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Mass. High Court Raises Bar For Trade Secret Injunctions

On Oct. 14, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held in Daikin Applied Americas Inc. v. Russo, that a trade secret plaintiff that shows a likelihood of success on the merits is not entitled to an automatic presumption of irreparable harm when seeking a preliminary injunction. The court held that, even with a strong liability case, the plaintiff must still prove irreparable harm under ordinary equitable principles.

The decision resolves what had been an uncertain question under Massachusetts law. The U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts had applied such a presumption in several decisions, while other federal appellate courts, including the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Seventh and Tenth Circuits, have expressly rejected it. The decision is also among the SJC's first to address the Massachusetts Uniform Trade Secrets Act, which took effect in 2018.

For litigants on both sides of a trade secret dispute, it offers several lessons.

The Court's Decision

The underlying facts of the dispute are familiar in trade secret litigation. The plaintiff company provides and maintains HVAC systems for institutional customers. The two defendants were the company's former employees, a service supervisor and a technician. Both defendants had access to the company's customer data, pricing and project margins.

The company alleged that, beginning in 2024, the defendants sent themselves, at personal email addresses, information including work contacts, bid and pricing data, internal service bulletins, and equipment passwords. In December 2024, while still employed by the company, the defendants formed a competing HVAC business. They left the company in March 2025, and the company filed a lawsuit in May 2025, alleging trade secret misappropriation and making other claims.

The company moved for a preliminary injunction at the outset of the case, asking the trial court to order the defendants to return the allegedly confidential information, refrain from using it and not solicit 75 identified customers.

Before the hearing, the defendants agreed not to use, and to return, any of the company's confidential information, and the Superior Court entered a confirmatory order to that effect. The defendants also offered to negotiate a tailored forensic search of their devices to identify any remaining company information in their possession.

With those stipulations in place, the only remaining preliminary injunctive relief in dispute was the company's request to bar the defendants from soliciting 75 identified customers for one year, including by withdrawing pending bids.

The company argued that its likelihood of success on the trade secret claim entitled it to a presumption of irreparable harm — and alternatively, that it had shown irreparable harm in fact. The motion judge questioned whether the company was likely to succeed, noting genuine disputes over whether the information was confidential and whether the company had taken reasonable measures to protect it. The judge declined to presume irreparable harm and denied the motion because the company did not allege that its losses threatened the very existence of its business.

The SJC transferred the appeal on its own motion and affirmed.

The Presumption of Irreparable Harm

The SJC's holding confirmed that even if the trial court finds the plaintiff likely to succeed on the merits of its misappropriation claim, irreparable harm is not presumed. Chief Justice Kimberly S. Budd, writing for the court, explained that the presumption the company proposed would eliminate the irreparable harm inquiry altogether:

Were we to adopt [the company's] theory, as long as parties seeking a preliminary injunction on a trade secrets claim could demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits, no irreparable harm analysis would be required. That approach is inconsistent with both MUTSA and the long-standing common-law equity principles that the act incorporates by reference.

The court anchored its holding in the statute. The MUTSA provides that actual or threatened misappropriation "may be enjoined upon principles of equity." From that language, the court concluded that "[p]resuming, rather than demonstrating, irreparable harm therefore departs from traditional 'principles of equity.'" It added that a preliminary injunction is "an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right."

The SJC's reasoning follows federal precedent in other intellectual property cases. Twenty years prior to this case, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a similar argument that a patentee was entitled to a presumption of irreparable harm in cases of patent infringement. In that case, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange LLC in 2006, the Supreme Court ruled that argument in favor of traditional principles of equity.

Since then, at least two federal circuit courts have extended the holding of eBay to trade secret misappropriation cases under the federal Defend Trade Secrets Act. The SJC cited those two decisions, the Seventh Circuit's 2021 decision in Life Spine Inc. v. Aegis Spine Inc. and the Tenth Circuit's 2017 decision in First Western Capital Management Co. v. Malamed, to support its holding under the MUTSA.

The SJC also ruled it was unpersuaded by several decisions of the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts that seemed to suggest a presumption of irreparable harm, including its 2024 ruling in DraftKings Inc. v. Hermalyn. The SJC observed that in nearly all of those federal cases, the district court ultimately found irreparable harm in fact, notwithstanding any dicta about a potential presumption of irreparable harm.

