FCC Updates to Submarine Cable Landing License Rules: New Requirements, Proposals to Address National Security, Regulatory Compliance

On July 17, 2025, the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (Commission or FCC) released a draft Report and Order (Order) and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (FNPRM) that seeks to streamline and improve the FCC’s submarine cable landing licensing process, preclude foreign adversary access to communications networks landing in the United States, and implement a one-time information collection to inform further rules. The FCC is expected to adopt the Order at its open meeting scheduled for Aug. 7, 2025.

Specifically, the Report and Order will:

• Define “submarine cable system” and clarify when a submarine cable landing license is required, maintaining the 25-year license term.
• Define “foreign adversary,” “foreign adversary country,” and an individual or entity “owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary.”
• Require applicants to certify whether they meet any criteria set out in the presumptive disqualifying conditions, that they have implemented a cybersecurity risk management plan, and that they comply with Covered List
• Establish a process to withhold, revoke, or terminate a license.
• Adopt presumptions precluding certain applicants from obtaining submarine cable licenses, such as those with foreign adversary ties or character disqualifications.
• Prohibit submarine cable landing licensees from entering into Indefeasible Rights of Use (IRUs) or leases for capacity where an entity owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary will install, own, or manage Submarine Line Terminal Equipment (SLTE), unless a waiver is granted.
• Eliminate the Cable Operator Report, and modify requirements for the Capacity Holder Report, including reporting of SLTEs on submarine cables landing in the United States.

The FNPRM seeks comment on:

• Licensing Requirement for SLTE Owners/Operators: The FCC proposes that all SLTE owners or operators must obtain a submarine cable landing license, with a blanket license for most existing entities, except those tied to foreign adversaries or disqualifying factors, and considers whether entities excluded from blanket licensing may submit a standard application or alternative showing to rebut the disqualifying presumption.
• Routine Licensing Conditions: SLTE licensees would be subject to standard conditions, including compliance with FCC rules, circuit capacity reporting, and restrictions on handling U.S. traffic without proper section 214 authorization.
• Annual Reporting for High-Risk Entities: The FCC proposes that SLTE entities connected to foreign adversaries or certain revoked authorizations be required to file annual reports detailing ownership, location, and third-party management.
• Certifications for New Applicants: New license applicants may be required to certify non-use of foreign adversary equipment or services, with a narrow exception for wet segment repairs using approved third parties.
• Streamlined Applications: The FCC proposes exempting low-risk applications from Team Telecom review if they meet specific national security and ownership standards, including cybersecurity and physical security compliance.
• Transition from Covered Equipment: The FCC seeks comment on a phased transition away from covered equipment/services and ways to incentivize trusted U.S. or allied technology use in cable systems.

Report and Order

I.    Foreign Adversary Definition

In the Order, the FCC defines “foreign adversary” to include China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Russia, and Venezuelan politician Nicolás Maduro and his regime. “Foreign adversary country” includes foreign adversaries and countries “owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary,” meaning:

1. Any individual or entity, wherever located, who acts as an agent, representative, or employee, or any person who acts in any other capacity at the order, request, or under the direction or control, of a foreign adversary or of an individual or entity whose activities are directly or indirectly supervised, directed, controlled, financed, or subsidized in whole or in majority part by a foreign adversary;
2. Any individual, wherever located, who is a citizen of a foreign adversary, or a country controlled by a foreign adversary, and is not a United States citizen or permanent resident of the United States;
3. Any entity, including a corporation, partnership, association, or other organization, that has a principal place of business in, or is headquartered in, incorporated in, or otherwise organized under the laws of a foreign adversary or a country controlled by a foreign adversary; or
4. Any entity, including a corporation, partnership, association, or other organization, wherever organized or doing business, that is owned or controlled by a foreign adversary, to include circumstances in which any person identified in paragraphs (1) through (3) of this definition possesses the power, direct or indirect, whether or not exercised, through the ownership of a majority or a dominant minority (10% or greater) of the total outstanding voting interest and/or equity interest, or through a controlling interest, in an entity, board representation, proxy voting, a special share, contractual arrangements, formal or informal arrangements to act in concert, or other means, to determine, direct, or decide important matters affecting an entity.

