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Midterm Elections Reshape the State AG Landscape: Potential Implications for Antitrust Enforcement

The 2026 midterm elections will not slow state antitrust enforcement. They will change who leads it, what those leaders target, and how states coordinate. Companies may see continued — and in some respects, more varied — scrutiny from both Democratic and Republican state attorneys general (AGs).

The Results

Voters in 30 states elected AGs in the Nov. 3, 2026, election. Based on unofficial results available as of the date of this GT Alert, Democrats flipped five offices (Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, Ohio, and Texas), while Republicans flipped none. Democrats retained every seat they were defending, including incumbents in Arizona, Minnesota, and Wisconsin, as well as open seats in Colorado, Michigan, Nevada, and Rhode Island. That would give Democrats a 29-22 advantage in AG offices, compared with a 24-27 deficit before the election.

Two sitting Democratic AGs, Phil Weiser in Colorado and Aaron Ford in Nevada, were elected governor of their respective states. Democrats also flipped several governorships, including Texas, which may affect state legislative agendas on competition and consumer protection.

Some counts are not yet final.

Texas: New Leadership, Same Capacity

Texas Democratic State Senator Nathan Johnson defeated Republican Mayes Middleton to succeed Ken Paxton, who left the office to run (unsuccessfully) for the U.S. Senate. Johnson will be the first Democratic Texas AG since 1999. Under Paxton, Texas built one of the most active state antitrust practices in the country; its enforcement has recently included a joint investigation with the U.S. Department of Justice into meatpacker pricing and a new inquiry into law-school accreditation practices.

While the transition will take time and Johnson has not announced specific antitrust priorities, stakeholders may see the following under the new AG’s administration:

  • Continuity in core enforcement. The antitrust division, its career staff, and its relationships with outside plaintiffs’ counsel remain in place for now, and pending antitrust investigations may not be dropped simply because of the change in party.
  • A shift in emphasis. Johnson campaigned on price gouging, consumer scams, predatory lending, health insurance market reform, and emerging technology risks. In Texas, pricing, affordability, and consumer-facing conduct may take on greater prominence, and politically driven cultural-issue theories may recede.
  • Closer alignment with other states. Texas has often acted alone or with Republican-led coalitions. A Democratic Texas AG may be more likely to join the multistate efforts led by Democratic AGs.
  • Transition uncertainty. Leadership changes in January may delay new filings, settlement decisions, and CID responses on current matters.

Other States: Coalitions Grow, but Republican AGs Remain Active

Over the past year, state AGs have increasingly acted independently of federal enforcers. They have challenged mergers the DOJ cleared; continued litigating after federal co-plaintiffs settled; and pursued conduct cases involving algorithmic pricing, pharmacy benefit managers, and no-poach agreements. The election results mean that this trend may continue, rather than reverse.

The election map matters beyond Texas. Democrats flipped Georgia, Iowa (where Republican incumbent Brenna Bird lost), Kansas (where Republican incumbent Kris Kobach lost), and Ohio, the last by well under one point on unofficial returns. At least 11 AG offices will have new leadership in January 2027, so companies may see a transition period in which new AGs set priorities, bring in new staff, and review pending matters.

  • Larger Democratic-led coalitions. With more Democratic AGs, multistate investigations and merger challenges might be staffed and funded more easily. Algorithmic and personalized pricing, healthcare, labor-market restraints, and large technology transactions may be likely focal points.
  • Newly elected AGs in Georgia, Iowa, Kansas and Ohio. New AGs often use high-profile competition and consumer protection matters to define their offices. Accordingly, the incoming class of AGs may complete early outreach to industry. This may also result in an uptick in investigations in 2027.
  • Republican AGs are not retreating. Republican-led states continue to pursue competition cases of their own, including in agriculture, healthcare, energy, and technology. Some such states may increase activity to distinguish themselves from their Democratic counterparts.
  • State legislation. Premerger notification statutes, pricing-algorithm restrictions, and expanded state antitrust authority may see more traction where Democrats gained governorships or legislative strength.

