In This Issue1
United States | Mexico | China | Poland | The Netherlands |
European Union | Italy
United States
A. U.S. Litigation
1. In re: Lantus Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litigation, Case No. 1:16-cv-12652 (D. Mass.)
On Oct. 27, 2026, Sanofi-Aventis U.S. and a group of drug wholesalers informed a Massachusetts federal court that they had agreed to resolve antitrust claims alleging that Sanofi improperly listed patents covering components of its Lantus SoloStar insulin pen in the FDA’s Orange Book to delay competing products. The settlement avoids a January trial and follows the court’s decision earlier this year denying cross-motions for summary judgment, in which the court found that although the patents should not have been listed in the Orange Book, a jury should decide whether Sanofi’s listings unlawfully restrained competition.
2. RealPage, v. James, Case No. 1:25-cv-09847 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025)
On Oct. 13, 2026, New York asked a federal court to lift an injunction blocking enforcement of a state law targeting algorithmic rent-pricing software, including tools offered by RealPage. State officials argue that the injunction harms consumers by allowing potentially anticompetitive rental-pricing practices to continue, while RealPage and other challengers contend that the law violates federal law and constitutional protections. The dispute reflects growing antitrust scrutiny of algorithmic pricing in residential rental markets.
B. Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
1. FTC closes Robinson-Patman inquiry after T-shirt manufacturer and distributor amend their agreement.
On Oct. 8, 2026, the FTC announced changes to a partnership agreement between T-shirt manufacturer Gildan Activewear SRL and major wholesale distributor S&S Holdings LLC. The FTC opened the matter after learning that the contract allegedly barred Gildan from offering S&S’s competitors certain pricing and discounts it gave S&S. The agency examined Gildan under Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, which prohibits certain price discrimination by sellers, and S&S under Section 2(f), which prohibits knowingly inducing or receiving unlawful price discrimination. After the parties amended the agreement to provide that “[n]othing in this Agreement restricts or restrains Gildan’s discretion to set prices or offer partnership support to any other North American wholesale distributor,” the FTC closed its investigation.
Bureau of Competition Director Daniel Guarnera warned that the agency “will not hesitate to enforce the law when a large, powerful firm insulates itself from competition by forcing sellers to give worse prices to the firm's competitors.”
2. FTC clears Publicis’s acquisition of LiveRamp, subject to conduct remedies.
On Oct. 19, 2026, the FTC proposed a consent order permitting Publicis Groupe S.A. to complete its approximately $2.2 billion acquisition of LiveRamp Holdings, Inc., subject to conduct remedies. Publicis is the largest of the five major U.S. advertising agencies and, through its Epsilon subsidiary, provides audience data services. LiveRamp is the leading data-connectivity provider in the U.S. media-marketing ecosystem and the only one offering a full spectrum of such services. The FTC alleged that the vertical deal would give Publicis the ability and incentive to foreclose rival media agencies and audience-data providers — by degrading their access to LiveRamp and by exploiting competitively sensitive data of non-Publicis clients serviced by LiveRamp to pressure them to switch — in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act and Section 5 of the FTC Act.
Rather than block the deal, the Commission required five years of behavioral commitments: Publicis and LiveRamp must provide neutral, nondiscriminatory access to LiveRamp’s standalone products and services on fair and reasonable terms; maintain firewalls preventing Publicis from accessing LiveRamp customer data; and submit to an independent auditor (every six months for the first two years, then annually for three years). The order also bars retaliation against customers who raise compliance concerns, lets customers request audits of their own data protections, and provides third-party mediation of unresolved disputes. Public comments on the proposed consent agreement are due Nov. 18, 2026.
3. FTC sends price-transparency warning letters to hospitals and health systems.
On Oct. 5, 2026, Chairman Andrew N. Ferguson sent letters to 24 of the nation’s largest healthcare services companies, warning that failing to give patients timely, accurate, and complete pricing information may be considered an unfair or deceptive practice under Section 5 of the FTC Act. The letters stress that compliance with the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services’ price-transparency rules is only a baseline and not a safe harbor from FTC Act liability. Because price is a material term, the FTC warned, omitting it or disclosing it incompletely — such as by leaving out physician or facility fees or covering only part of a course of care — may mislead patients who reasonably believe they have been quoted the full cost, and may be unfair where it causes substantial, unavoidable consumer injury. The initiative builds on Chairman Ferguson’s Healthcare Task Force and a recent enforcement action against online contact-lens seller Lens.com.