II.    Foreign Adversary Presumptive Disqualifying Conditions

Based on the above definitions, the FCC will adopt a presumption that entities owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary, entities on the FCC’s Covered List, or entities whose authorizations have been revoked on national security and law enforcement grounds, are not qualified to hold a cable landing license.

The FCC also will adopt a presumption that entities seeking to land a submarine cable in a foreign adversary country, or to modify, renew, or extend a cable landing license to add a new landing location in a foreign adversary country, are similarly unqualified to hold a cable landing license.

Applicants may rebut these presumptions only with clear and convincing evidence that they do not fall within the scope of the adverse presumption. Applications from entities within the scope of these presumptions will generally be denied unless the applicant can demonstrate that there is no national security risk, or that the national security benefits substantially outweigh any risks.

III.    Prohibition of IRUs and Capacity Leases with Foreign Adversaries

The FCC will prohibit cable landing licensees from entering into IRUs or capacity leases that would allow entities owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary to install, own, or manage SLTE on submarine cable systems landing in the United States. The prohibition will apply to new arrangements and any extensions of existing arrangements.

Similar to the foreign adversary presumptive disqualifying conditions, waiver of this prohibition will be granted only if clear and convincing evidence is presented showing that such agreements would serve the public interest and present no national security risks, or that the national security benefits would substantially outweigh the risks.

IV.    Character Presumptive Disqualifying Condition

The FCC presumes an applicant is not qualified for a submarine cable license if it has violated the Cable Landing License Act, committed national security-related violations of the Communications Act or Commission rules, made false statements or engaged in fraudulent conduct concerning national security or the Cable Landing License Act, been adjudicated to have made false statements or engaged in fraudulent conduct before another U.S. government agency, or materially failed to comply with a submarine cable license’s terms.

An applicant may rebut this presumption only with clear and convincing evidence that the applicant has the requisite character, despite its past conduct. However, the FCC makes clear that the criteria set out in this presumptive disqualifying condition are not the only grounds on which the Commission may deny an application due to character concerns; other considerations may include an applicant’s violations of other provisions of the Communications Act, Commission rules, or other laws.

V.    Process to Withhold, Revoke, or Terminate a License

The FCC will adopt an informal written process for revocation or denial of cable landing licenses, which will include notice, an opportunity to cure, and an opportunity to respond. The FCC may commence a revocation proceeding on its own initiative or upon a recommendation by the Executive Branch agencies and makes clear that it will consider initiating revocation proceedings where there are concerns about a licensee’s ability to comply with the Cable Landing License Act or other statutes, the FCC’s submarine cable rules or other regulations, and national security commitments, or to otherwise protect national security interests.

The informal written process is designed to be flexible, and the FCC will delegate authority to the Office of International Affairs (OIA) to determine procedures on a case-by-case basis, including oral hearings if warranted. Through a one-time information collection, the FCC also will require all submarine cable licensees to provide updated information to assist with the Commission’s goal of revoking licenses associated with insolvent cables and licenses held by insolvent licensees.

VI.    Cable Landing License General Requirements

The FCC will codify that a license is required for cables that connect U.S. points and that pass outside U.S. territorial waters, extending 12 nautical miles from the coast. The Commission also will adopt a definition of “submarine cable system” that includes all components up to the SLTE, regardless of whether the SLTE is at a landing station or inland:

A submarine cable system carries bidirectional data and voice telecommunications traffic consisting of one or more submarine cable(s) laid beneath the water, and all associated components that support the submarine cable system end-to-end, including the segments up to the system’s terrestrial termination at one or more SLTEs, which include transponders that convert optical signals to electrical signals and vice vera.

VII.    Submarine Cable Applicant/Licensee Requirements

The FCC clarifies that only entities that control (rather than merely own) a cable landing station must be licensees. In submitting applications, entities must explain how their cable system serves the public interest, including national security and statutory objectives. Applicants will be required to provide detailed technical and geographic information about the cable system, including landing point, power feed equipment (PFE), SLTE, network operations center (NOC), cable landing station, beach manhole, route position, and security operation center (SOC) locations.

Applicants may initially file general geographic descriptions for the specified equipment, but a grant of the application will be conditioned upon final approval of specific location information that must be filed no later than 90 days prior to construction. Specific locations will be treated confidentially but may be shared by the FCC with other federal agencies with a need for the information and where the public interest would be served by such sharing.

