referral to Team Telecom
To promote more efficient processing of FCC submarine cable landing license applications, the FCC has adopted a set of ten national security standards that, if met, will presumptively exempt an applicant from referral to Team Telecom. The national security standards include an entity certifying that:
- It is a licensee that either has a cable landing license that was granted by the FCC after Nov. 27, 2020, and is conditioned on compliance with a mitigation agreement or, starting in 2028, it was (within the previous five years) granted a license either conditioned on compliance with a mitigation agreement or pursuant to the exemption process established by the Second Order, and it has no new 10% or greater interest holders since the most recent review by the Commission;
- No cable system ownership below 5% is held by foreign adversary-controlled entities and the applicant/licensee has not entered into and will not enter into an agreement with foreign adversary-controlled entities to secure financing related to or affecting the submarine cable system or strategic partnerships or mergers that might affect access to and/or the management or operation of the submarine cable system;
- No senior official of the applicant or the applicant’s parent companies is a foreign adversary-controlled person and such officials will not perform duties with respect to the submarine cable system from a foreign adversary country;
- It will prohibit its customers or any further downstream customers from entering into a new or extension of an existing arrangement, such as for IRUs or leases for capacity on the submarine cable, where such arrangement would give a foreign adversary-controlled entity the ability to install, own, or manage SLTE on the submarine cable;
- It will file a report with the FCC and Team Telecom regarding its arrangements, such as for IRUs and/or leases for capacity, within 60 days of commencing service on the submarine cable and thereafter on an annual basis;
- The submarine cable system will not connect directly or via a branching unit with a submarine cable that is owned or operated by a foreign adversary-controlled entity or that lands in a foreign adversary country;
- It will adhere to enhanced cybersecurity and physical security standards;
- It will report specified security incidents to the FCC and to the Committee Members in writing within 72 hours;
- It will implement heightened physical and logical security controls to secure the submarine cable system; and
- It will adhere to an enforcement and compliance requirement for ongoing monitoring following the grant of any license to assess compliance with all applicable routine conditions and the national security standards.
Team Telecom may only object to an application presumptively meeting the ten national security standards in narrow and compelling circumstances where credible and articulable national security, law enforcement, or other concerns specific to the applicant or the cable system exist. The FCC also excludes from referral to Team Telecom certain renewal or extension applications where the Commission referred, and Team Telecom reviewed, an application previously filed by the applicant within three years of the filing of the renewal or extension application.
Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
In the Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the FCC seeks comment on additional routine conditions to improve oversight of cable landing licensees, including SLTE owners and operators. The FCC also notes that it expects to conduct the one-time information collection adopted in the First Order in the near future to gain further insight into the SLTE landscape.
Potential Impacts for Industry Players
The FCC’s new rules may signal a shift toward standardized, rule-based mitigation that may reward ownership stability and clean corporate structures, potentially disadvantaging multi-party systems or entities with relatively small foreign ownership or partnership interests. Moreover, compliance burdens may flow downstream into IRUs, capacity leases, and vendor and colocation agreements, including where such agreements involve SLTE hosted in data centers further inland.
With further changes still under consideration and a one-time information collection regarding the SLTE landscape still to come, market participants should note that this may not be the end of the FCC’s reform effort.