4. FTC and DOJ expand their focus on competition in agricultural inputs and equipment.
Two developments in early October may reflect a coordinated federal approach to agricultural competition involving both antitrust agencies and the U.S. Department of Agriculture. On Oct. 6, 2026, U.S. Attorney General Todd Blanche and Secretary of Agriculture Brooke L. Rollins announced a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), signed Oct. 5, 2026, under which the DOJ Antitrust Division and USDA will expand cooperation on competition for agricultural inputs, including feed, fertilizer, fuel, seed, equipment, and pesticides. The MOU amends and restates a September 2025 working-level agreement and reflects the DOJ’s stated intent to investigate conduct affecting farmers, who are directed to report concerns through the Antitrust Division’s Citizen Complaint Center and the DOJ-USDA Agricultural Markets Enforcement Partnership.
The next day, Oct. 7, 2026, the FTC and USDA opened a joint public inquiry through a request for information, into market practices affecting the manufacture and distribution of agricultural equipment, including potential anticompetitive conduct. Following the FTC’s recent settlements addressing pesticide markets and equipment-repair restrictions, the inquiry invites farmers, independent repair providers, and current and former manufacturer and dealer employees to comment by Dec. 7, 2026, on business models, contract terms, and alleged restrictions or retaliation.
C. Department of Justice (DOJ) Civil Antitrust Division
1. DOJ closes investigation of Arrive’s proposed acquisition of Passport Labs.
On Oct. 8, 2026, the DOJ Antitrust Division announced that it had closed its investigation of Arrive AS’s proposed acquisition of Passport Labs Inc. Both companies are providers of mobile parking payment solutions (MPPs) that municipalities use to let residents pay for parking by phone. After Arrive announced the deal on March 4, 2026, the Division issued Second Requests and then entered a timing agreement prioritizing production of MPP-competition evidence. Following a five-month review of documents, data, and interviews with industry participants and municipalities, the Division concluded that a substantial lessening of competition was unlikely: smaller vendors beyond Arrive, Passport, and PayByPhone have recently won municipal contracts, and Passport itself had declined to bid for or lost some notable contracts, indicating that viable alternatives would remain. Associate Attorney General Stanley E. Woodward Jr. credited the Division's “phased approach to merger review,” which conserves “the Department's finite resources.” For more on the Division’s approach to HSR Second Requests, see our July 2026 GT Alert, DOJ Antitrust Division Institutionalizes Quick Escalation to Front Office in HSR Second Request Process.
2. DOJ outlines its tech-sector and merger-enforcement approach at the 2026 Antitrust Tech Summit.
On Oct. 15, 2026, DOJ Antitrust Division Deputy Assistant Attorney General Stephanie A. Greco spoke at the 2026 Antitrust Tech Summit in San Francisco, in remarks titled “Will We See You in Court? Antitrust Enforcement in the Trump Administration.” Greco identified technology competition as a Division priority and tied the Division’s enforcement efforts to the administration’s broader affordability agenda, naming health care, housing, food, and higher education as areas of focus. She tied the Division’s work to the administration’s broader affordability agenda, naming healthcare, housing, food, and higher education as areas of focus. On merger review, Greco said the Division has no bias against dealmaking and views mergers as more often procompetitive than not but will act where a transaction is likely to raise prices or degrade quality. She defended negotiated settlements and consent decrees as delivering faster, more certain relief, and encouraged parties to raise potential remedies early rather than at the end of a Second Request.
Mexico
National Antitrust Commission (CNA)
1. CNA launches investigation into possible monopolistic practices in the acceptance of grocery vouchers and electronic payment methods.
On June 11, 2026, acting on a complaint, the Investigative Authority of the National Antimonopoly Commission (CNA) opened an investigation (case file DE-014-2026) into possible relative monopolistic practices in the nationwide market for the acceptance of grocery vouchers and electronic payment methods at retail establishments as well as in related services. The investigation seeks to determine whether any practices unduly hinder competition among providers of grocery vouchers and electronic payment methods. Grocery vouchers — a benefit typically provided through cards or electronic wallets — are used to buy food and everyday products, and the CNA noted that retailers’ acceptance terms may limit families’ options for using them.