States are also increasingly willing to act without, or even against, federal enforcers. After the DOJ settled with an entertainment company and its subsidiary, a bipartisan coalition of more than 30 AGs continued the monopolization case. In March 2026, eight AGs (California, New York, Colorado, Illinois, Oregon, North Carolina, Connecticut, and Virginia) sued under Section 7 of the Clayton Act to challenge a television merger after the federal review. On Oct. 29, 2026, the DOJ said it had referred several local mergers to state AGs, including asphalt matters resolved by New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, and noted that it welcomes state leadership where effects are largely intrastate. State AGs may take on a larger share of regional merger review as a result.

The below priorities may feature prominently once the new and returning AGs have been sworn in:

  • Algorithmic and surveillance pricing. State AGs have been central to litigation involving algorithmic rental-pricing software. In June 2026, a bipartisan coalition of nine AGs announced a settlement with a real estate investment company, and in October 2026, a court in North Carolina denied the software provider’s attempt to dismiss that state’s case. Stakeholders may see continued scrutiny of shared pricing software, competitor data-sharing, and personalized pricing, with a more active role for the newly elected Democratic AGs.
  • Mergers, including after federal clearance. States have become more willing to challenge or seek different relief on transactions that federal agencies cleared or settled. Deal teams may wish to plan for state review of both national and regional transactions.
  • Healthcare and pharmaceuticals. Large multistate coalitions have pursued generic-drug price-fixing claims, and 42 states and territories sued a large pharmaceutical company in February 2026. Healthcare transactions also face state-specific notice and review requirements.
  • Labor markets. Antitrust cases involving no-poach and wage-fixing agreements have produced state settlements and remain a priority for AGs focused on worker compensation.
  • Consumer-facing pricing practices. So-called “junk fees,” drip pricing, retail pricing accuracy, and negative-option marketing are common targets. They sit at the boundary of antitrust and consumer protection, and many AG offices handle both.

State legislatures are also adding AG authority. Washington and Colorado now require parties to certain Hart-Scott-Rodino (HSR)-reportable transactions with a local nexus to send a copy of their HSR filing to the state AG. Those laws do not impose a waiting period, but they carry penalties of up to $10,000 per day for noncompliance. Colorado amended its law in 2026 to require filing the copy within one business day of the federal filing. Other states, including California and New York, have advanced similar bills. The Uniform Law Commission also finalized an updated model act in April 2026. With more Democratic AGs and a stronger Democratic position in several states, more states may take up premerger notification, pricing-algorithm restrictions, and expanded AG investigative authority in the 2027 legislative sessions.

Importantly, much of this enforcement is bipartisan. Many pricing, healthcare, and labor-market cases draw support from both sides. Clients should not assume that operating in a Republican-led state means lower antitrust risk, or that a change in party at the top of an AG’s office will end an existing investigation.

The Federal Backdrop

Early reports indicate Democrats will control Congress, which may lead to greater oversight of the DOJ and the Federal Trade Commission. Democratic control may also mean settlements and clearances are questioned. State AGs may continue to fill perceived gaps in federal enforcement, particularly where federal agencies have settled or declined to act. Federal clearance should not be treated as a reliable indicator that a transaction or practice will draw no state scrutiny.

Stakeholder Considerations

Against the evolving state enforcement landscape, stakeholders may wish to consider the following as new and returning AGs set priorities for 2027:

  • Build state AG engagement into deal strategy. Assess state-level exposure and timing early, even for transactions that are likely to clear federally.
  • Review pricing practices and algorithm use. Pricing, algorithm, and data-sharing practices, along with consumer disclosures, may draw attention from both parties’ AGs.
  • Refresh state-by-state risk maps. Stakeholders should consider updating their maps to account for the new AGs in Texas, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, and Ohio; for the new Democratic AGs in Colorado, Michigan, Nevada, and Rhode Island; and for any state in which they operate with pending inquiries.
  • Manage open matters through the transition. Maintain continuity with career staff in Texas and other changing offices and prepare for potential shifting priorities and timelines.
  • Preserve documents. Confirm that holds and compliance programs cover state-level inquiries and multistate requests.