In place of a presumption, the SJC ruled that trial courts are to "consider the specific allegations, the type of irreparable harm likely to arise, and the form of injunctive relief most likely to mitigate any such harm." The court reaffirmed that "[g]enerally, economic harm may be remedied by a monetary judgment," and that such harm is irreparable only if it threatens "the very existence of the movant's business."

According to the court's decision, a trade secret plaintiff must make a strong showing of irreparable harm to warrant a preliminary injunction. The plaintiff may not rely on a presumption of such harm, even if its liability case is strong.

Proving Why Damages Will Not Suffice

In this case, the court held that the company's evidence of irreparable harm fell short in two ways.

First, the company argued it would lose HVAC sales and the value of accompanying maintenance service contracts. However, that argument ran directly into the concept of quantifiable losses, which generally does not establish irreparable harm under eBay and related case law.

Even if the precise value of a maintenance contract is unknown in advance, the SJC reasoned, "a robust approximate value can be derived using economic models based on historic information." In a commercial case, lost profits or opportunities from a competitor's solicitation may be viewed the same way.

Second, the company argued that, without an injunction, it would likely lose customer goodwill. The SJC rejected that argument because it relied almost entirely on counsel's arguments at the hearing. The only affidavit addressing goodwill simply said that the 75 customers at issue were ones for which the defendants had access to confidential information or with which the defendants had significant contact. It did not support the proposition that losses would be immeasurable.

Ultimately, the SJC concluded that "nothing supports the proposition that monetary damages would not fully compensate [the company] should it prevail at the end of the litigation."

While the SJC's decision went against the company in this case, it clarifies the circumstances that may support a finding of irreparable harm in Massachusetts.

First, a plaintiff may show an existential threat to its business — for example, that lost sales would be so significant as to threaten its existence. This is a high bar, and in many cases, the facts may not support this conclusion.

Second, a plaintiff may show a specific difficulty in quantifying its damages. If the plaintiff shows damages are difficult or impossible to quantify using historical data and traditional economic damages models, it may qualify for injunctive relief.

Third, a plaintiff may demonstrate harm to its goodwill, which it may do through affidavits tying the harm to the particular customers and relationships at issue and explaining why the loss cannot be measured. While these concepts were discussed by the SJC in this case, they are not necessarily the only ways a plaintiff could demonstrate irreparable harm.

Plaintiffs should consider the fit between the relief requested and the potential irreparable harm. The SJC's decision directs district courts to weigh "the form of injunctive relief most likely to mitigate any such harm." Accordingly, courts may consider whether the requested relief is narrowly tailored to the specific irreparable harm alleged.

The Effect of Targeted Stipulations

The SJC's decision also addresses considerations relevant to trade secret defendants. In this case, the defendants did not concede liability. They denied that most of the information at issue was proprietary. Nevertheless, before the injunction hearing, the defendants agreed they would return — and would not use — the company's allegedly confidential information, and they expressed willingness to negotiate a tailored forensic protocol. The Superior Court entered the stipulation as an order.

That stipulated order altered the posture of the injunction hearing. After the stipulation, what remained was a request to bar solicitation of 75 customers in a case where the defendants had not agreed to postemployment nonsolicitation covenants.

The SJC ruled that the defendants were already "enjoined from using any [of the company's] confidential information," so the core of the misappropriation claim had already been addressed. The court held that the remaining requested relief was extraordinary compared to the strength of the plaintiff's merits case.

The defendants therefore benefited from a prompt agreement not to use, and to return, the information at issue. That stipulation narrowed the dispute, leaving the company to justify the broader relief it sought. However, it failed to do so with the evidence presented.

Conclusion

This decision confirms the high bar for obtaining preliminary injunctive relief in Massachusetts state courts. Such relief remains an extraordinary remedy and is not presumed. In the past, some trade secret plaintiffs relied on Massachusetts authority suggesting that trade secret rights were unique and that a competitor's possession of the plaintiff's confidential information could give rise to a presumption of irreparable harm. With this decision, the possibility for such a presumption is no longer viable.

LINKS

Read "Mass. High Court Raises Bar For Trade Secret Injunctions," authored by Gregory S. Bombard for Law360. (subscription)