Under Mexico’s Federal Economic Competition Law (LFCE), relative monopolistic practices occur when an economic agent with substantial market power uses that power to improperly exclude rivals, prevent their market participation, or confer exclusive advantages. The CNA has not yet defined the relevant market, identified specific conduct, or named any economic agents that may be called to respond.
The investigation will last 30 to 120 business days from the opening order and may be extended up to three times. During that period, the directorate general for market investigations may request information and documents, conduct verification visits (subject to a prior order), summon individuals to testify, and gather other evidence.
2. CNA sanctions absolute monopolistic practices in public tenders for information technology.
On Oct. 27, 2026, the CNA found that nine suppliers of computer, telecommunications, and printing equipment engaged in absolute monopolistic practices (bid rigging) in federal procurement of information and communications technology (ICT) goods and services. According to the CAN, from 2012 to 2022, the suppliers coordinated bidding positions and prices and allocated contracts among themselves while presenting their bids as independent.
The affected tenders— for computer equipment, servers, managed printing, telecommunications, and cybersecurity tools — spanned health and social security institutions, state-owned enterprises, and central and decentralized government agencies. According to the CNA, the collusion caused agencies to pay more than 40% above competitive prices.
Absolute monopolistic practices are the most serious infringement under the LFCE, and, following recent amendments, fines may reach up to 15% of the involved economic agents’ aggregate revenues. The CNA also ordered notice to the affected procuring institutions and the Secretariat for Anti-Corruption and Good Government, which may lead to proceedings under the Law on Acquisitions, Leases, and Services of the Public Sector and the General Law on Administrative Responsibilities and, ultimately, to disqualification from federal tenders. The affected agencies may also seek restitution and compensation in court. The sanctioned companies’ sole judicial remedy is an indirect amparo before the Specialized District Courts for Economic Competition, Broadcasting, and Telecommunications in Mexico City, and the fines may not be stayed except as provided by law.
China
1. SAMR imposes record penalty on Ctrip for alleged abuse of dominant position in the online travel agency sector.
On July 25, 2026, following a six-month investigation prompted by hotel operators’ complaints throughout 2025, China’s State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) imposed a record RMB 5.179 billion (approximately US $720 million) penalty on Trip.com Group Limited (Ctrip) for abusing its dominant position in violation of China’s Anti-Monopoly Law (AML). The penalty comprises RMB 1.658 billion in disgorged illegal gains and a RMB 3.521 billion fine equal to 7.5% of Ctrip’s 2025 domestic revenue — the highest rate SAMR has imposed on any domestic business. SAMR also ordered Ctrip to refund RMB 122 million in reserve deposits forcibly deducted from hotel operators. The case is reportedly the first antitrust enforcement action in the online travel agency sector.
SAMR defined the relevant market as online hotel booking platform services in China, distinguishing it from offline booking, hotels’ own direct-booking channels, and aggregation services that redirect consumers to other platforms without providing post-sale support. It reasoned that suppliers in those markets cannot readily replicate a platform’s substantial investments in hotel inventory, IT infrastructure, customer service, and consumer data. SAMR found Ctrip dominant based on its market share exceeding 50% by both gross merchandise value and revenue in each year from 2020 to 2025; its control over pricing, traffic allocation, and hotel inventory; its financial and technical strength; and its high user stickiness. SAMR also cited high market concentration (an average Herfindahl-Hirschman Index above 4,000 and an average three-firm concentration ratio near 95%), substantial entry barriers, and Ctrip’s advantages in the adjacent transport-ticketing and tour-services markets.
SAMR found that Ctrip engaged in two forms of abuse from 2020 through 2025. First, Ctrip allegedly required select premier-brand hotels to distribute their entire room inventory through Ctrip. After removing explicit exclusivity language from its agreements, Ctrip allegedly maintained de facto exclusivity by offering those hotels priority algorithmic placement and other marketing incentives, monitoring their listings on competing platforms, and penalizing noncompliant hotels by requiring withdrawal from those platforms, downgrading their status, limiting their traffic, and reducing incentives. SAMR rejected Ctrip’s argument that hotels participated voluntarily, citing the large number of hotels penalized, and found that conditioning marketing incentives on exclusivity was itself an abuse.