Applicants must report use of third-party service providers owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary, that is on the Covered List, or that can access the submarine cable from a foreign adversary country. A “third-party service provider” is an entity that is involved in providing, hosting, analyzing, repairing, and maintaining the equipment of a submarine cable system, including third-party owners and operators of NOCs.

Applicants must certify whether they meet any presumptive disqualifying conditions. All applicants and licensees must certify they have implemented a cybersecurity and physical security risk management plan, addressing logical, physical, and supply chain risks. Applicants must also certify that their cable system will not use equipment or services on the FCC’s Covered List and existing licensees must certify they will not add such equipment or services.

VIII.    New Routine Conditions for Cable Landing Licenses

The FCC will adopt routine conditions that apply to all cable landing licenses:

• Prohibiting IRUs and capacity leases with entities owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary.
• Prohibiting the use of Covered List equipment and services.
• Requiring annual Foreign Adversary Reports for certain licensees.
• Requiring commencement of commercial service within three years of the license grant.
• Requiring notification of licensee or cable system name changes, or changes to a licensee’s contact information, within 30 days.

IX.    Other Changes to Current Requirements

Other rules and requirements that will be adopted in the Order include:

• The FCC will enforce streamlined processing for qualifying applications, unless the Executive Branch agencies provide specific national security justifications for any delay.
• The Commission will require prior approval for adding new landing points or licensees to a license, whereas notifications will suffice for landing point or licensee removals or other minor changes.
• Applicants seeking assignment or transfer of control of their license must specify the percentage voting and ownership interests and demonstrate the change in control is in the public interest.
• Pro forma notifications must include similar information as substantive change of control transactions.
• A specific rule is created for special temporary authority for submarine cables, which details the required information and process.
• The FCC requires reporting of both equity and voting interests of 10% or more in foreign carrier notifications.

X.    Foreign Adversary Annual Report

The FCC will require annual reports from existing licensees that are owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary, that are on the Covered List, that have had a Commission approval revoked on national security or law enforcement grounds (including affiliates and subsidiaries), or that have a submarine cable licensed to land in a foreign adversary country. The filing fee for the Foreign Adversary Annual Report is $1,445.

XI.    Modifying the Capacity Data Collection for National Security and Other Purposes

The FCC will eliminate the Cable Operator Report and collect the same information in the Capacity Holder Report. It will also require cable landing licensees and common carriers to file Capacity Holder Reports for their capacity holdings on domestic submarine cables.

The Commission defines “available capacity” or “current equipped capacity” on a submarine cable as all the capacity (both lit and unlit capacity) based on equipment currently used on the submarine cable. It also defines “planned capacity” as the intended capacity (both lit and unlit capacity) on the submarine cable two years from the reporting date (Dec. 31 of the preceding calendar year) that includes any current plans to upgrade the technology. Further, the FCC defines “design capacity” as the maximum theoretical capacity on the submarine cable, regardless of equipment currently used or current plans to upgrade the technology.

Licensees and common carriers will be required to identify, with respect to each sale, lease, or purchase of a fiber pair and spectrum, the submarine cable, the U.S. and foreign landing points of the fiber pair and spectrum, and the entity that manages the fiber pair and spectrum, if different from the entity that owns it. Cable landing licensees and common carriers must also identify whether they own or control SLTE on the U.S. or foreign ends of each submarine cable landing in the U.S.

XII.    One-Time Information Collection

The FCC will require that licensees provide updated information on currently licensed submarine cables and assess for any insolvent cables or licensees. The Commission will also require all licensees to provide information concerning the SLTE owners and operators on the cable. Finally, licensees will be required to provide information as to whether they currently use any equipment or services identified on the Commission’s Covered List, use a third-party foreign adversary service provider, or use a third-party service provider that can access the submarine cable system from a foreign adversary country. Responses will be required by the filing deadline to be published in the Federal Register. Failure to respond could subject licensees to monetary forfeitures, in addition to enforcement action.

Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

I.    Regulatory Framework for SLTE

The FCC proposes that any entities that own or operate SLTE must apply for a blanket license, except those subject to the foreign adversary or character presumptive disqualifying conditions. The Commission seeks comment on whether to allow entities that are excluded from the grant of a blanket license to file a standard application or alternative showing to demonstrate that they can overcome the adverse presumption set out in the disqualifying condition. The Commission further seeks comment on whether the exclusion of certain SLTE owners and operators from the grant of a blanket license may disturb existing licensees’ operations and interfere with investment-backed reliance interests of such licensees.

The FCC would apply routine conditions to SLTE licensees, including compliance with FCC rules, treaties, reporting requirements, and the filing of annual circuit capacity reports, and a condition that the licensee, or any person or company controlling it, controlled by it or under direct or indirect common control with it, may not handle traffic to or from the United States, its territories or its possessions unless such service is authorized by the Commission pursuant to section 214 of the Communications Act, as amended. The Commission seeks comment on whether it should require notifications for changes in ownership, control, or location of SLTE, and is considering cybersecurity and physical security certifications for SLTE owners and operators.

Further, the FCC proposes that existing SLTE owners and operators that are owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary are on the Covered List, are using equipment on the Covered List, have had an FCC authorization revoked on national security or law enforcement grounds, or, where the submarine cable system the SLTE is located on lands in a foreign adversary country or the SLTE is operated from a foreign adversary country, must file an annual report with information on ownership, location, and third-party management.

II.    New Applicant Certifications and Routine Conditions

The Commission seeks comment on whether submarine cable landing license applicants must certify they will not use equipment produced by entities owned by, controlled by or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary. The FCC also proposes to prohibit cable landing licensees from using any third-party service provider in the operation of the submarine cable that is owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary, on the Covered List, or that can access the submarine cable system from a foreign adversary country. However, an exception is proposed for third-party services involved in repair and maintenance of the wet segment of the cable, while contemplating ways to incentivize use of U.S./non-foreign adversary flagged or crewed repair ships.

The FCC is considering requiring licensees to notify the Commission within 30 days of any change in the location of key cable infrastructure (e.g., landing stations, SLTE, NOCs), and any changes resulting in foreign adversary ownership or control. They would also need to certify to changes to the list of foreign adversary countries within 30 days.

Licensees would also be required to notify the FCC 60 days before license expiration if they do not intend to renew or extend the license, or if the licensee plans to retire the cable system. They would also need to certify to new additions to the Covered List, if using equipment or services on the list, within 60 days.

III.    Presumptively Exempting Applications from Referral to Executive Branch Agencies - Streamlining

The FCC proposes to establish a national security standard to exempt certain submarine cable applications from referral to Executive Branch agencies (e.g., Team Telecom) if they meet certain qualifications. Applicants must be in good standing on an existing submarine cable license, have no past character violations, submit a cybersecurity certification, meet physical security standards, not use logic-bearing hardware or software from foreign adversaries, not be owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary, and have no interconnection with foreign adversary cables, among other requirements.

IV.    Other Considerations

The FCC seeks comment on whether it should require a gradual transition away from the use of covered equipment and services and the appropriate timeframe for such a transition. The FCC is also interested in how it can incentivize use of trusted technology in submarine cables, possibly by prioritizing licenses for cables using U.S. technology or landing in allied countries.

The Commission is also considering streamlined approval for domestic-only cables, possibly through blanket licensing, while still addressing national security concerns. The FCC is open to modifying or streamlining existing license conditions based on prior mitigation agreements to align with any new rules, especially for domestic cables.

The Commission invites comment on the use of artificial intelligence (AI) in SLTE and submarine cables, and specifically requests information on any national security risks if AI is owned or controlled by foreign adversaries. The FCC would also like to understand the impact of any proposed FCC rules on other federal agencies and processes, and whether further coordination or rule changes are needed.

Finally, the FCC questions whether it should incorporate definitions from recent Department of Justice rules (pursuant to Executive Order 14117) regarding “countries of concern,” which align with the FCC’s list of foreign adversaries.

Conclusion

The FCC’s new submarine cable landing license rules aim to balance long-desired changes meant to increase application processing efficiency with national security considerations. If applicants for submarine cable builds landing in the U.S. can overcome the presumptive disqualifying conditions, they should be able to take advantage of a quicker and more uniform process designed to attract increased investment.

Industry players, especially those that own or operate SLTE and may become subject to submarine cable licensing procedures, should read the FNPRM closely to determine whether submitting comments are in their interest.