When the UK’s competition agency, the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), was established in 2014 as an independent non-ministerial government department, the UK government’s “steer” was introduced as a non-binding ministerial statement of strategic priorities for the CMA. It was intended to provide a transparent statement of how the government saw the competition regime fitting within its broader economic priorities. The CMA was and is expected to have regard to the steer, but it retains full independence in how it approaches its work.
Achieving economic growth has always been central to the UK government’s mission. This was as true in 2014 as it is now. But there are some important differences between now and then. In 2014, the government’s steer saw the “central task of the CMA […] to ensure that the forces of competition are fully harnessed to support the return to strong and sustained growth.” By contrast, the government’s 2025 steer encourages the CMA “to ensure that businesses receive a ‘best in class’ experience.”
This suggests that the government wants to encourage greater investment into the UK from businesses and investors and expects the CMA to support this mission.
Recent Developments in the CMA’s Policy Framework
Over the last six months, there have been multiple new announcements and initiatives from the CMA relating to its policy framework, which occurred in parallel to the publication for consultation of the government’s draft steer in February 2025. Three announcements stood out – potentially intended to catch the eye of businesses and investors:
(i) the introduction of the “4Ps” (pace, predictability, proportionality, and process), intended to change how the CMA operates, and now regularly referred to by the CMA as a new mantra;
(ii) the introduction of the “mergers charter,” which not only incorporates the 4Ps but also introduces new KPIs for the CMA to meet in relation to its merger review function; and
(iii) the CMA’s mergers remedies review, which may lead to a greater willingness from the CMA to accept both (a) parties’ claims in relation to merger-related benefits and efficiencies; and (b) behavioural remedies to address competition concerns arising from a transaction.
Alongside these initiatives, the government has also floated further legislative reforms to revisit (a) one limb of the UK’s merger control thresholds - the potentially broad “share of supply test”; and (b) the concept of “material influence,” under which the CMA has considerable flexibility to review acquisitions of minority shareholdings even where these do not confer control on the acquirer.
Those following the CMA’s decisional practice may have seen an uptick in merger clearances and the settling of long-standing antitrust investigations[1]. This last tranche of activity might potentially be explained away by the facts of these specific cases. However, the coincidence of all these events, taken together, may also warrant further examination.
What Businesses and Investors Should Know
Enforcement Remains a Priority
Though the CMA’s policy framework is currently in a state of flux (as described above), it remains committed to enforcing competition law. The CMA continues to take its statutory functions seriously and appears committed to delivering against its statutory duties.
Foreign Transactions May Benefit
The CMA may not intervene in international transactions with limited UK connections where it might have done so previously. Moreover, if a transaction is already under review elsewhere, the CMA may consider whether the outcome of those reviews might address concerns arising in the UK and decline additional action. Businesses operating in global markets may welcome this development, as they may see less regulatory duplication and more remedial consistency, an issue that seems to have grown in recent years.
New Ways of Working
Businesses have also been offered what some may perceive as olive branches when it comes to how the CMA works. Here are some highlights.
The steer conveys the message that CMA should be collaborative so that business experience a “predictable, proportionate and transparent regulatory environment.” In this regard, there is evidence to indicate that the CMA has been collaborative. Take for example, its work in relation to the UK’s “green agreements guidance” where the CMA led other UK regulators towards a harmonized position. But business and investors may welcome the steer’s explicit signal on this issue.
The steer also encourages the CMA to be expeditious and to abide by its statutory deadlines. While the CMA has always operated within its statutory timeframes, stakeholders have noted instances when the CMA extended its timetable. These extensions occurred for various reasons, including accommodating parties requesting additional time. The Digital Markets Competition and Consumers Act 2024 introduces new provisions that allow the CMA to impose significant fines on parties who create delays by responding late to information requests without a “reasonable excuse,” a concept now more precisely defined. By seeking to be more expeditious, the CMA may be less flexible for parties seeking more time.
The steer expects the CMA to be proactive and responsive to businesses and seek regular feedback. The government intends to amend the CMA’s framework agreement so that the CMA is required to obtain regular feedback from its stakeholders, including businesses and consumers. How this initiative plays out in practice remains to be seen. Some argue that no regulator should be isolated from those it regulates. But “regulatory capture” may be a risk, especially if the regulator relies on positive feedback from its stakeholders. To mitigate this risk, stakeholders, especially those who interact less frequently with the CMA, should be visible to the CMA so that it continues to interact with a diverse range of stakeholders and takes their views into consideration.
More substantively, the steer invites the CMA to “focus on collaborative approaches to resolving issues with interested parties” and balance the need for transparency with the market impact of public communications regarding its activity. The suggestion appears to be that the CMA should try to avoid litigation and reconsider whether it should name firms under investigation at the start of an inquiry. If this interpretation is correct, such changes may risk weakening the CMA’s hand with respect to deterrence and enforcement. By the same token, it may shelter businesses from negative publicity and the increasing risk from follow-on damages litigation. Settled investigations generally reveal less detailed evidence of an infringement than fully contested investigations, the latter being more valuable for pursuing follow-on damages litigation.
If the developments above are not enough, the steer also focuses the CMA’s future discretionary activities towards (i) the government’s eight priority sectors for growth; (ii) key public services; and (iii) supporting the government’s agenda. Taken literally, this may suggest there will be sectors of the economy less likely to be investigated than before, for example, the groceries sector. But the steer is non-binding. If, for example, the cost-of-living crisis re-emerged, it is highly unlikely the CMA would not pursue an investigation into the groceries sector if it had a reasonable suspicion of anticompetitive practices.
Takeaways
It appears both the UK government and the CMA have listened to businesses and investors. They intend the CMA to be more “user friendly” and seek to change several ways in which the CMA operates to deliver against this goal.
For businesses and investors, the government hopes that the CMA won’t be a “blocker” but an “enabler” and “best in class” at supporting the UK growth agenda.
This suggests that rather than being sidelined, the CMA may remain at the heart of ensuring that markets work well for UK businesses and UK consumers, and it has some very significant powers to help achieve this goal.
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[1] See, for example: CMA clears GBT / CWT corporate travel merger - GOV.UK; UK government bonds: suspected anti-competitive arrangements - GOV.UK; Anti-competitive behaviour relating to freelance labour in the production and broadcasting of sports content - GOV.UK; Anti-competitive conduct in relation to vehicle recycling and advertising of recycling-related features - GOV.UK