Second, according to the SAMR, Ctrip imposed unreasonable trading conditions — treated under the AML as analogous to tying — by requiring other hotels to offer it the lowest price across platforms. “Golden-brand” hotels had to price rooms on Ctrip at least 5% (or RMB 20) below their prices on competing platforms, and non-brand hotels could not price higher on Ctrip than elsewhere. Ctrip allegedly enforced these terms by automatically lowering hotels’ Ctrip prices whenever it detected lower prices elsewhere and by penalizing noncompliant hotels through ranking downgrades, traffic restrictions, and deposit forfeitures. The automatic adjustments generated the RMB 1.658 billion in additional commissions that SAMR confiscated. SAMR concluded that Ctrip’s conduct harmed consumers by limiting choice, potentially raising prices on competing platforms, and degrading service from hotels whose margins had been squeezed, and the decision reflects SAMR’s focus on restoring competition in highly concentrated markets and curbing so-called “involution-style” competition.
Poland
President of the Polish Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (UOKiK)
1. UOKiK fines bid rigging in electricity grid infrastructure tenders.
On Sept. 28, 2026, UOKiK fined EnergoTech, Przedsiębiorstwo Techniczno-Usługowe Elektra, Przedsiębiorstwo Handlowo-Usługowe Kurpiewski, ZPUE, Ekto, Elmo and Przedsiębiorstwo Wielobranżowe Farad a total of approx. PLN 13.5 million (approx. $3.4 million) for alleged bid rigging in tenders for the reconstruction of electricity grid infrastructure and the construction of radio-controlled switching points.
UOKiK found that the companies had coordinated their bids and conduct in electronic auctions, affecting the outcome of 11 tenders organized by PGE Dystrybucja, Poland’s largest electricity distribution system operator. According to UOKiK, the companies agreed which bidder would win particular tenders, including by refraining from lowering prices or competing for subsequent contracts in exchange for being allocated another contract.
The decision is not yet final and may be appealed.
2. UOKiK fines Nasz Prąd for using unfair contractual terms.
On Oct. 7, 2026, UOKiK fined Nasz Prąd, a provider of heating, photovoltaic and thermal modernization solutions, PLN 21.475 million (approx. $5.4 million) for allegedly using unfair terms in standard-form consumer contracts. These included unilateral changes to heat pump capacity and prices, high contractual penalties related to commencing thermal modernization works, equipment dismantling costs, and liability for the suitability of roofs for photovoltaic installations. The decision is not yet final and may be appealed.
UOKiK is also investigating other potentially misleading practices by Nasz Prąd concerning the presentation of its offer, the investment financing rules, consumers’ withdrawal rights, and the identity and purpose of its representatives’ visits. No charges have been brought to date. UOKiK has also notified the prosecutor’s office of suspected contracting irregularities by the company.
3. UOKiK brings charges against CANAL+ Polska for allegedly misleading consumers about sports package expiration dates.
On Oct. 14, 2026, UOKiK announced charges against CANAL+ Polska for allegedly misleading consumers about the duration of their access to the “Mistrzowska Piłka” sports package.
UOKiK found that consumers were not always informed that access to the package would end in June 2024, before the start of the new Champions League season, which could be streamed only through other paid packages. In some cases, consumers were told that the package would remain available throughout the term of their contracts. Offer summary marketing materials also indicated later expiration dates, which conflicted with the specific dates set out in the detailed contractual terms. If the allegations are confirmed, CANAL+ Polska may face a fine of up to 10% of its annual turnover.
UOKiK is also investigating changes introduced by CANAL+ Polska to consumers’ access to Spanish LaLiga matches. No charges have been brought to date.
The Netherlands
A. Dutch Competition Authority (ACM)
1. ACM calls for greater transparency on computer-controlled pricing.
On Sept. 28, 2026, the ACM published the results of a market investigation into computer-controlled consumer prices, which included an examination of pricing practices in the Dutch airline ticket market.
The investigation examined how pricing algorithms adjust prices based on factors such as supply and demand and competitors’ prices. The ACM found that computer-controlled pricing can generate efficiencies and lower prices for some consumers, but may also reduce transparency, increase the time and effort required to find the best price, and undermine consumer confidence.
As AI and data make personalized pricing more widespread, the ACM is calling for greater transparency about the factors influencing prices and for a broader debate on the responsible use of pricing algorithms. It has launched a public consultation on the findings and recommendations in its draft report. The consultation closed on Nov. 9, 2026, and the ACM expects to publish its final report by the end of 2026.
