On 8 September 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) issued a judgment on the interaction between reputed trademark protection and freedom of expression. In Inter IKEA Systems v. Algemeen Vlaams Belang, the Court held that political opinions and political parody may, where certain conditions are met, constitute a “due cause” for the use of a sign identical or similar to a reputed trademark.
The judgment does not create a broad freedom of expression exception to trademark infringement. Rather, the national court must assess, in light of all circumstances of the case, whether the user’s freedom of expression outweighs the trademark owner’s rights and interests.
Background
The case arose from an immigration-policy campaign launched by the Belgian political party Vlaams Belang in November 2022. The campaign was entitled the “IKEA Plan - Immigratie Kan Echt Anders” (“Immigration Really Can Be Different”). It presented 15 policy proposals on asylum and immigration, described as ready to be “assembled” by the Belgian government.
Vlaams Belang used the IKEA name as an acronym for the campaign slogan and adopted visual elements strongly associated with IKEA, including signs corresponding to IKEA’s marks and illustrations resembling the stick figures used in IKEA assembly instructions.
Inter IKEA, proprietor of reputed Benelux and European Union IKEA trademarks, brought infringement proceedings before the Dutch-language Commercial Court of Brussels. Vrijheidsfonds VZW, which conducted the campaign on behalf of Vlaams Belang and/or its representatives, admitted that the marks had been used without authorization but argued that the use was justified by freedom of expression. The Commercial Court referred questions to the CJEU on how to strike a balance between freedom of expression and the rights conferred by a trademark.
The CJEU’s Decision
The CJEU held that freedom of expression under Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the “Charter”) may, in principle, constitute a “due cause” within the meaning of Article 9(2)(c) of the EU Trade Mark Regulation and Article 10(2)(c) of the Trade Mark Directive for the use of a sign identical or similar to a reputed trademark. In reaching that conclusion, the CJEU emphasised that the trademark proprietor’s right to intellectual property, protected by Article 17(2) of the Charter, is not absolute and must be balanced against the third party’s freedom of expression under Article 11 of the Charter.
The CJEU further held that a party cannot establish due cause merely by invoking political opinions or parody. It must explain the concrete reasons why using the mark is justified in the exercise of freedom of expression and demonstrate that those reasons outweigh the trademark proprietor’s rights and interests.
Relevant circumstances include:
- The user’s purpose and good faith, including whether the use serves to convey an idea or opinions concerning the mark, its proprietor, its business practices, or its goods and services;
- Whether the use contributes to a debate in the general public interest and whether it occurs in a strictly commercial context ; and
- The impact on the trademark proprietor, including the intensity, scope and manner of the use, the reputation of the mark, the degree of similarity between the sign and the mark, and whether the use may create the impression that the trademark proprietor endorses or supports the political message or ideas conveyed.
Practical Relevance
The judgment provides guidance on the role of freedom of expression in the application of the enhanced protection afforded to reputed trademarks. The Court confirms that freedom of expression, including political speech, can justify certain uses of reputed trademarks. At the same time, the decision makes clear that there is no broad “freedom of expression exception” to trademark protection.
For brand owners, the judgment provides a structured framework for challenging unauthorised trademark use in political, activist, artistic, or public-interest contexts. For those seeking to rely on freedom of expression, the ruling makes clear that invoking free speech alone is insufficient. A user must demonstrate that the use serves a genuine expressive purpose and, where relevant, contributes to a debate of public interest. The judgment also indicates that merely leveraging the reputation of a well-known brand to amplify an unrelated message is unlikely to constitute a due cause.
Conclusion
The CJEU’s judgment establishes that freedom of expression, including political opinion and political parody, may in principle constitute “due cause” for the use of a sign identical or similar to a reputed trademark. Whether it does so depends on a case-specific balancing of the third party’s freedom of expression against the trademark proprietor’s rights and interests. The judgment thereby gives fundamental rights a clearer role in the application of the enhanced protection afforded to reputed trademarks, while confirming that a use driven by the objective of taking unfair advantage of, or causing detriment to, a trademark’s distinctive character or repute cannot constitute due cause.