B. Dutch Courts
1. Dutch Administrative High Court (CBb) upholds ACM fines in egg cartel case.
On Sept. 15, 2026, the CBb upheld fines imposed by the ACM on Global, Wulro and Interovo, egg-product manufacturers, for allegedly coordinating purchase prices, allocating suppliers, and exchanging competitively sensitive information. The court found that the ACM had correctly established that these practices were capable of restricting competition, given the manufacturers’ strong position on the market for the purchase of eggs.
The court rejected the manufacturers’ arguments that deficiencies in the ACM’s investigation had infringed their rights of defense. Most of the fines were upheld, although the fine imposed on Wulro was further reduced because it had been fined twice for the same conduct. The judgment is final.
European Union
European Commission (EC)
1. The EC adopts first Guidelines on the application of Article 102 TFEU.
On Sept. 3, 2026, the EC adopted its first Guidelines on the application of Article 102 TFEU to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings. The Guidelines explain the principles the EC will apply when assessing conduct by dominant companies that may exclude competitors from the market, drawing on EU case law and the EC’s enforcement experience. The Guidelines are intended to increase legal certainty for businesses and promote consistent enforcement of Article 102 TFEU by the EC, national competition authorities, and national courts. The Guidelines follow a process launched in 2023, including public consultation on the draft Guidelines published in August 2024, and the EC’s withdrawal of its 2009 Guidance on enforcement priorities concerning exclusionary conduct.
2. The EC raises concerns over MMG’s proposed acquisition of Anglo American’s Brazilian nickel business.
On Sept. 16, 2026, the EC sent a Statement of Objections to MMG regarding its proposed acquisition of Anglo American’s Brazilian nickel business.
The statement forms part of the EC’s Phase II investigation and sets out its preliminary concern that the transaction may restrict competition in the supply of low-carbon ferronickel, an input used in stainless-steel production. In particular, the EC is concerned that MMG could divert supplies from the target’s Brazilian operations away from European customers to affiliated stainless-steel producers, potentially reducing the availability of low-carbon ferronickel in the EEA.
The statement represents the EC’s preliminary assessment and does not prejudge the outcome of the investigation. The EC’s provisional deadline for a final decision is Nov. 30, 2026.
3. EC study examines the impact of mergers on innovation and markups.
On Sept. 4, 2026, the EC’s directorate-general for competition published a study examining the impact of mergers on innovation and markups. The study analyzed more than 3,000 mergers that were reviewed and cleared, with or without conditions, by the EC between 1990 and 2024. It found that, on average, these mergers were associated with lower innovation among both merging firms and their competitors, measured by citation-weighted patent output, as well as higher markups and accounting profits. According to the study, these findings are more consistent with increased market power than with merger-induced efficiencies. The study provides further evidence relevant to the EC’s ongoing review of the EU Merger Guidelines.
Italy
Italian Competition Authority (ICA)
1. ICA publishes A2A commitments in electric-vehicle charging abuse investigation.
On Oct. 20, 2026, the ICA published commitments proposed by A2A S.p.A., A2A Energia S.p.A., and A2A E-Mobility S.r.l. in an investigation into a potential margin squeeze in public electric-vehicle charging services. The investigation, opened in December 2025, concerns the A2A Group’s provision of publicly accessible charging-point operator services to competing mobility service providers.
The proposed commitments include changes to discounts and to the methodology for setting base roaming prices for charging up to 99 kW, a new discount tier for low volumes, and appointing an independent monitoring trustee.
Third parties may submit observations until Nov. 20, 2026. The parties may respond and make ancillary amendments until Dec. 21, 2026. The ICA expects to complete its assessment by Jan. 20, 2027, subject to any mandatory opinions.
2. ICA issues guidelines aimed at ensuring lawful and reliable online reviews.
On Oct. 13, 2026, the ICA adopted final guidelines on online reviews for products and services offered by restaurants and tourism businesses operating in Italy. The guidelines aim to verify that reviews are reliable and come from consumers who actually purchased or used the relevant product or service, in line with Italy’s 2026 Annual Law for Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises.
Businesses should consider clearly explaining how reviews are published, managed, ranked, and moderated, including the criteria used to label them as “verified” or “authentic.” Platforms hosting third-party reviews should consider adopting reasonable and proportionate measures and procedures to verify and address unlawful reviews. The guidelines also address review manipulation and outdated reviews. They are expected to be reviewed within one year, or earlier if relevant legislative, judicial or enforcement developments occur.
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1 Due to the terms of GT’s retention by certain of its clients, these summaries may not include developments relating to matters involving those clients.